THE GLOBE. MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1880.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1878, 1 March 1880, Page 2

THE GLOBE. MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1880.

That the hanky-panky trick played by the late Ministry with the plan of the Thames-Waikato railway was probably not the only instance of a class of sin which the Government of the day was in the habit of counting to itself for righteousness, and anxious that other people should so count, has all along been strongly suspected. The person who permits himself to play “ euchre ” with an extra bower in his sleeve, will probably not object to have a few supernumerary cards of value about him when the game is “ poker.” The standard of rectitude is neither elevated nor lowered by a mere change in the game. And as it is with the gambler so also with the politician; indeed if we contrast an unscrupulous gambler who is not yet found out, with an unscrupulous politician in similar security, the comparison must be all in favor of the former, inasmuch as his sphere of noxiousness is necessarily confined to a small and perhaps select circle, whereas his political analogue preys upon society at large. With respect to the stratagem adopted in the case of the Thames map, a somesomewhat curious parallel has lately been brought to light in the evidence given by Civil Commissioner Brown to the Native Commission at Hawora. Our correspondent’s summary of what transpired was published on Saturday; but in order that it may not escape the particular attention of readers we reproduce it in this place. Ho says—“ The Natives allege that Mr. Sheehan promised to produce a plan on which the reserves were laid down. It turned out in the evidence of Major Brown that no such reserves had been made during the survey, and that the lands had been advertised for sale without any reserves being made or the natives consulted in any way on the subject. But after the surveyors bad been turned off. Major Brown, being then in

Wellington, was directed by Mr. Sheehan to go to the survey office and mark off on the plans some imaginary reserve. This he did, the result being of a character quite unlikely to meet the wishes of the Natives who were never told of it or about it.” Again, a little lower down ho says—“lt also comes out that Major Brown, on his own responsibility, would have made reserves while the survey was going on, and was on the point of consulting the Natives about it when he was stopped by a telegram from Sir George Grey, which prohibited him from doing so until the Government had been consulted. The Natives were in the meantime not to know anything about it. Later on Mr. Sheehan directed Mr. Brown to disregard the telegram, but it was too late. In a few days the surveyors were ejected and nothing had been done.”

Before we proceed to show how entirely irreconcileable this testimony is with Mr. Sheehan’s statement in the House, it may be well to support Major Brown’s character against attack by citing the late Native Minister’s own opinion of him. On July 23rd ho told the House that the Civil Commissioner was “ a man who deserves the confidence of any Government, as well as this.” Again —“ I have always acted in the most perfect good faith with the Civil Commissioner, Major Brown. I have had the utmost confidence in him, and so far as I know, that good faith and confidence has been fully repaid.” To those acquainted with Major Brown’s long and useful career in Taranaki, and the estimation in which he has been held as Superintendent, Representative, and Civil Commissioner, the idea of his receiving a character at the hands of John Sheehan will be amusing; nevertheless, we give it for wbat it is worth, and as a crumb for the digestion of believers in the junior member for the Thames. To come now to Mr. Sheehan’s account of the Waimate reserve question. In his reply to Sir William Fox’s motion on the Address in Reply, Mr. Sheehan said—- “ As to the question of reserves, there is abundant evidence in writing that there was every intention to make ample reserves, and that the Natives were asked to meet ns or our officers to settle where the reserves should be made.” How is this to bo reconciled with Major Brown’s statement that he was absolutely prohibited hy special instruction from consulting the Natives on the subject ? Further on, Mr, Sheehan said—“ I can show a plan prepared by which it will be seen that nearly 4000 acres out of 16,000 acres was to be reserved for the Natives.” He omitted, however, to state that this was the reserve marked off by Major Brown in Wellington by special command, without consultation with the Natives, and without their knowing anything about it and after the surveyors had been ejected. The whole burden of Mr. Sheehan’s remarks was that “it was intended” to make reserves. Seeing that the intention was not carried out notwithstanding Major Brown’s solicitations, and that the delay in doing so, according to that officer’s view, resulted in the hostile demonstration of last year, the colony will not bo likely to accept this excuse for a piece of as thoroughly perverse mismanagement as has ever occurred, and one which has caused directly and indirectly an enormous outflow from the Treasury, and a grievous injury to numerous settlers. It is highly probable when the Commissioners hold their sitting at New Plymouth some further revelations of an interesting character will he made public. It will no doubt be remembered that on the first sign of aggressive movement on the part of Te Whiti a statement was circulated of the discovery in the New Plymouth Native office of a number of unfulfilled promises to the Natives, of which the Government had known nothing, and that this was the cause of Te Whiti’s aggression. This statement, it is needless to say, is directly contradicted by Major Brown’s narrative; but it will be well to learn precisely what grounds there wore for the promulgation of tho rumor by then Government reporters.