EUROPEAN PEACE

Hokitika Guardian, 25 March 1933, Page 5

EUROPEAN PEACE

ROME MEETING

MR MACDONALD IN COMMONS

(British Official Wireless.)

RUGBY, March 23. The Prjme Minister took the first availably opportunity of informing the House of Commons of the proceedings during the visits he and the (Foreign Secretary recently paid to Geneva and Rome. Their colleagues

asked them to g, O to Geneva, ] ]e said, because every report showed that there was grave danger of a some-

what immediate collapse of the Disarmament Conference, and they believed that it might b. e possible to

avert such a collapse of a plan which

woul c | cover the whole field of disarmament and security. H e .anticipated that the first reaction would be general opposition to the plan, but th e second reaction, after consideration, would be that everyon e would

wish to take it as a basis for immediate consideration. He wag right regarding the first reaction, .and be thought that there was a good chance of (his being right regarding the second.

The British plan contained, for the first time, figures regarding the various arms, When the Conference resumed, it would be upon the figures they had put forward. They were obliged to continue the principles to giv e equality to Germany. They had made it perfectly clear that the obligations placed on th e nations of .Europe were to be obligations of honour and responsibility, which would be all tb, e more serious a s they were undertaken in a voluntary way, but events had happened recently that e normously increased the risk of taking a big step like that at the present moment. Their plan pre-sup-posed a transitional stage. Equality I itself would not b e carried out, but during that .stag e there would be no re-armament.

“We have provided a form in which an agreement may b € reached,” he said. “Europe is very unsettled, and it is in a very nervous condition. Fortunately, there is one thing that can save Us all, .and that is well founded confidence in each other. That is lacking more to-day than for a long time. Events, have happened and •speeches ihav e been made -which naturally and properly have added to that sense 0 f insecurity, and even after we arrived at Geneva, some of those events occurred.”

Referring to hi s visit to Rome, the Prime Minister said that on arrival, a short document was handed to them which showed Signor Mussolini’s views .regard'iilg an affective policy of no) labor at ion between the four Western powers, to maintain pence in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, and of the “no force" pact, which had been contemplated by the Five-Power Conference, as a return for Germany’s getting a declaration in principle of their willingness to give her equality status, and a declaration, that those Powers should not resort to force to try to .solve any of their immediate political differences.

Signor Mussolini felt that Article 19 of the Covenant regarding treaties was not t 0 become dormant. There were two sides in Article 19. It said that a treaty mad e should be observed, and only altered by the consent of both parties, ' but it also said the treaties containing provisions which in the efflux of time raised problems which might result .in a most undesirable conflict, ought to be subject to revision.

plan laid if down that the proposed co-operation should be carried joufc within the framework of the ■League. Ten years is indicated as the first' period for the treaty, should it bp possible to arrange it. Indications are given that if this conception of co-operation between the Powers is adopted as an immediate aid to peace, the friendship engendered could have further beneficial consequences. That would he necessary, and the British Government would work out further details.

They. h"d expressed themselves as very much interested in Signor Mussolini’s proposal, and promised to study it in all .'its bearing. They indicated some matters of essential derail, for which provision must be made. For instance, how the smaller States effected should be consulted. ,TT C could give those States an assurance that so far .as the conversations were concerned, there was no foundation whatever for the fears recently expressed. The smaller States had a right to be consulted, wherever then’ ,special ‘interests were concerned, and that would be done.

The motive of the plan was unrloubtedlv to remove the causes of war in Europe, its emphasis being upon the League taking up the responsibility imposed upon it bv Article 19 of the (Covenant. There was no greater immediate danger to Europe than that, when the .inevitable nationalist revival occurred, treaties might be the subiect of challenge by one interest, arid under conditions which would only renew animosity and ruin the prospect of friendly a'-gommorlnlio’’. The conversations at Rome amounted to this, that now, when it was m>rfectlv plain to everybody that national life was being revitalised in Europe, the four Powers should me°t before they may be driven apart, and try to remove by negotiation, the dangers' wlvch should have to be met

in any event. “I express no opinion, though I cn.

itertain strong hopes bf the .result,” ,s-*iicl 'Mr MacDonald. The British Government was now trying to devise a means of solving what was a problem 1 |of the greatest delicacy. Reconsideration of treaties was not enough, and other nations must make substantial contributions. He expressed the. hope that the means, of co-ope.raticn, .for which they were searching, would b e found and that they would 'he of a nature to commend themselves t<, the sympathy and aid of 1 1 1 ei r fr« nds beyond the At 1 an tic.