German U-Boat Exploits

Hokitika Guardian, 6 July 1922, Page 4

German U-Boat Exploits

MOW 3 OI -OFR ( IU'ISKRS WERE LOST.

SUBMARINE THAT SANK ANOTHER.

(German Historian’s Account)

Despite the much-vaunted successes of Ihe German submarines in iho war, the wav in which the High Sea Command utilised its U-boat comes in for a good deal of criticism from the ollicial historian. He declares that instead of being employed for defensive purposes, as was too often the case, the .submarines should have been used for attacking the British Fleet, hindering the transport of troops across the Chan nel, and supporting the German advance on Calais. Alter the action in Heligoland Bight .the prevention of similar misfortunes in the future had been carefully considered and a new scheme of patrol instituted which included the cooperation of submarines. Submarines were kept at Heligoland and in the Ems ready to take up positions "which would enable them to inflict losses on a.ny British vessels which approached. This necessitated the immobilisation of a number of submarines and left very few for offensive purposes. In addition to this, considerable alarm existed in Germany,.no to a possible landing of British forces on the Danish coast near Ivsbjerg in order to attack tile Kiel Canal. Agents reported large British forces in this area < n August 31st and on September 7th (1011). and in each case submarines were hastily sent to the spot. The (lei man author characterises this as a mistake, as light cruisers and destroyers were the proper craft for these duties; but the order to avoid losses apparently left the C.-in-C. no choice. He could not use the latter type of vessels because it entailed risk for them, and he had to send submarines which wore not covered by his instructions. The air forces were not yet sufficiently efficient to <io the work which was peculiarly their ou u. WKDDIGKX’K DAIUXG.

The offensive was not. however, ontin Iv neglected, aml :ts various reports pointed lo Lite Kirth of Forth being used by the Jlritish forces, two suhmnri lies were dispatched there, one of them the famous F. 21 eontmanded hy the equally famous lleising. As tin attempt to reach Leith, the venture was not a sueee.ss, for U2l did not manage to pass May Island, and the other boat, U. 20 only sat a little farther, reaching the Point of Fidra on the nth, hut it was marked by the first success-

ful torpedo attack hy a German submarine, fI.M.S. Pathfinder being the victim of a torpedo fired at I,noo metres hy U. 21 off St Abb's Head. The submarines returned safely to Germany. This was the first attempt hy German submarines against our bases, and tin rfore the alarm at Sea pa Flow on September Ist was a false one. It. was not until the middle of October that I’.f) after sinking the Hawke, reached the Pentland Firth. Here she unsuccessfully attacked a group 0 f tisli destroyers some "20 miles east of Seapa Plow. ‘The tactics of (lie submarine commander, who was no other than the Weddigen who had already distinguished himself hy the sinking of the Aboukir, OTossey and Hogue, were characteristically daring and offered some explanation of Ihe cause of his losing ids life in the attack on’ the Orand Fleet in March 1910. Seeing a line of live destroyers approaching him he steered his little vessel so as to pass between the two most westerly of them, tinkling on to mi opposite course to theirs just before meeting them.

In this way lie hoped to get a doable shot at them, one right ahead and the other astern. In doing so ho approached within about 370 yards of the Nympho, the second boat in the line. She saw him and attempted to ram him .and in order to avoid this he had to dive at once, which prevented his firing his second torpedo. The Nympho's turn had saved her from the torpedo, which however, nearly hit the fourth boat in the line. The destroyers phased him for three hours, but be ultimately escaped, and, considering that bo probably stirred up a hornets’ nest, loft the neighbourhood and proceeded to Fair Island Channel, thence to the coast of Norway, and so homo. SUCCESS OF THE U. 9.

As to submarine activity in the Channel, the greatest success of the war was achieved on September 22nd

when the Cressey, Hogue, and Aboukir were sunk by Weddigen in U-9. The story is well-known hut a few extra, details appear in the bohk. The small sketch-map of the attack shows how completely the cruisers played into the hands of the submarine commander by circling round in their efforts to assist each other. The fatal shots were tired at the following ranges the first at the Aboukir—soo yards—the next two at the Hogue—3Bo yards —the next two at the Oressy—l,loo yards—the last one at the Cressey—--550 yards. Weddigen considers that all 'these were hits with the exception of the second fired at the Cressey, which may have been detonated by the explosion of the first one when it hit. Accorling to the log of the submarine not a shot was. fired at her during any of the attack—a statement which is in conflict with the British account. The author severely criticises the lack of preparedness in the British ships .especially in only having one gun on each side manned, and ho points out that the German Navy, had, after their experiences in peace manoeuvres with submarines, adopted the plan- of having one watch at action stations by day as well as at night. The author complains that the English Chart nel, although the main route for the transport of British troops to France was proclaimed as a barred zone in wlieli every vessel would ho treated ns hostile. In view of this the account given in full of the sinking by 1'.2! of a ship which she had definitely recognised as a transport from the more fact that there were a largo number of people on hoard is both pathetic and amusing, for the steamer sunk was, although the .author does not

snv so, the harmless passenger steamer Admiral Gnuteaumo, with 2.000 refugees, mostly women and children, on hoard.

During the period under review two submarines, U. 20 and U. 29 after passing through the Channel, returned home north about. 1T.20 did so (between October loth and 20th.) hv design. while F. 29 had no choice as she had developed defects which prevented her diving. Therefore, though not equipped with charts of the area, she hoisted the British ling, proceeded into the Atlantic, answering the greetings of passing steamers, and eventually reached Wilhehnshaven on November 17th. after a very trying voyage of ten days. These two exploits proved the cruising power of the Gentian submarine to he greater than had been nnticipatd and were a. great credit to their designers. One further submarine success, of which the full story is given for the first time in these pages, must lie incuthmed as it possesses a melancholy interest for the British Navy. This is the destruction of H.M.S. Submarine. E. 3 off the Kms h.v U. 27 on October j ISth. For some days previous German submarines had been waiting in selected positions in the Bight in the hope of catching one of the British submarines which were being constantly reported. I On sighting E. 3. six of whose crew were standing on the conning-tower with their attention fixed in the direction of the Ems, F. 27 approached with the sun liohnd her and at a distance

of iiliout 33(1 yards fifed a torpedo wliicli lilt. A column of water nearly fidft. high was thrown up and when this had .subsided the boat had disappeared. Four of the crew were seen in the water but the German submarine commander made no. attempt to rescue them until half an hour later as he was afraid of exposing his boat to the attach of another British submarine. When he did return to look for survivors none was to he found, and even then the attempt to find them was eonlined to coming occasionally to the surface and opening the hatches. It is as well to put this on record in view of the German complaints that the British neglected the duty of picking up survivors.