WHERE TO WIN.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 173, 12 May 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

WHERE TO WIN.

EAST VERSUS WEST. There ha been a great deal of general discussion (writes "A Student »r War" in the 'Manchester Guardian") on our plans for winning the war whict has centred round two main topics. The first i- the old topi'; of rivalry between the Fi-hn and the Western spheres of militn- ■• action. The second is the newer pro icm of our tactics if we are to force the German lines in the We.-t. A few remarks may be offered on each of these topics. The suggestion that there is a school of military thought in this country which has somehow contracted a preference for r.pi lations in the oast rather than in the west, is ridiculous. The utmost for which the so-called "easterners" ever contended was that last year there was a better chance of securing decisive results in the east than in the we-t. That the west is the area :it which the greatest German m'litary strength is situated, and that a great victory here would lie worth more than elsewhere, is disputed by no cue. But the argument of the easterns was that this victory on the west was not to be had until we had accumulated enormous stores of munition? and solved certain tactical problems, neither of which seemed likely within the year, whereas there was a victory to be had in the ca«t at a comparatively small expenditure of energy if only it were wi>e'y directed. The events of la:-1 year have surety justified this view. We have paid n terribly heavy penalty for cur efforts to break through in the west before the conditions of success were present. We were not in a position to ignore the east, partly because our interests are exceedingly great there, and not over well protected, partly because the polit'cal origins of the war are there. The motive of the Germans in forcing; this war on Europe was to prevent n harrier being formed to their expansion in the oa-t by a Serbia in a state, of semi-dependence upon Russia. Her invasion of Belgium and France was n means of clearing a road for herself in the east, not an end in itself. An offensive campaign in the Balkans was from the very beginning part of the. German plans, as is shown by the Austrian invasion of Serbia. Nor is it accurate to say that no results that wo coul dobtain in the east could be decisive. Supposing that we had occupied Constantinople and Baghdad and maintained Serbia, then we had only to hold in the west to win the war. Success in the east last year was in fact the only way in which we could hope to win the war by merely holding our own.

It is not so now, and this apart from our losses, is the penalty we arc paying. Last year, before Bulgaria joined the Germans and the "corridor to Constantinople was opened by tho exile of the Serbian army from it* country. Turkey and the Balkans were the most favourable fields for our operations. The conditions however, arc very different now. The (iallipoh peninsula, where we came nearer to a decisive v«tory than we have done elsewhere in the war, is now abandoned, and with it has gone tho opportunity of striking a blow at the heart of Turkey. The great jumping-off -round of Serbia has been lost, too. and if and when the advance from Salonika begin- in the spring we shall find ourselves attacking positions or ,'itormous strength. Moreover, we have iad time to strengthen ourselves in 'ranee, and :t may well be that when ;hc next moment for an offensive offers itself, the best chances may be in the ni-4. i'he division between the easterners and the westernrs is not a permanent division. It may quite well be that the ca-t would have been the hot field for us last year, and that the west will be this year.

And that brings us' tn tlio question of the strategy and tactics which are. most likely to win us success in the we.it. Hitherto the accepted theory has ben that after a prolonged process of •" ni l i!>l mil:,"" tlie whole of the present German lines could ho carried. All our big offensives have been linscd on that theory, and the battle at Loos, disappointing' as it* later stages were, gave it some continuation. Had the Scottish Division which poured over Hill CO into the plain of Douai been adequately supported, it seems probable that such an indentation could have been made in the German lines as to compel a general withdrawal. The problem on this theory for the future would be the more rapid bringing up of supports, whether of infantry 01 artillery. It is. in other word?, a problem of unlimited munitions, and ol battlefield tactics. There are, however, some critics who maintain that th.'is theory is unworkable, that the danger of deep, narrow penetration ol the enemy's line is greater for the attack than for the defence, and that anv rush through (unless it is on a very wide front) is sure to end in disaster. What this new school ot critics looks forward to is a gradual penetration ol the system of defences, group by group over a wide front, to be effected mainlv bv artillery, with infantry in a secondary role. It is an interesting view, though the cumulative cost oi

such a p'an is likely to he something of which nn one here has any concopti in. We can only hope that tinviiw is wrong, and thai the breaking as distinct from the peeling theory (for that is what the new suggestions to) may prove to be sound. Sn fur a< our evidence pies it would seem'tha! whatever success is to be gained will bo gained quickly—in the first few hours nf a battle—and that nn attack which is prolonged w as "nod as lost. All our successes in the west and also the sensational German

victory at Gorlieo. have been won in Ihs first few hours: the rlieelw and the lu'iivv 1 1 --''- liiivc followed later