THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1913. DOMINIONS AND NAVY.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXV, Issue 10713, 15 April 1913, Page 4

THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1913. DOMINIONS AND NAVY.

The presence of the batth>cruiser "New Zealand" in our own waters will arouse a, good deal of speculation concerning the policy that has induced the overseas dominions to take an active interest in the naval defence of the Empire. A writer in the March number of the "JRotmd Table" discusses the question at considerable length, and with an apparent close acquaintance with British home and foreign policy. To tlie Canadian or Australian who thinks that there is no necessity for Great Britain to have any foreign policy, or who condemns a policy which commits her to entangling alliances, the writer puts the very pertinent question, What would be your frame of mind supposing Vancouver Island were iccupied by sixty million of Japanese with an army of two millions of men and the second most powerful navy in the world, ov if China and Japan were as near your shores as Germany and Fiance to Great Britain? His own opinion is that even with the help of our allies our position is none too stable, and_ he concludes the section as follows : 'Notwithstanding the entente and the Japanese Alliance, we need not disguise from ourselves that Great Britain is to-day in a far less favourable position than she was fifteen years ago. In the first place, her relative strength is far smaller. . . . Whereas in 1895 the British fleet was one-half the combined fleets of the rest of the world, to-day it is equal to not .much more than one-third. In the second place, necessity has compelled Great Britain to throw the weight of her strength" more .definitely into the European balance. . . . . Lastly, the strength of Great Britain outside Europe has seriously declined. She cannot afford to make difficulties which m«y involve a display of force, because the British Fleet is of necessity tied to the Nortk S»a."

In the nest section the writer turns to the problem he has set himself to state: What part should tihe Dominions play m tho defence of the Empire and in the determination of policy ■* The main point which he makes and to which he returns .over and over again is that Defence is the correlative of Policy, and that from the nature of tilings there can only be which is to remain a single international unit. Semi-independent local navies may be compatible with the unity of an Empire, but, local foreign policies arc emphatically not. Here, then, is the problem: "If it :s admitted that in the long run there must, be one foreign policy only, then tho only alternative to undivided control .by the British Government is common control by all the self-governing parts of the Empire. Moreover, a. single foreign policy for which all parts of the Empire are responsible, means the equal acceptance by all its citizens of responsibility for its results. . . . Though the perception of this truth may still be dim, the choice before Canada and all the other Dominions is not that between responsilnlity and irresponsibility, but between responsibility without the Empire, as an independent nation, and responsibility within the Empire shared jointly with the other nations comprising it." To drive home this point, the writer takes the various Dominions in succession, and show s how impossible it is for tlhem to provide even for their own defence, far less contribute to Imperial defence, until they know and have taken into account the policy' of the whole of the rest of the Empire, and how inevitable, therefore, it is thai they should come to demand and be entrusted with a real share in the < ontrol of that policy. "There is an inherent instability in the present situation, and for two reasons In the first place, each Dominion will find that it cannot properly detennim: its measures for defence, whether naval or military, without ;i clear knowledge of and some control over the policy which these measure,:, are intended to safe-guard ard support. And, in the second phice. there is no instance vet and there h hardly likely to be in the future of an Anglo-Saxon community which has arrived at national self-conscious-ness -being confccmt to allow .the control of its destinies to rest whollv and permanently in other hands."

Ajs' tho next step, but oniy as a step in the solution of this difficulty, the writer advocates the acceptance by the Dominions of the invitation given them by Mr H<arcourt' s despatch of December last to send representatives to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and goes on to give an interesting account of the functions and position of that body, and of the way in which the proposed changes in its composition would work out. Particular emphasis is laid on the wrongness of (supposing that the presence of a single representative on a purely advisory body will be of no value to the Dominions.

"That view is, in our opinion, wholly mistaken. The influence of Canada or Australia will not be measured ,by their representation on the- Committee of Imperial Defence, but by the value which the British Government attaches to the concurrence of those two Dominions in ite policy. About that there is no doubt. Indeed, so great is that value that the British Government sometimes almost suffers from! too much fear of giving offence. It is certain that only the very gravest reasons would induce the British Cabinet Ministers on the Committee to disregard the opinions of the Dominion Governments as expressed through their representatives."

At the same time, the writer fully realises that the Committee will only be a makeshift —for it ■will still be only "an advisory body representing five Governments, but binding none of them," and he prophesies that further constitutional changes will inevitably be found necessary in the not-far distant future. After putting in a plea. for*the setting up of local naval colleges and the holding of a conference in the near future, the writer concludes •■ ing summary of the position :

"Neither the local navy nor the temporary Canadian plan represents a final development. Each has the defects of its qualities, and in the final outcome the qualities of both must he combined. The local navy in the present conditions of Imperial organisation sacrifices unity of control; on the other hand a centralised navy in the North Sea and tlie Mediterranean will do northing to nourish the growth of naval sentiment in the Dominions. Unity of control is all-important; ,but so is the sustained interest of each community in its own fire The task of the future is to harmonise the two."