SUB-ARCTIC PERILS

Hokitika Guardian, 22 June 1931, Page 2

SUB-ARCTIC PERILS

WILKIX S EXP EDI TIO X. AMERICAN ADMIRAL’S OPINION. SAX FRANCISCO, April ad. Perils that will beset Sir Hubert Wilkins and his party in their attempt to go under the North Pole in the suumarine Nautilus have been delineated by Admiral Hugh Rodman, coast and geodetic and naval observatory expert of the United States Navv. He says that all the world has tn. i'ed by the daring and romantic plans of Captain Sir George Hubert Wilkins to make a submarine passage under the Arctic pack; but it should be just as willing 10 condemn foolhardiness, particularly wh:n the results are unlikely to add one iota to the world's ben.fits, and little to the scientific information. "S r ■Hubert plans to cross from the vicinity of Spitzbergen, via the North Pole,’’ he says, ‘’to the Behring Strait in the North Pacific. On this distance about 1590 inihs lies under the Arctic ice ■fields, unless open water be found, which I believe is not at all likely. ‘The Nautilus is the former United States 5,0.-12, one of our older type submarines, 175 feet in length, which has been reconditioned for th:s special work. Commander Sloane Danenhower, a graduate of the Naval Academy, who resigned in. 1911, will be her commanding officer, Be is experienced capable, and resourceful ill submarine vork. The Nautilus will be ill the. hands of an expert, The pair of Diesel cm gines, one for each of her twin screws, are used for propulsion and the recharging of batteries while running on the surface, but they cannot be used under water.' When the craft is submerged motive power, lighting, heating, arid all other purposes are entirely dependent upon the storage batter.es. ’T have seen a statement attributed to Commander Dauenhower that the Nautilus can travelse in 41.66 hours at three knots, submerged, 125 miles. But from tlm Lest available sources oi information .] believe this statement or estimate to be in error, and that mine is more marly in accordance with records of the Navy Department and more nearly correct.” A DIFFERENT ESTIMATE. The estimate of Admiral Rodman is that if the Nautilus were to use the full battery charge with no reserve it w.ould take 21 hours to make 42 miles. Then she would have to come to the surface and spend eight hours in recharging, with an amount of fuel consumed in recharging equivalent to that consumed in lUu mdv/ ■>; m f ace cruising. .Hence it would mi ■■ L “ miles

submerged at least 1000 limn., or aoout 42 days, provided that lu-i underwater cruising limits could be distributed so that at the end of each battery limit she could come to -the surface, recharge, and proceed immediately. "I believe,” he says, “that such will be tar from the actual case.”

Admiral Rodman says the diving limit of the submarine is about 290 feet, <1 nil even under open water, to manoeuvre safely in that depth zone lequires the strictest care and attention to avert disaster,' for emergencies frequently arise necessitating coming to the surface at once.

Regarding guiding the craft, Admiral Rodman says: “In the ..onning tower, where the control lies, are the various instruments and gauges. The craft is steered by a gyro compass, which requires constant electric power to operate. The magnetic compass is not only unreliable in those latitudes; it is virtually useless. In fact, it probably would be very misleading, and might point in just the opposite direction from the proper one. There would bo no way of detecting such an error except by astronomical observations, which would be impossible when submerged. Furthermore, as the Pole is approached, the gyro compass has less directive force. Should it fail to function from lack of power to drive it, or from a mishap or breakdown, there would be no way left of which 1 ant aware by which geographic location could even be approximated. The submarine then would be absolutely helpless. If she attempted to get from under the ice by the shortest route to open water she could not detect her course and would be hopelessly lost.”

.MAY SPELL DOOM. The difficulty of describing definitely the characteristics of the Polar icefields represent the chief danger which threatens the success of the Wilkins expedition, Admiral Rodman asserts, for although reliable explorers like Peary, Nansen, and Amundsen have obtained a great amount of information, at specific times and places, they all record that the ice is almost always in a state of motion, due to the currents, tides, and the terrific storms which prevail. Anoth r feature which has been brought home to the Admiral in actual experience in the tee is that a submarine, even while running on the surface, is about the poorest type possible for cruising in ice-infested areas. “And finally,” lie says, “even should the ice-boring apparatus for the conning tower and air tubes be found practical and should it become necessary to abandon ship, the chances of the party ever making land are far too slight to be considered seriously. For they will have in doer for transportation and no pre-arranged relay or supply stations.’’ Admiral Rodtn.au says l!ic mental strain will be unnatural ami unhealthy in the cramped space of a submarine, a strain that will become an extreme danger. Without power and the batteries exhausted, life below could be maintained only for six (lavs at the most, he says. T’nsre would be no al-

tentative but to attempt to bore through the ice and abandon ship. If I were to venture a guess, it would be that the Nautilus’s propellers will be disabled in the loose ice around Sptizberg-n before a serious attempt has been made to take the initial plunge under the ■Arctic ice cap. And if it should so happen, I would consider it a most fortunate accident. .After all, what good can come of such an attempt? What benefit of any sort can be derived from it ; what new data can he collected which can be benefieiallv utilised?"