Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 1938. AN EXTENDING CONFLICT.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 25 August 1938, Page 6

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 1938. AN EXTENDING CONFLICT.

JT is quite possible that the Japanese, if they draw freely enough upon their resources, may drive the offensive they have just resumed in the Yangtse Valley to the point of capturing the Wu-han cities —Hankow- and Hanyang on the north of the Yangtse and Wuchang on the south. During the past year of warfare, it has been demonstrated more or less conclusively that the Japanese can always advance along a given line of communication in China, at a price. On the other hand, they are for practical purposes almost as far from reaching a position of decisive advantage in China as they were when they opened their attack on Shanghai. At an enormous cost in lives and material, the Japanese ostensibly have occupied an enormous additional area of Chinese territory. Their earlier seizures of Korea and Manchukuo are dwarfed by the regions from which during the past year they have compelled Chinese armies to retreat. If the, invaders succeed now in mastering Hankow and its neighbouring cities the dimensions of their area of occupation will become .more than ever impressive. Presumably, however, none would be happier than the Japanese to see this area of occupation reduced to comparatively modest proportions, provided they were left undisturbed to control and deal with it in accordance with their own ideas. Taking account of the recent precedent of Manchukuo, it cannot be doubted that the essential aims of the Japanese when they attacked Shanghai were to amputate a fairly substantial section of Northern China, crush the organised resistance of Chinese armies, and then proceed to exploit a conquest of practicable dimensions. Instead of being able to capitalise in this way the results of a measured military effort, the Japanese find >: themselves engaged in ever-extending conflict with an enemy whose , spirit of . resistance appears to be in no way weakened by successive defeats. Moreover, the victory ~ won in the so-called occupied areas is far from conclusive. Over a great part of the extensive territories in question, the Japanese really hold only the ground they occupy or effectively patrol. Save where they are effectively guarded, their vast and extending lines of communication are everywhere exposed to attack by organised and active guerilla forces. A large part of the enormous area Japan claims to have conquered must be regarded as a liability rather than an asset. Save in the event of some great collapse of the Chinese morale, of which at present there is no sign, there is no reason to suppose that the capture of Hankow, or other considerable extensions of conquest, will alter what is vital in the existing state of affairs, or take Japan any nearer to the decisive victory to which she aspires. China has vast resources not yet called upon. Should Hankow and its adjacent cities share the fate of Shanghai and Nanking, there are still powerful forces holding strong defences and well supplied with military material in Canton and other parts of Southern China. In addition, preparations have been made by the Chinese Government for a retreat, in ease of necessity, to the western province of Szeehewan. A number of governmental bodies, including the Supreme Court of China, were transferred some time ago to Chungking, the capital of Szeehewan, which lies 550 miles west of Hankow, beyond the gorges of the Yangtse. Detailing these facts and others, a special correspondent in China, Mr E. A. Mowrer, wrote not long ago:— What is more important, numerous industries with tons and tons of machinery were, even before the fall of Shanghai, uprooted from their vulnerable sites near the coast and started on their long trek into the sunset, to be re-established somewhere in .the remote .province of Szeehewan. Nothing remained but for the Chinese Central Administration to follow, if and when it should prove necessary. For at Chungking the Chinese could find almost absolute security behind which to direct the resistance all over China, and not least in the regions theoretically “occupied” by the Japanese invaders. At the most immediate view, substantial grounds appear for believing that the Japanese have as poor prospects of being able to set limits to their necessarily exhausting task of invasion in China as of carrying that task to a satisfactory and advantageous conclusion.. It does not put their ultimate prospects in a happier light to take account of other factors in their total situation, notably the'explosive possibilities of their contact with the Soviet forces on the borders of Manchukuo and Siberia.