Crisis in India

Southland Times, Issue 24818, 10 August 1942, Page 4

Crisis in India

THE arrest of 54 leaders of the Congress Party, accompanied by sweeping measures of control, brings India to a major political crisis. It was obvious that these steps would have to be taken. The “quit India” resolution was a direct challenge to Britain, made in circumstances which gave it the most sinister implications. Any discussion of Indian nationalism, at this stage, could have merely an academic interest. There have been blunders and failures on both sides. But the complex problem was narrowed to a single issue when Sir Stafford Cripps presented a plan endorsed by the British Government. According to the terms of the proposed agreement, the defence of the country was to remain a British responsibility; but India was offered a place in Mr Churchill’s War Cabinet. Self-government was to take effect after the war, when a constitutional congress would be drawn by proportional representation from the provincial legislatures. Moslem interests were protected by a proposal that states or provinces which rejected the new order could have the right to frame their own constitutions. The plan was a compromise; but there is no other way to guarantee the future independence of India without disregarding the rights of powerful minorities. Pandit Nehru tacitly endorsed this view when he based his objection on the defence issue. His counterproposal, that the war effort should be placed in the hands of an Indian Minister, had to be rejected for two good reasons: there was no Indian statesman who had shown himself equal to the task; and Mr Gandhi (whose influence over Congress and its followers remains too powerful to be ignored) had refused to abandon his policy of passive resistance. The seizure of Congress documents, the authenticity of which was acknowledged by Mr Gandhi, revealed the true nature of this policy as an extreme form of appeasement. To gain their ends the Congress leaders were prepared to organize a nation-wide series of strikes. Mr Gandhi may call this method “nonresistance”; but there are plainer words for it in the English language; and its sponsor has himself acknowledged the violence inherent in his policy by speaking of “the biggest

fight of my life.” He is prepared to open India to a servitude more vigorous than any it has known in modern times. India has never been closer to a true freedom; but this can be accomplished only through an Allied victory. Although surrender to Japan might be an escape from British rule (a rule entering its mildest phase), it would be an escape through suicide. India must remain, for the duration of the war, an Allied stronghold and an important link with China and Russia. The action of Congress will complicate the problems of defence, which were already formidable. Civil strife may cause a dispersal of forces that should be concentrated at the frontiers. But the British authorities can no longer allow the Hindu extremists to play Japan’s game, even though they give it the appearance of a negative idealism. There is only one fight which matters today; and it is not Mr Gandhi’s.