THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1882. THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2591, 27 July 1882, Page 2

THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1882. THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

The Rubicon is now evidently passed, and England is committed to a war with Egypt, and what is m- v e, is not likely to gain any assistance from other Powers worth speaking of. France, which at one time declared its willingness to help as with a contingent of men larger than oars, has now withdrawn into the background, and only proposes to send 5000 men to gnard the Suez Canal. Italy will probably send a small body of troops in order not to be entirely left oat in the cold should any question as to the proprietorship of the country arise in the future. Turkey apparently wishes to be out of the fray altogether, and prefers taking np its old game of waiting to sea how everything will turn out, and then making the most of the circumstances. As to the remaining Great Powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia, all that we know at present is that, having failed in their attempt to induce the Porte to intervene, they are maintaining a strict neutrality, and seem to have no disposition to carp at the action of England. "With regard to the result of the war, if no complications intervene, there can, of course, be no doubt. Any attempt on the part of Egypt to make but a temporary stand against such a power as England would be perfectly futile. Troops would be poured in from England on the one side and India on the other, and the best that could happen to Arabi would be that he should have the power of escaping into the interior, where pursuit would be most difficult. The Egyptian contingent that fought in the Russo Turkish war behaved remarkably well, and showed that there was good stuff in them ; but they were fighting alongside the Turks, who proved such tough customers for the Russians. Arabi's present following is already more or less demoralised, and, although the numbers are given as large, yet nothing is said about the state of discipline that prevails. A Holy War may indeed have been proclaimed, but the days when fanatic zsal was able to carry the day against disciplined valor has gone. The English troops are in a high state of efficiency, in fact wo suppose that for years the country has not been so well prepared for a military enterprise. We have, moreover, a number of commanders exactly fitted for such warfare as that which will eventuate.

Operations have as yet been confined to the sea coast to the eastward of Alexandria. A small skirmish, in which we lost none and sixty prisoners were captured, was the first occasion on which the two opposing forces met. Then came the preparations to seize Aboukir, about ten miles from Alexandria, and to-day we hsar that a second skirmish took place near Ramleh, when tho Pasha's troops offered bnt slight resistance, and the village was occupied by the British. Ramleh is a description of snburb of Alexandria, occupying about the same position to the city that Brighton doaa

to Melbourne. It ia a ses-sido place, and the merchants and professional men-hare live there, trains frequent intervals between the > l l||i Khedire has a palace thefaawKas indeed"* he has in most of the pleasant ; places in Egypt—and it wilt bo remetnhsred that it was in this residence of/Mffjfchat the Khedive ran such a risk" of by his own soldiery. The British expeditionary force will consist of aboat 20,000 men. Arabi's force is pnfc down at any number between 30,000 and 100,000. If the larger number is at all near the mark, it may be taken for granted that the larger part are miserably armed. Many of them will be from. desert triboe, who are picturesque enough, in their attire, but whose equipment is more suited to the marauder than to the regular soldier. It is not, indeed, to the result of the war that anxiety should be so much felt as to the manner in which affairs are to be settled when hostilities are over. And in this connection it may be a matter of congratulation that France is not joined with us in present operations. That country is so mixed up in European politics that, once entered into partnership with her, we should find it most difficult to keep out of the complications that might arise. Not to mention the jealousies that might crop up in a joint occupation, England had far better play a'" lone hand "is this matter. Her aims are so well understood by other nations that she can be suspected of no ulterior designs beyond that of keeping our com* i munications with India open. Seeing that Egypt has been offered to ns before now and we have refused it, it will be clear to any nnprejudiced politician that any arrangement that would settle tha matter of communication satisfactorily would be acceptable to the British. Ministry. "We haw no hankering, as have France or Italy, after a foothold in Northern Africa, and have no ulterior designs except in so far as to see that no other Great Power secures the control of the Suez Canal, and that Egypt is quietly and strongly governed. England can afford to giva and take with the view of obtaining her object, and can do so now all the more easily because she will not be embarrassed by having to consult another Power. Joint expeditions do not, as a rule, turn out well, In the Crimean war a march, would have been made straight on Sebastopol directly after the battle of Alma, and the place would undoubtedly have been taken at once, if St. Arnaud had not objected. Divided counsels are not favorable to the sharp and decisive measures required in modern warfare. But, while it is a cause for congratulation that the coast is clear for England, both in a military and diplomatic point of view, the misery that has been already brought on Egypt cannot but be a matter for the deepest regret. In the case of a Conservative attack on the present Ministry for their vacillation in the earlier stages of the present crisis, the latter will certainly have their work cut ont for them to justify their line of conduct. In such an attack the safety of the Gladstone Administration will rest in the fact that there would seem to be no possibility of the Radicals combining with the Conservatives in ousting the present holders of power. The Radicals blame the Government because the policy of vacillation was not indefinitely prolonged. The Conservatives, on the other hand, declare action was too long delayed. It is hard to see how people holding such diverse views can possibly coalesce. The danger for the present administration will lie rather in the general feeling in the country that, in times when Europe is stirred, the Conservative party has proved itself to be more alive to the exigencies of emergencies. The Liberals on such occasions appear weighed down by a general wish to act up to a biblical standard, which other nations take no account of. Cos.. sequently they are at a decided disadvantage in dealing with their more unprincipled competitors. The Conservatives, on the other hand, take things as they see them. They have no wish to be bitter than their neighbors, and are content to hold their own in the world as thp.y find it. The Liberals have a knack of making England respacted; the Conservatives of making it feared; and there are some who say that, on occasions, it is better to be feared than respected.