LORD CHELMSFORD’S ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT ISANDULA.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 2072, 14 October 1880, Page 3

LORD CHELMSFORD’S ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT ISANDULA.

Lord Strathnairn, in calling attention in the House of Lords on August 19th to Lord Chelmsford’s report on the operations of the Court of Inquiry on the action at Isandula, gave his lordship an opportunity to tell the story of this sad disaster. In easy and graceful style he gave his version of the events that led up to the disaster of Isandula, and his account was listened to with the close attention which men usually give to a well-told and animated story. After passing a high eulogium on the manly bearing and bravery of the two battalions of the 24th Regiment, Lord Chelmsford remarked : isolated hill, standing alone, with precipitous sides all round 5 its top 250 yards long, and extremely narrow. The camp was pitched on the east side of the hill, facing due east, and running north and south in the direction of the hill. The ground from that hill sloped down easy, quite like a glacis, perfectly clear of any covering which could have possibly been taken by any troops attacking it, for a distance of 800 yards, front and back. There was no ground that commanded it to the left within a distance of 1200 yards, and there was no ground that commanded it on the right at a less distance than 600 yards. Tailing, therefore, into consideration the nature of the weapons with which the Zulus were armed, it might practically be said that the camp was not commanded from any position whatever near it. With regard to tbe garrison that was left in camp, 762 Europeans remained on the ground. These Europeans were principally composed of the two battalions I have mentioned, and of volunteers and Natal police, all men skilled in the use of their weapons and thoroughly trustworthy to defend any position in which they were placed. In addition to that there were 400 or 500 Basutos, who joined the camp with Colonel Durnford ; and these men on that fatal day behaved splendidly. Everyone who escaped from that field spoke in the highest terms of their gallantry; and it is stated that they remained as long as there was any chance of doing good. So that, on a front of 250 yards there would have been 1100 Henry-Martini rifles to defend it. There would have been a wall, in fact, which completely defended the rear ; and the proportion of rifles to the running yards would have been about four. I suppose no one can say that such a provision is inadequate for the defence of such a position as I have described. When I left the camp on the early morning of January 22nd, 1879, orders were given to Colonel Pulleine and Major Carey to draw in their infantry, but to keep their vedettes and cavalry still advanced, and, at the same time, a letter was written to Colonel Durnford to move up to leandula camp and take command of it; and, in addition to written orders. Major Carey had a personal interview with Colonel Pulleine, so that it was vividly impressed on Colonel Pulleine’s mind that his orders were to defend the camp. After the forces which I accompanied went away nothing occurred until eight o’clock in the morning, when a report came in from the front to the effect that a body of the enemy were seen advancing on the northeast from the left front of the camp. Upon this Colonel Pulleine assembled all his men on an open space which lay between the men’s tents and my head-quarter tents in the centre of the hill and close underneath it. He, at the same time, sent off a mounted messenger

to communicate the news to me; but there was no information contained in the message with regard to the strength of the force of the enemy that was advancing on the north-east. “ About 9 o’clock,” says Oapt. Essex, of the 75th Regiment, “ a small force of the enemy showed itself on the hills to the left, and shortly afterwords disappeared. At ton o’clock, or between ten and half-past ten. Colonel Durnford arrived in camp, and took over the command,” according to Lieutenant Cochrane’s evidence. On the arrival of Colonel Durnford in the camp. Colonel Pulleine stated that his orders were to defend tlio camp, showing that ev©n at that early stage some difference of opinion occurred between the two officers as to the manner in which the force was to bo distributed. Between ten and eleven, while Colonels D urnford and Pulleine were talking together, reports came in from the different pickets that the enemy were in force behind the hills to the left, and were advancing in three separate columns, one moving to the left of the rear, and one towards the General. Another message came that the enemy was retiring in every direction. This last message was brought in by a man not in uniform. Upon the last report being received, Colonel Durnford said he would go out and prevent one column from joining the force supposed at that time to he engaged against the troops under the General. Sefore leaving, Colonel Durnford asked Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of the 24th Regiment, Colonel Pulleine objected, and said he would not bo justified in sending i away any men, as his orders were to defend tne camp. Colone Durnford said, “Very well; I had better no take them. I will go with my own men but,” he added, “if I get into difficulties, you must send me help.” Colonel Durnford started, but before starting he took upon himself to alter the instructions which Colone Pulleine had received to keep the infantry pickets in and only to have the cavalry vedettes out, and he ordered Colonel Pulleine to send a company of the 24th to the crest of the hill on the left, which was 3200 yards distant. Colonel Durnford started, and according to the evidence of Lieutenant Cochrene he was followed by a rocket battery, and escorted by a native contingent company. Colonel Durnford cantered away with two troops of native Basutos for a distance of five or six miles to the front, leaving the rocket battery escort to follow as best it could. He had previously ordered two other troops of Basutos to move on to the hills on the left. On arriving at a distance of five or six miles from the camp he met a man mounted who had come down from the hills on the left, and who reported to him that a very large force of the enemy were behind those hills. This report had scarcely been given in when the enemy appeared, not only on the left, but to the front also. They opened fire upon Colonel Durnford’s party at 800 yards, and moved forward in skirmishing order, twelve deep, with a support behind them. Colonel Durnford retired for two miles, and came upon the rocket battery, which had been cut up and destroyed. The enemy had been lying in ambush on the left flank, and had taken advantage of the unprotected condition of the battery. The retreat was then carried on steadily, the firing being kept up rapidly. Leaving Colonel Durnford to retire, I will now state what was taking place in the camp at that time—viz., twelve o’clock. At that hour, in camp, heavy firing was heard on the hills to the left, and shortly after Captain) Shepstone came doffH from the hills into camp, and reported to Captain Gardner, who had just returned from the main force under my command, that he had come with a request to Colonel Pulleine, from Colonel Durnford, for reinforcements to be sent out, as they wore heavily engaged. Now it was impossible that Captain Shepstone and Colonel Durnford could have met after they had once started in different directions. Therefore the only supposition is that Colonel Durnford must have given Captain Shepstone instructions when separating, that if he came into difficulties he was to use his name and go back and ask for reinforcements. Colonel Pulleine sent out those reinforcements. Two companies came into action on the crest of the hill. Shortly after a third company was sent out. Those two companies were shortly ordered to retire from the crest of the hill. They came down, pursued by Zulus, and took up a second pos ! - tion 400 yards from the base of the hill, and there made a stand. Their ammunition began to fail. Captain Essex, who had been with those two companies, went back to camp to hasten supplies. Some ammunition went out by hand, and some by mule. When he returned to those three companies he found that they had again retired, and were within 400 yards of the extreme loft of the camp. But while that episode was going on, Colonel Pulleine, when he sent out the two companies, had drawn up the remaining force, placing two guns at right angles in front of the camp, and about half a mile from it. These two guns opened fire, and being mounted guns merely, at 3400 yards they did not produce the desired effect. The Zulus pressed on and came within about four hundred yards of the line, when the three companies, in extended order, were directed to advance. They advanced thirty yards, and immediately afterwards were ordered to retire. Simultaneously with that retirement the native contingent, which had been out on the hills, fell back, and rushed into camp. The Zulus saw their opportunity and rushed in, and, before the two companies to the right had time to fix their bayonets, were amongst them. Colonel Pulleine’s force simultaneously retired, and, seeing that the position was too extended, he ordered tne mounted men, consisting of the whole company of Basutos, and forty men and volunteers, to retire into the camp in order to take up a better position, but it was too late. A general move was made to take up a final position, but it was too late, large masses of the enemy being then in the camp. That is the true, plain, and unvarnished tale. At tho last and fatal moment, when the camp had to be defended, the 1100 men that there were extended in open order on a line 2000 yards long, from right to left. Inside the camp not a man, except a few servants and orderlies, was left to defend it. It is therefore not surprising that, under those circumstances, men should have been unable to perform the duty for which they were placed there. All they could do was to die like noble and gallant soldiers, every one at hia post. The camp at Isaudula, then, was not lost from having an inefficient garrison ; it was not lost because the position was unfit for tho number of troops that had to defend it; but it was lost because the strict orders given to defend it were departed from. I regret to have opened up this painful subject, to which I have studiously abstained from alluding to in public and almost in private, because I wished to consider the feelings of persons who have lost those who were near and dear to them ; and if I have now removed any misapprehensions which may possibly have been in your lordships’ minds, regarding this sad disaster, I shall be perfectly satisfied.