PACIFIC STRATEGY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 October 1942, Page 4

PACIFIC STRATEGY

AND AMERICAN COMMANDS SOME CHANGES SEEN & ANTICIPATED I ' MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICY LIKELY. WITH GREATER CO-ORDINATION. (By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright) (Received This Day, 12.40 p.m.)' NEW YORK, October 27. “Until last weekend American policy in the entire Pacific area was dominated by a “beat Hitler first” attitude and an endeavour to maintain a defensive position on the Australia-New Zealand front, but Admiral Halsey’s appointment suggests a new turn of high policy, putting greater emphasis upon aggressive operation in the SouthWest Pacific,” says the “Christian Science Monitor’s” Washington correspondent. He adds: “The situation, down under has been shaping up to a change in policy and a change in personnel. It is unfortunate that much criticism of the operations in that area preceded Admiral Ghormley’s removal. He did what he was supposed to do. He kept aloof from General MacArthur and opened a campaign with a limited objective in the Solomons, but limited objectives in the Pacific obviously will give Japan what she wants most an ample opportunity to consolidate her territorial gains. The rigid demarcation line between General MacArthur’S and Admiral Ghormley’s commands has been an embarrassment to everyone. Dissatisfaction with the progress in the Solomons has become so great that Washington opinion has Veered some-what-away from the strong anti-Mac-Arthur bias’. Political Washington was largely responsible for the establishment of two separate commands in the Pacific, partly because of jealousy of General MacArthur’s popularity and partly because the Conservative opposition launched a “MacArthur for P/J--sident” campaign. Now the means taken to cut down General MacArthur have backfired. The Navy, which insisted on independence from General MacArthur has subjected itself to heavy criticism, while General MacArthur sat quietly at the sidelines, doing what was possible to lend the Solomons air support, but unable to lend other support, because he was never’ given the necessary, shipping. It is even asked in Washington whether it was not a mistake to move on the Solomons instead of first cleaning up New Guinea. The importance of the issue serves to highlight the lack of a unified command in the Pacific. General MacArthur came to Australia with the promise that he would be the supreme commander of the entire AustraliaNew Zealand area, but finally this was whittled down to Australia. A separate naval command in New Zealand was established over the protest of the New Zealand Government, which always has planned its defence in close harmony with Australia. Admiral Halsey may have among his instructions an order to open negotiations toward the eventual establishment of formal “diplomatic relations” with General MacArthur.” ' . ..