SHORT OF WAR

Wairarapa Times-Age, 9 July 1941, Page 6

SHORT OF WAR

WHY THE UNITED STATES HALTS

ROOSEVELT & HIS ADVISERS.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES

Behind the scones the deep struggle between the President’s advisers to get his sear for their methods of defeating the Axis goes on unabated, writes the Washington correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald.” This remains true, in spite of the belief that Mr Roosevelt's momentous announcement of American policy in his latest “fireside chat” may .profoundly change the shape of tilings in the world.

Certainly, the contest between the men upon whom he depends for counsel, to get his acceptance of their concepts, schemes, or plans for securing that outcome of the war which is the devout wish of all of them, lias not yet been resolved. While there can be no gainsaying the fact that all those whom the chief executive calls to the White House to consult want Hitler defeated, and are convinced that only through American action can that defeat bo expeditiously assured, many of them are poles apart as to how, when, and on what terms that action should be forthcoming. This is the story behind the story of the development of the American viewpoint in a great historical crisis. FIVE CATEGORIES. The counsel which President Roosevelt has been receiving falls into five rough categories: (1) Immediate declaration of war on Germany. (2) Ono hundred per cent allowance of all defence production to Great Britain, accompanied by 100 per cent' devotion of American shipping, naval, and air strength to assure delivery to the battlefront—involving “shooting.” perhaps, but not of necessity full participation in the war. (3) Continuation of aid to Great Britain on the present basis, that is, a “fair" share of America's production of military and naval material, with a similarly “fair” provision for delivery to the battle line: this to be increased in proportion to the rate of increase of production. (4) Token fulfilment of the LeaseLcnd Act. but actually more or loss complete concern with arming the United States as quickly and as fully as possible to be ready tn meet Hitler, as meet him she must sooner or later, since Great Britain cannot be expected to hold the front line indefinitejy. (5) A progression of steps, each a unit in itself, designed to render Great Britain effective assistance, in dealing with this or that pressing problem of the war, the steps to be cumulative and designed continuously to intensify American action and American opinion as to the war, with little care, if any, lest these steps should mean direct involvement in hostilities. NAVY IS READY. Of course, it must be realised that these categories overlap, and it is certain that in some instances the same advisers ofier more than one category of advice. The element of timing makes this inevitable, as will become clear from an enumeration of the mon who advise the President, and an identification of each with the kind of advice he is reported to be offering Mr Roosevelt. Ranking officers in the navy are among those who give the first category of advice. These think the navy is excellently ready for action, and if thrown into the contest now on the side of Britain, would be a decisive factor in stopping Axis victories. Senators Pepper and Glass, high in Democratic Party councils, are also leaders in the movement for an immediate demand by the President for a declaration of war by Congress. It is known that the President rejects this advice —indeed, it is known that those called to the White House who express that opinion are not again asked for advice save on technical matters. The President feels that he cannot advise the country to go to war at this time, because of his preelection promise to keep it out of the war; because the people are not yet ready for active combatancy; and because a war declaration at this time could not achieve passage by Congress.

It is interesting to note that Army heads, like General Marshall. Chief of Staff, are known to feel that the nation’s land forces are as yet insufficient in number, training and equipment for war. He, however, is said to hold that America’s participation in the conflict is inevitable.

Mr Harry Hopkins, known to be the President’s closest confidant, is believed to offer Mr Roosevelt the advice of the second and fifth categories. These categories, naturally, supplement each other; one is expression of policy and the other an exploration of the means to carry this policy out. Colonel Knox (Secretary of the Navy) and Mr Stimson (Secretary of War) are of the same opinion as Mr Hopkins. However, Mr Hopkins and Colonel Knox differ about means. It is believed that Mi* Hopkins advised, and President Roosevelt found the advice acceptable, that more naval units should be granted the British. Colonel Knox opposed this. He contended, supported by his technical heads,' that it would be far better for the American Navy to find itself in active combatancy in carrying out a mission for the British, rather than to divide the American Navy up. His insistence that existing navy units must be kept under American command ultimately won out. With the exception of minor modification —transfer of some torpedo-boats and coastguard cutters —the President has finally accepted Colonel Knox’s counsel on this head. STEP BY STEP. The President himself is his own best advocate of the advice of category five, involving progression by a series of steps, and his latest address points clearly in that direction. His two most reecnt steps —(a) declaration of an unlimited national emergency, with the bolstering and maintenance of a sense of ever-increased concern and effort by the American people in the war and its victorious conclusion, and (b) reaffirmation of freedom of the seas (the right of American vessels to move wherever permitted by international law) —are designed to make possible increased aid to Britain. Category three and category four of the President’s advisors include the same men for the most part. Principal among these is said to be Admiral Land, head of the Maritime Commission, whose recent unauthorised an-

nouncement of figures, never acknowledged to be official, to show that German sinking of British shipping is not seriously affecting delivery of American war supplies to Great Britain, produced an indirect repudiation by the President’s secretary, Mr Stephen Early, it is Admiral Land who is also said to have advised the President ■/ against acceding to a British request for a temporary retardation in the building of America’s “two ocean" navy, in order to turn over ways thus freed to the building of more pressingly needed merchant vessels. MR ROOSEVELT’S CHOICE. Mr Roosevelt’s disclosure of his anxiety over the rate of German destruction of shipping—three times the present Anglo-American building rate —indicates that he is unlikely to accept' Admiral Land’s advice. It appears clear also that the President firmly believes the United States cannot wait to fight Hitler until Britain turns over the front line to her. The best method is to bolster Great Britain so that she need never relinquish the front line. It is said that the President has ask--ed all those about him in whom he ha< confidence to keep their minds at work on the problems of category five of advice, the category to which he is now almost irrevocably pledged. He would like ever-newer and more imaginatively conceived devices, each in itself a definite step forward in his plan for greater assistance to Britain and greater interest and devotion by the people of the United States to the cause for which the war is being fought.