The Right of Privateering

Te Aroha News, Volume XIV, Issue 2095, 19 April 1898, Page 2

The Right of Privateering

It is apprrq ria f e to the existing condition of affairs to call to mind that Spain and the Ufiited States are the only civilised nations that recognise the right of privateering as an auxiliary of maritime war.' The abstract justice of such a method of war is plain from the following opinion of Bluntschli, quoted in Wharton’s book on international laws:—“As nothing prevents a state from forming a body of volunteers to be employed as a part of the auxiliary force of its army, so a maritime nationmay, with entire propriety, re-enforce its fleets by adding vessels previously employed in trade.” ' .<•

And Thomas Jefferson stated the case even more forcibly.'t; He said:— “What difference is it to the sufferer that his property is captured or des troyed by a national or privateering vessel ? Did our merchants, who lost. 917 vessels by British capture, feel any gratification that most of them were taken by His Majesty’s men-of-war, and bub few of them by British privateers? Were the spoils less rigidly. exacted by a seventy-four-gun 6hip of war than by a privateer of four guns? . „ . In the United States every enconragemont should be given to privateering in time of war with a commercial nation.” ' And it is mere matter of fact that one among the most illustrious of American naval heroes, Paul Jones, was a privateer. The first strong movement against privateering was made by Fiance and Great Britian during the progress of Crimean War. The motives at work are thus set forth in a memorandum of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at that time French Ministers of War. “What most influenced the Euglish Government was the fear of America inclining against us and lending to our enemies (the Russians) the co-opera-tions of her hardy volunteers. The maritime population of the United States, their enterprising marine, might furnish to Russia a fleet of privateers that, attached to Russia’s service by letters of marque, and covering the seas with a network of sails, would harass and pursue our commerce (that of England France) even iu the most remote waters.” ,

The United States declined to enter into a treaty with France and England for the abolition of privateering unless Russia also should be a party. The progress of the war made this imp .ssible. But at the close of the war privateering was abolished on the parts of Italy, Germany, Russia, France, Aus : tria, and Britain, and all of the nations of Northern Europe. The United States was asked to become a party to the treaty, and expressed her willingness to join, provided that the private property of a belligerent on the high seas should be exempt from seizure by the public armed vessels of the other belligerent, unless such property were contraband of war. Great Britain refused to entertain this proposition, and the United States held aloof, and now stands free to equip privateers in her, own defence or for the purpose of destroying the commerce of an enemy.