QUICK RESULT NOT LIKELY

Southland Times, Issue 24821, 13 August 1942, Page 5

QUICK RESULT NOT LIKELY

it is foolish to believe that the Japanese will await the outcome of the Solomons Battle before continuing their planned movements elsewhere. Unless the Allies get at the heart of their concentration quickly they may move at any time. „ „ , The correspondent of The New York Times shares the same belief and states that, while the Japanese have suffered heavy air losses, they have replacements within reach and they may furthermore become sufficiently alarmed by the Solomons action to deflect units of their major naval and aerial armadas. Although most American correspondents here take the view that the attack will result in greatly reducing the danger to Australia The New York Times correspondent remarks: “Except for the enemy forces actually engaged in the Solomons Battle every other threat which the Japanese represent remains the same as last week and these threats are substantial.”

Allies’ Hazardous

Task

The Press Association’s correspondent at a South Pacific port says that a quicK and thoroughly decisive result should not immediately be expected in the Allied attack on the Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands. Seizure from the sea of a defended shore is one of the most difficult and hazardous of military operations. It cannot be achieved without the payment of a heavy price in ships and personnel. After the Coral Sea battle Rear-Admiral F. C. Sherman, U.S.N., captain of the lost carrier Lexington, said no defensive force could stop a determined offence by air in the Solomon Islands. The operations of the Allied naval units are defensive against landbased air attack.. Ships must be lost until the Japanese air force operating against them can be denied the air, for this Allied force has to depend immediately upon its own air forces and finally upon seizure from the land of the enemy’s airfields. Hazardous also is the landing operation for forces assaulting the beaches. A sudden change in surf conditions may leave units of it stranded during precious hours. The interruption of reserves and supplies can result in part of the landing forces being cut off ana slaughtered. SURPRISE DIFFICULT Secrecy and surprise are difficult to obtain. Tactical surprise is more likely to succeed than an attempt to make the shore unnoticed. Sometimes a tactical surprise can be gained by feints; sometimes it can be obtained by dispersing the attack over several landing places and pushing in reserves at whichever place turns out most promising. This requires a nice sense of timing, quick decision to take advantage of opportunities and flexibility of mind that can disregard preconceived ideas. Cover and concealment off a hostile coast are impossible. Movement is restricted during disembarkation from transports, while from transports to the shore the troops must violate all the rules of attack on land. They cannot seek the protection of natural cover; they are bunched in groups within the fire of concealed artillery and automatic weapons, and they have restricted opportunity to return the fire at the beach. Every boat is like a defile from which troops must pour on to an almost perfect field of fire. Delayed by obstacles, confronted with terrain known only through aerial reconnaissance an<| reports of civilians who have been there, night landings offer less advantage than might be thought. Detective and illuminating devices make surprise during an approach to and assault on a beach almost impossible. Smoke may help to cover a daylight landing, but its use is limited by the weather and in turn it limits the supporting fire from protecting ships during the critical stage of obtaining a bridgehead. A landing force is almost deprived of artillery support unless aircraft can be employed in sufficient numbers and without serious interference. Naval guns are not an effective substitute for shore artillery. NO CHILD’S PLAY Finally, a landing force needs trained troops—men who have exercised in all types of action which they might be called upon to carry out during the assault and consolidation. For all these reasons the operation in the Solomons is child’s play for none of those taking part. Many things can go wrong, no matter how careful the planning or courageous the attack. The correspondent also says it is clear that the forces in the attack are predominantly American. British and Dominion counsel has no doubt been taken in the preparations for the operation. British experience of combined operations in commando raids on Axis positions has possibly also assisted in laying the plans, but the naval units engaged are probably the only ones which include forces other than American, at least for the present. All communiques about the operation will probably come from Pearl Harbour or Washington. Vice-Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, who is in direct control, makes all his reports in the first instance to his immediate superior, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at Pearl Harbour. However, it is possible to judge that while the ship and personnel losses may be more severe than is the public’s expectation, the operation is proceeding well. Nothwithstanding the undoubted difficulties and probable mishaps, Admiral Ghormley and his force so far seem to have been “ringing the bell.” The stakes may be high, but the reward for Allied communications in the Pacific and, more remotely, but nevertheless equally clearly, for the eventual security of New Zealand and Australia, will be even higher.

Further bombing attacks on enemy shipping off Timor are reported in today’s communique from General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters.. The sinking of a Japanese cargo ship in this area on Monday afternoon was confirmed by the pilots taking part in Tuesday’s raids. The latest attack in the Timor area was carried out by Allied medium bombers, but the results are not known. Medium bombers also scoffed direct hits on the wharf and buildings at Toeal, in the Kei Islands, about half-way between Timor and the south-western coast of New Guinea. Two of seven Zero fighters which attacked the Allied bombing force north of Samarai, in New Guinea, were shot down. We lost one plane and others were damaged. The offensive against Rabaul was continued. In a night raid on an aerodrome bombs fell near the runway.

AMERICAN ATTACK ON KISKA HARBOUR

(Rec. 9 p.m.) WASHINGTON, Aug.,ll.

A Navy Department communique says information has been received regarding the folic wing incidents in the Aleutians:—■ . _

July 22. —Army bombers raided the area of Kiska harbour through fog. The results were not observed.

July 29.—Navy patrol plaifes attacked Kiska at night-time. Army bombers attacked shore installations and ships. August 3.—Japanese aircraft attacked the United States destroyer Kane off Atka Island. No damage was inflicted. Army bombers again attacked the Kiska harbour area. The results were not observed.

August 4.—Army pursuit planes shot down two seaplane bombers of the Kawanisa 97 type. August B.—A Pacific Fleet task force, protected by Navy patrol planes, heavily bombarded a group of enemy ships, camp facilities and shore installations at Kiska. The attack was a complete surprise. The enemy, mistaking the first salvos of shells for bombs, opened anti-aircraft fire against imagined planes. An intensive bombardment from cruiser and destroyer guns soon silenced the shore batteries, started fires and inflicted severe damage in the camp area. The only enemy resistance was from aircraft. Our loss consisted of one observation plane. August 9.—Naval patrol planes followed up the bombardment, attacking two cargo ships in Kiska harbour and scoring two hits with bombs on each ship, causing severe damage. Observers also sighted a sunken cargo vessel, which is believed to have been sunk during the previous bombardment by surface forces. BIG AMERICAN RAID ON CANTON (Rec. 7.30 p.m.) CHUNGKING, Aug. 11. American bombers in a big scale raid dumped tons of bombs on enemy military objectives at Canton. They blasted docks and warehouses along the Pearl river and scored direct hits on a Japanese aerodrome and probably destroyed 15 bombers parked on the field.

The Chungking correspondent of the United Press of America says the attack was designed to cripple the big striking force the Japanese have been building to attack the United States Air Force. American bombers also blasted Japanese installations, barracks, aerodromes, runways, hangars and railway stations at Nanchang and Yochow. The Americans shot down three Japanese planes attempting interception near Nanchang.

The United Press of America correspondent expresses the opinion that the attacks on Japanese bases along the 600-mile front from Hankow to Canton were undoubtedly partially designed as a diversion to prevent the Japanese from rushing aerial reinforcements to the Solomons.

ATTACK ON JAPANESE CONVOY (Special Australian Correspondent, N.Z.P.A.) SYDNEY, August 12. The Japanese convoy attacked south of Timor by Allied bombers on Monday is believed to have been on the way to the Solomons sector with reinforcements. There is no suggestion, however, that any large _ scale move.nent of enemy troops was involved. One of the cargo vessels damaged was of about 4000 tons and a smaller vessel, probably sunk, was of about 1500 tons. Australian and American airmen who took part in the raid report having seen the Japanese abandoning the ships. American war correspondents in Australia are more cautious in assessing the value of the offensive in the Solomons than are observers in the United States. The New York Herald-Tribune representative here gives a warning that