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WHY HE RESIGNED

LORD CECIL AND DISARMAMENT PERSONAL EXPLANATION. DEPARTMENTAL OBSTRUCTION. London, November 16. In the House of Lords, as the outcome of a reference to questions of foreign policy by Lord Parmoor. Lord Cecil made a personal explanation regarding his resignation. He said it was the culmination of a series of events such as the Labour Government’s rejection of the treaty of manual assistance, followed by the Conservative rejection in 1924 of the Geneva Protocol. He went to the Naval Conference conscious that his instructions would cause serious difficulties. Exactly what he anticipated occurred. He repeatedly was put in the position of defending situations seemingly wholly indefensible, thereby creating the impression that Britain was lukewarm on the subject of disarmament. Lord Cecil narrated several instances of what he described as departmental ; obstruction; indeed, the representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed! their indifference, if not hostility, to the whole proceedings. He djd not infer that that was the attitude of the whole Cabinet. Nevertheless, lie was unable to convince Cabinet of the importance of taking a stronger line with the technical advisers, owing to the harmfulness of many incidents. He asked for a free hand personally to decide minor matters. This was declined. He trusted Cabinet had now seen the result of too great deference to expert advice and would give Lord Cushendun greater support than it felt able to accord him (Lord Cecil).

ADVANCE NOT COMMENSURATE WITH OBJECTIVE.

Lord Cecil said that when he returned from Geneva he was exhausted and discouraged, and l felt that, though not a complete failure, the advance was not commensurate with the objective. Above all. he felt the fundamental difference between his and view's on the .importance of international effort to disarm. He referred to Mr Churchill’s declaration after the breakdown, when he said: "England is unable to now, and I hope never will In future, embody in a solemn international agreement words binding us to the principle of mathematical parity of naval strength." Lord Cecil continued that, though he did not agree, he was certain Mr Churchill was convinced his warning was essential for the safety of England. He is equally sure that if he persisted he would bang, bolt and bar the door against any hope of agreement with America on naval disarmament.

There was no doubt that the moment Mr Churchill realised that the delegates agreed on parity, even though they received express telegraphic sanction to do so. he began to press on his Cabinet colleagues the necessity qf avoiding what he regarded as a disastrous concession. The culmination of many telegrams was the recall of Lord Cecil, who traced at length the subsequent negotiations and added that the Government had taken a course which, he believed, caused the failure of the vital negotiations. If he had remained in office he would have had to take the responsibility for that, as well as to defend it. That was impossible.

LORD BALFOUR’S REGRETS.

Lord Balfour regretted that Lord Cecil thought it necessary to level serious charges at hii late colleagues. He did not' see how the course of events at Geneva justified th© extreme course adopted by lord Cecil, who, it appeared to lord Balfour, had allowed inevitable differences to accumulate to a point at which his temper gave way. He did not believe the two great Pacific countries would fail to reach a friendly agreement on the point at issue. Britain did not object to America building as many small craft as she thought necessary. but we had duties to perform to the Empire and to the people of the Homeland. “Let us say to America, ‘Do not ask us to diminish our small craft beyond the point we deem necessary for our safety? Surely that line of policy is not so inherently unreasonable that America will even refuse to listen."

Lord Balfour regarded the Geneva Conference as interrupted, not ended. Compared! with the great issues, the differences that had arisen were small and petty.—(A.P.A. and "Sun" cable.)

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HBTRIB19271118.2.75

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XVII, 18 November 1927, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
668

WHY HE RESIGNED Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XVII, 18 November 1927, Page 7

WHY HE RESIGNED Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume XVII, 18 November 1927, Page 7

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