BRITISH SUBMARINES

Wairarapa Times-Age, 1 March 1943, Page 4

BRITISH SUBMARINES

TRIUMPHANT SUCCESS IN MEDITERRANEAN HEAVY OFFENSIVE AGAINST AXIS SHIPS. VITAL SUPPLIES DESTROYED. Emphasis on the menace of U-boats has partly obscured one of the finest stories of the war —the story of how British submarines, in face of far greater odds, have achieved incomparably more important results than Üboats, writes a special correspondent of “The Press.” The difference, in fact, is simply that between success and failure. The key to Hitler’s strategy of world conquest was the creation of a Euro-pean-African bloc by the conquest, after Europe, of Africa. A significant passage in a German broadcast said, “The Axis concentrates its forces in the Mediterranean, because, as always, it is the key to decision.” The Mediterranean hinge between the two continents is the 75-mile Sicilian Narrows, which (after Wavell had proved that the Italian army alone was unable to conquer Egypt) was covered by 500 to 700 German aeroplanes based on Sicily. These excluded British surface patrols from the Sicilian moat, thus lowering the drawbridge from the “fortress of Europe” to Africa for German reinforcements to pass in overwhelming strength by the only gap in Britain’s 5000-mile surface blockade from North Cape to the' Suez Canal. Across ' the path of these reinforcements lay only a few British submarines to turn the British “bomb alley” into the German “death run.” They alone at that moment stood between Hitler and the world. INSUPERABLE ODDS. The British submarines faced apparently insuperable odds, owing principally to the shortness of the Axis routes: from Cape Littino (Crete) to Tobruk the distance is only 175 sea miles; from Cape Passero (Sicily) to Tripoli, 240 miles; from Cape Passero to Benghazi, 360 miles. This meant that Axis ships capable of travelling at the rate of seven and a half to 15 knots could cover 33 to 70 per cent, 50 per cent, and 33 per cent of these routes by night (from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.):. It meant also that British submarines were left only three and a half to seven hours (on the first route), eight to 16 hours (on the second), and 16 to 32 hours (on the third) to locate and attack their target in daylight. There was no time for stalking; hence infallible timing of interception was indispensable. A third result was that submarines were unable to surface within torpedo range owing to the 100 per cent Axis bomber protection on all routes. Finally, the Axis risked the minimum number of targets. In 1941 the eight Axis divisions in Africa required a minimum of 4000 tons of supplies daily in one 2500-ton ship a day, or 360 ships per annum, which is exactly what Mussolini is estimated to have risked out of some 900 ships available in 1941-42. Yet against unprecedented odds the small fleet of British submarines in the Mediterranean sank 216 ships (30 per cent of the total used in two years) and heavily damaged an additional 61 (8 per cent). This left Rommel’s army a mere 60 per cent of its scheduled strength for the final decision in the battle of Egypt on October 23, 1942. Six weeks before the battle our submarines opened the heaviest offensive yet. This resulted in not one tanker reaching Rommel at the crucial moment —a 100 per cent tanker blockade. ROMMEL STARVED FOR PETROL. The result of this drive was that the Luftwaffe was so short of petrol that it was unable to launch more than a single attack against British troops in the first four days of fighting; then it abandoned, in perfect condition, a large proportion of the 513 aeroplanes captured from El Alamem to El Agheila, and similarly, at Castel Benito, the airfields south of Tripoli. Such was the success of the attack inside Mussolini’s “quadrilateral of fire” ! (on which the immediate control of the Mediterranean nearest Africa mainly depended) which British submarines maintained alone for two years until British destroyers re-en-tered the narrows, in January, 1941. British people can take pride in comparing this magnificent achievement with the exactly similar attempt by the U-boats to cut the British life line to Africa and to prevent the Sth Army closing the encirclement of Europe by defeating the Afrika Korps. Every factor overwhelmingly favoured the U-boats-—length of route, time, bomber escort, and numbers. The length of the British route, Liverpool to Aden (via the Cape) equals 12,000 miles (50 times the voyage from Naples to Benghazi). The U-boats had four months for the attack on British ships, compared with our submarines’ aver-age-four hours. The Axis submarines faced the British bomber escort over a maximum of 50 per cent of the voyage, compared with the Axis escort of 100 per cent. While British submarines in all areas on September 3, 1939, totalled 69, the U-boats available numbered 300 to 400. Yet, although they had all these advantages, the failure of the U-boats was so complete that 50,000 British troops rounded the Cape every month from January to June,' 1942, won the battle of Egypt, and are now completing the encirclement of Europe. This is the sum of the U-boat failure and the splendid success of the British submarines. I