The Southland Times MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1942. Offensive in the Pacific

Southland Times, Issue 24818, 10 August 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1942. Offensive in the Pacific

THE Allied offensive in the Solomon Islands ends the long period of waiting in the Pacific, a period made difficult by evidence that the Japanese were resuming their southward advance. It is too early . to estimate the full scope and weight of the attack. But one fact is important: this is the first attempt to recover bases occupied by the Japanese. The critics who have been complaining that inadequate forces and materials were sent to the south-west Pacific now have their answer —perhaps sooner than was expected. It is apparently no part of American policy to make the road to victory longer than is necessary. The Solomon Islands lie due east of New Guinea. If they pass into Allied hands the Japanese will be exposed on their left flank to bombing, and perhaps to direct attack. North of the Solomons is the island of New Britain, a point still closer to New Guinea. If the present move is successful the Japanese will be faced with encirclement in their southern base. The immediate danger to Australia would at once be lifted. But the offensive is not merely a bold stroke to drive the enemy back from the northern coasts of Australia; it is primarily an attempt to dominate the vital sea routes. In this area both sides must work at the end of extended communications. The Japanese can use their atolls in the Caroline group, north of New Guinea; but these include only minor naval stations. Squadrons of any size have to be based at Manila or Singapore, both of which are about 2500 miles from Rabaul. The battle of the Coral Sea put an end to the enemy’s attempt to advance in force. Thereupon he entered upon a phase of what could be described as naval infiltration, using small draft and comparatively light forces to spread through . the screen of islands east of New Guinea. The value of this method is that it avoids the danger of a crippling blow which must always be faced by an armada. But it ceases to be effective as soon as superior forces are thrown against the occupied positions. ' If the Americans intend to dislodge the Japanese from their newly-acquired bases they should be able to concentrate forces strong enough to overwhelm the defences. And every island taken in this way provides a springboard for air attack in the next encounter. The only way the Japanese can meet the threat is to bring up massive naval squadrons and to fight it out for control of the sea. There is probably nothing that Admiral Nimitz would like better. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island proved that United States warships and naval aircraft are of better quality, and are handled more efficiently, than those of the enemy. It is not true that the Japanese avoid frontal attacks: they did not hesitate at Singapore. But they cannot use at sea the tactics which served them so well in the jungle of Malaya; or at least, they cannot use them in the face of strong naval opposition. No predictions can be made until final reports are received of the fighting in the Solomon Islands. If the Allies are successful, however, the Japanese will have to face a crucial problem of strategy. Their greatest weakness is in ' shipping. With American planes operating from bases in the Coral Sea, the enemy must expect to lose more ships than he can afford while he creeps from one stepping stone to another. The alternative is to meet the United States challenge and attempt to force an entry to the south. If these speculations are supported by events it will be seen that the Americans have found a quicker and better way of checking the Japanese than by using their mercantile and naval tonnage for building up an army in Australia. They are beginning their offensive where they are strongest—at sea, and in the skies over the sea.