THE,WAY TO VICTORY.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XL, Issue 1868, 24 August 1918, Page 3

THE,WAY TO VICTORY.

ARTICLE BY MARSHAL FOCH.

That battles can be won in the end only by the army which takes the offensive is the significant declaration made by Marshal Foch, Com-nmnder-in-Chief of the Allies, in an important article contributed by him to the weekly journal, the Field, in which he discusses the problem of the soldier and the way to victory. “Modern warfare, to arrive at its end and to impose its will on the enemy,” says Marshal Foch,” recognises only one means —destruction of the enemy’s organised forces. “War undertakes and prepares this destruction by battle which brings about the overthrow of the adversary, disorganises his command, destroys his discipline, and nullifies his units as far as their fighting power is concerned. Our first axiom must be that completely to achieve its object a battle must not be purely defensive. A purely defensive battle, even well conducted, does not result in a victor and a vanquished. It is simply a game that must be begun over again. “From this it is an obvious corollary Unit an offensive, whether started at (he beginning of an action, or whet her it follows the defensive, can only give results, and in consequence must always be adopted at the finish. To maintain our position is not synonymous with being victorious, and even prepares for a defeat. If we remain where 1 we are and do not pass to the offensive to fix the direction of attack, to guard against the plans of the enemy and prevent him from carrying out the .same manoeuvre, we must undertake to carry on and sustain numerous combats, each with determined aim. “But since there remains no doubt, that decisive attack is (he very keystone of a battle, all other actions which make up a battle must be envisaged, considered, organised, provided with forces in the measure in which they will prepare, facilitate, and guarantee development of a decisive -aI tack characterised hy its mass, its surprise, its speed, and for which, in consequence, it is es-< sential that there shall lx l a maximum reserve force possible of troops of manoeuvre. The reserve —that is to say, the prepared bludgeon—is organised, and kept care-, fully instructed to execute the single act of battle from which results are expected, namely, the decisive attack. “Reserves must be husbanded with (In 1 most extreme parsimony, so that the bludgeon may be strong enough to make l the blow as violent as possible. Let loose at (he finish without any lurking idea of saving (hem, with a well-thought-out plan for winning the battle at a point, chosen and determined, reserves artthrown in all together in an action surpassing in violence and energy all other phases of battle, an action with proper characteristics —-surprise, mass, and speed. All our forces really participate, either by preparing it, or by carrying it out. “In this, our supreme aim, we must not be deceived by appearances. Although theory fails when applied by feeble bands, and when, accessories obscure (he main principle, history and reason show us that in battle there is a single argument which is worth while, namely, decisive attack, which is alone capable of assuring (he desired result —the overthrow of the adversavv."