NAZI STATE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 January 1942, Page 4

NAZI STATE

GERMAN ARMY ALOOF TREND OF RELATIONSHIP. HITLER’S DIRECT COMMAND. The decision of Hitler to take over direct operational command of the German Army marks a new stage in the complicated history of the relationship between the army and the Nazi State, writes the military correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald.” The change is so striking that it can only be taken to reflect irreconcilable differences of opinion between the professional and the political soldiers in the Reich.

Far from being a mere change of title, Hitler’s decision raises questions which, if they could be specifically answered, would throw more light on the trend of German policy than, any other series of events.

From the very outset of the Nazi regime the army and the State kept their relations in a state of precarious but undefined balance.

For nearly four years after the massacre of June 30, 1934, the party and the army pursued complementary policies. The army accepted the regime which made possible expansion and rearmament on a scale unknown since the last war, but it very jealously guarded its own organisation. It remained, as ever, a closed caste, and it prevented any marked infiltration of party leaders or any automatic absorption of the Nazi Wehrverbande reserves.

By February 4, 1938, the consolidation of the Nazi regime had proceeded ( so far that Hitler was able to issue two revolutionary decrees, bringing about drastic changes within the army. Creating for himself a new post, he became Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and abolished the position of War Minister. The previous War Minister, Marshal von Blomberg, was retired, and his functions were handed to General Keitel, a relatively obscure major-general, who had, when in charge of the personal section of the War Ministry, shown himself extremely complacent in accepting Nazi ideology. Henceforth he was to be Chief of the Supreme Command, working directly under Hitler. General Brauchitsch, commander of the 4th Army Group, became actual Commander-in-Chief of the army, replacing von Fritsch, who had led the reactionary soldiers in opposing Nazi foreign policy, and the infiltration of Nazi “weltanschauliche” doctrines into military training. Brauchitsch was unpopular in the army, because of what were regarded as “unmilitary” interests in economics and foreign affairs, and because of his pliable attitude towards the Nazi politicians. The retirement of seven other army generals and six air force generals completed “the February purge,” the purpose of which became clear when next month Austria was invaded. ARMY RIVALRIES.

The difficulties did not end at this stage, however, because Keitel and Bi’auchitsch were “political soldiers” rather than inspired field commanders and a tug-of-war began between Hitler and his “Ministry generals” on the one hand, and the indispensable operational generals on the other. Keitel swaggeringly led the troops into Austria and the Sudentenland, but nobody believed that he could direct a major war. However unacceptable the fact may have been to Hitler, this would be the job of “the three Junkers,” or “the unholy trinity”—Generals Karl von Rundstedt, Fedor von Bock, and Ritter von Leeb. Although all more than 60 years of age, these were the backbone of the Reichswehr. Unlike the generals dispossessed in the February purge, these men would follow the commands of Hitler in any war, providing that German power would increase, and providing that actual operational command remained in their hands. They had been in charge of the three key group commands at Berlin, Cassel, and Dresden since 1935, and all three were army men pure and simple. Rundstedt and Leeb retired in October, 1938, when von Bock was replaced by von Halder as Chief of the General Staff, but they were soon recalled to their posts. While not concealing their fanatical belief that the Reichswehr would pursue its own way, irrespective of all political changes, these three faithfully played the old war game. In Poland, Rundstedt led the southern armies and Bock the northern; while, in France, Rundstedt organised the Sedan breakthrough and controlled the central army group, with Bock on the north and Leeb on the south. Later still, in Russia, Leeb, Bock, and Rundstedt commanded the northern, central, and southern fronts respectively. They were the fields generals par excel- , lence.

MILITARY REALISTS. All three are the aristocratic highpriests of a military faith. They live [only for the aggrandisement of the German Army, and they would sacrifice everything, the Nazi Party or anything else, if the preservation of that army as a fighting force was threatened. The present crisis may well-have arisen because they though that Hitler, however correct he may have been in invading Russia, was jeopardising the army by insisting on unduly costly tactics on the Eastern Front, in order to' save his own political face. They are military realists, aloof from and despising politics. They make no secret of their attitude to Brauchitsch, and they keep “yes-men” like Reichenau and politically flexible soldiers

like List and Falkenhorst in relatively subordinate positions. For them, the Army, not the party, is Germany. They fight for the Fatherland, not the Fuehrer. To men of this inflexible type, the actual field command of the armies by Hitler cannot be welcomed in any circumstances. There have been many reports that the Fuehrer has been increasing his personal interference in purely operational matters, as well as in the more legitimate field of grand strategy. It is believed that ,wherever alternative strategies were available; he has always insisted upon the more audacious plan. He is thus credited with the planning of the Norwegian and Balkan campaigns, and the adoption of the M-1940 Plan, which reduced France, is said to have been due to his insistence. More latterly, he has repeatedly stated in public that he had planned the Russian campaign personally. Perhaps this explains his desperate efforts at rehabilitation, regardless of hard military facts. RISE'OFJODL.

In this policy, Hitler has turned from Halder, the Chief of the General Staff (who was reported killed before Moscow) to an almost unknown artilleryman, General Alfred Jodi, who has become the Fuehrer’s personal military adviser and the head of his own military staff. From the time his advice was taken on France, Jodi has forced his way up, against Brauchitsch and the “Ministry Generals” on the one hand, and “the field fighters” on the other. It is noticeable that Jodi has accompanied Hitler wherever he went on the Russian battlefront, and, in spite of the Fuehrer’s growing isolation and aloofness, Jodi has had personal access to him, where field-marshals and senior generals have found him unapproachable. This burly, dour figure is now the most powerful soldier in Germany, and the assumption of personal command by Hitler can only mean an increase in his power. One report says that he has already become Chief of the General Staff.