EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 287, 1 August 1855, Page 2

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE.

THE NEW RUSSIAN EMPEROR,

Alexander 11. has ostensibly placed himself without reserve in the hands of the only statesmen possessed of his father's real intentions, and this has produced such a favourable impression upon the Russian public that he will apparently find it comparatively easy to settle, the business bequeathed to him-as he shall think proper. One or two other circumstances have contributed to strengthen him. His own qualities have had some effect. Perhaps still more will be accomplished by the rather studied but very striking death scenes. His disposition predispose him to seek peace, and a desire for peace is also said to be prevalent among his ?!>bjsets. The nobles dislike the dimunition of their incomes., and, still more, the increase of their expenditure, in the shape ot voluntary contributions to the cost of the war, As for the lowel'orders * they have 110 martial spirit. Unlike the Englishman, who is pugnacious by nature, and no soldier by habit, the Russian is naturally a very peaceable animal, compelled to assume the appearance of a soldier by a military government. And yet, notwithstanding all these influences, peace is a remote and improbable event. The' demolition of Sebastopoi is the only material guarantee that can be afforded for the diminution of the undue preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. Upon the success of the attempt to reduce Sebastopoi, the Emperor of the French may be regarded as having staked his throne, for failure in that attempt might awaken a spirit in the French army that would be fatal to him. But to the demolition of Sebastopoi no Russian Government can or will submit unless under extreme pressure. The Russians would prefer the destruction of St. Petersburg to that of Sebastopoi. The possession of the latter they regard as insuring to them the indefinite extension of their empire towards the south. St. Petersburg, on the contrary, is a cul-de-sac, which leads nowhere, and the Russians know well that it is preity certain to be destroyed by natural causes before another half century passes over their heads. Here, then, will be the stumbling-block in the Vienna negociations. With many a grim; ca Russia may swallow the conditions of the Allies relating to the free navigation of the Danube, and the renunciation of the exclusive protectorate of the Danubian provinces and the Christian subjects of the Porte. But when the question of limiting Russia's ascendancy on the Black Sea, and to that end dismantling Sebastopoi, comes upon the tapis, then Russia will make an obstinate stand, exhaust every wile of diplomacy, and, finally, break off the negotiations rather than consent. Nor is this the only difficulty with which the representatives of the Western Powers will have to contend at the Vienna Conference. Austria may give them quite as much trouble as their adversary, Russia. When Austria occupied the Danubian Principalities, on the retreat of the Russians, it was with no intention of ever again relinquishing its grasp upon them. No efforts will be spared by the Austrian diplomatists to obtain the -consent of the Western powers to the virtual, if not the avowed, annexation of the Principalities to the Austrian dominions. There are, however, three sufficient reasons against

the acquiescence of Fiance and England in any such proposal. The first is, regard for' the rights of their ally, the Sultan. Feeble though' the link may be that binds Wallachia and Moldavia to the Turkish Empire, it is still a bar to the acquisition ot these provinces by Austria. France and England have armed to assert the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire against Russia ; can France an.i England with consistency consent to any encroachment on the integrity of the Ottoman empire byAustria? The second reason is regard for the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the Principalities. They have been more, and more unjustly, injured /luring the present struggle than any other parties. Whatever the merits of the controversy between Russia and Turkey, it has never yet been pretended that Russia had any ground for with the Walhichians and Moldavians. Even though the Czar had had real cause for being angry with the Porte, he could not pretend that he bad been injured by the Wallachians and Moldavians. Even he punished them for the faults of which he pretended the Pone had been guilty towards him. He invaded their territory; he seized upon their public moneys ; he allowed his soldiers to live upon them at free quarters; he subjected them to maniallaw. This plague came to an end in time. The Russians were obliged to evacuate the Principalities. But no sooner were they gone than the Austrians entered, and proved a more intolerable plague than their predecessors. It is strange, but true, that theAustrians, the most stupidly good natured of human beings at home, becomes the most brutal and outrageous of tyrants when invested with power in a foreign land. The outrages of the Austrian: soldiery almost make the Moldavians and Wallachians^ wish for the Russians back again. During the Oriental struggle, an unoffending people have been harassed and plundered by both sides. And if the Austrians are allowed to retain the Principalities, the future fate of the inhabitants of those countries will be even worse than the past. The Austrians will be in Wallachia and Moldavia what they have been in Italy—and worse, for there they will be more removed from the control of the public opinion of Europe. The third reason against allowing the Austrians to retain possession of the Danubian Principalities is the necessity of obtaining a real guarantee for the free navigation of the Danube. If Austria is to succeed Russia in the possession of the -right bank and delta of the Danube to the sea—and this is what the Cabinet of Vienna now aims at —England will see the waters of that river navigated exclusively by Austrian monopolist steam companies. The rights of the Sultan, the rights and interests of the Wallachians and Moldavians, the rights and interests of every maritime state, will be endangered if Austria is allowed to retain possession of the . Damibiari Principalities. But the whole soul of the Austrian Government is set upon obtaining permanent possession of them; and, to accomplish this, the negotiations at.Vienna will be spun out; Russia and the Western Powers will be alternately fawned upon and menaced; no duplicity, no falsehood, will be spared. The unscrupulously ambitious projects of Austria require to be as closely watched as those of Russia.