The Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1870.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume V, Issue 215, 12 September 1870, Page 2

The Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1870.

Together with this evening's issue we hope to present our readers with a sketch map of the country, which as the theatre of war is now attracting universal attention. It is necessary, however, to warn them that the lines, marked as railways, do but roughly indicate the fact that railway communication exists between certain points of strategic interest ; we have been unable to obtain maps of sufficient size, at least, of recent date to do more. We believe too that a railway passing through Triers and Luxemburg is vow directly connecting Coblentz with the French system, but as we cannot find it iv the maps, it is not represented in our plau. Since publishing the telegram forwarded from Hokitika, we have received a considerably fuller version of the same message, which reached Auckland from Sydney by the steam ship Auckland.

Tbe main additional facts are that it was near Longwy, north-west from Luxemburg that the Prussians made one of their raids, while a party of twenty-two Prussians blew up the great Rhine railway bridge at Kehl. This audacious proceeding argues that Baden, to which tbe long strip intervening between Mainz and Kehl belongs, is favorable to Prussia, as w r ell as her declared allies of Saxony and Hessen.

We also learn that the French base of operations extends from Strasbourg to Thionville, both strong fortresses connected by lines of railway passing through Metz and other places of arms.

The Prussians have begun this war with that audacious initiative, which has been one of their traditions since the Great Frederic, by this inroad to Longwy, which we learn from the Auckland telegram extended as far as " Canliug and Neiderbrouu," names like Triola aud Carting uudiscoverable iv our maps, and unlike them, insoluble by contest or conjecture.

This movement we take to have been merely a feint, as we find the Prussians immediately retreating on Triola, (Triers, Treves) and preparing thence to retreat on Carting (Coblenz), leaving a division of only 10,000 men, even according to French accounts, to dispute Saarbruck, the first German station of the railway which connects Mainz and Coblenz with the French frontier — our telegram absurdly made out that 100,000 Prussians could only kill eleven Frenchmen before they retreated — we adopt 10.000 from the Auckland version. Had this Prussian movement not been a mere feint, we should scarcely bave heard of a strong Prussian army retreating so tamely through a country as well adapted for defence as the Saar-Mosel district. The object of such a stratagem does not appear to us far to seek, for we learn that immediately afterwards a Prussian array again appears within the French frontier to fight a desperate action at Wissenbourg. Very probably this army may have con* sisted, iv part at least, of the retreating Prussians of the Mosel Valley, who, slipping past Coblenz, which the French will find a proceeding far more difficult, have swung round through Mainz and Worms to fight at Wissenbourg. The short march from Wissenbourg to the head waters of the Saar and thence to Triers will entrap the French army in the rugged defiles of the Mosel, which are effectually plugged by CobleDz at the lower end ; and the heavy loss at Wissenbourg will have been a cheap price to pay, if it enables the Prussian army to fall upon the French rear or flank by the valley of the Saar, and thus cut off their communications with France ; while throughout the march from Wissenbourg to the Mosel the Prussian columns will have a German country on at least one flank. One of the great Frederic's maxims was Si- Von veut atlraper des souris, en laisse ourverte la souriciere. His military descendants seem to have well baited the trap, as well as left it open. This appears to us the only explanation of the sudden disappearance of the Prussians from the Mosel Valley, as well as of their equally sudden reappearance at Wissenbourg, and of their desperate struggle to secure a place of so small comparative importance as that fortress.

We wait eagerly to learn their success, which will depend upon thair exhibiting a quality, not usually deficient in Prussian armies, celerity.