MESOPOTAMIA.
MORE DIRTY LINEN. INQUIRY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT. Received June 23, 12.45 a.m. London, June £7. The report of the Mesopotamia]! commission constitutes another historic wa* document. It has been issued in Blue Book form and consists of 18S pages. It deals comprehensively with the operations through the various stages of the advance on Bagdad, and the incidental happenings, and examines lengthily the questions which had given rise to publie criticism. The main reports embodying the findings, conclusions and recommendations was signed by all the commissioners except Commander Wedgwood, M.P., who presented a dissentient report. The commissioners find the expedition was justifiable as a military enterprise, but the division of responsibilities between the India- Office and the Indian Government was unworkable. The scope of the expedition's objective was never sufficiently defined in advance. The criticisms are made on the commander-in-chief's or his representatives' failuroa to periodically visit Mesopotamia. The advance on Bagdad in October, 1015, was an offensive movement atbased on political and military miscalculations, attempted with tired and insufficient forces, and with inadequate preparation, npd it resulted in the Kut disaster. The weightiest share of the responsibility for this advance lies on Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the disaster. The others responsible for the order and sequence of events were the Viceroy lLord Hardlnpe), the commander-in-chief (General Sir R. Duff), the Military Sec? rotary at the India Office (General Sir 1?. G. Barrow), Mr Austin Chamberlain, who were the committee of the Cabinet. The commission points out that the last two were responsible as the political heads, who cannot secure complete immunity through adopting their expert subordinates' wrong advice. The general armament and equipment were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the win l '; system. The commissariat was badly organised during the period of the Indian Government's responsibility, thi-ugh there was not a general break-down. The Simla authorities bestowed meagre attention on the illiberal trcntmflit of the expeditions that went away during 1014-15. The supply of reinforcements was insufficient. In connection with the advance on Bagdad and the Kut relief operation*, the Indian military authorities insufficiently realised from the first the paramount importance 1 of river and railway transport in Mesopotamia, though their responsibility was grave. General Nixon was responsible for recommending the 1915 advances with insufficient, transport and equipment.
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Taranaki Daily News, 28 June 1917, Page 5
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387MESOPOTAMIA. Taranaki Daily News, 28 June 1917, Page 5
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