IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1303, 23 May 1878, Page 3

IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

["Pall Mall Budget."] The appointment, announced the other day as soon to be made, of an Imperial Committee to consider the best means of defence for our colonial ports is a step which, though taken very late in the day, must be productive of much good provided the members are carefully chosen and enter V.pon their duties free from pedantic notions. This is just one of those matters which, judiciously treated by the central authority, will tend to increase the loyalty of out rich and powerful colonic*, whilst at the s-~.mp time strengthening the whole empire both tor offence and defence; but handled in a dogmatic or dictatorial fashion it will inevitably bring about heartburning and dissatisfaction in every direction. As to the importance of the whole question at the present time there can be no two opinions. The mere sense of security that would be engendered by the knowledge that all our vantage-posts were well prepared to resist attack, and were so connected by telegraph that no enemy could hope to take us by surprise at any point, must prove of great value to us in time cf. v.jir, and still more during those periods when peace can only be preserved by feeling, and showing that we feel, indifferent to the outbreak of hostilities. At this moment we can scarcely say that we are in that position. We have enormous advantages—which most of us perhaps do, not even yet fully appreciate. But there are weak places her?. and there which might involve serious injury at the commencement of any great struggle; and tlie loss of confidence in the vigour and foresight of the Government leads men to exaggerate the possible consequences of a sudden assault upon our empire. Before proceeding far in the business of preparation it will be essential to sound each' colony as to how far it would be wilting to co-operate with the mother country. Those who havo had bvit a'dlight experience of colonial affairs know well how easy it is to arouFe jealousy and distrust. Some local politicians of our freegoverned colonies wish nothing better than an opportunity for parading themselves as the protectors of colonial independence and the colonial revenue against the demands of the Imperial Q-overnment. The colonists are loyal and generous enough at bottom, and '-•:,, a period of real danger would probacy contribute far more both i.. momy'and men to the maintenance v-.f the empire than we at home üboiud dream of asking from them ; but to take exception to most of the suggestions which emanate from the Government in ordinary times is their way of showing that they are members of a free and enlightened communi y. To make the necessary arrangements, therefore, work smoothly will, we venture to predict, prove to the full as much

a political as a military or naval problem. That difficulties in this direction will gradually melt away as we proceed we do not doubt for an instant; but they will certainly bo less formidable if they are recognised as obstacles at the outset. We have instances of what might occur at the present moment. The New Zealand Premier, though formerly the representative of the Queen in that colony, has set his face against any expenditure even now for the purpose of defending the New Zealand ports; and we paw the other day what sort of attitude the Cape colonists have assumed towards the Imperial forces. On the other hand, the loyalty of Canada has blazed out in enthusiasm, and all the Australian colonies will follow in her track.

It is gratifying to note that a groat deal of the work now contemplated has been done already. Considered merely as naval positions, and apart from the dangerous changes about to be made in the Black Sea, Armenia, and the Persian Gulf, our chain of ports on the route to India (which is also the most direct route, not only to Japan and China, but Australia and Now Zealand as well) is as strong almost as it can be made. With Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Perim, Galle, Singapore, and Hong Kong—all Imperial stations —properly provided, and with a powerful lleet in the Mediterranean, as well as in the India and China Seas, it would be difficult for any conceivable combination of Powers to damage us much in this direction. Here the important matter of coaling comes in ; and while our own vessels, if ordinary foresight is used, will be able to coal and refit at leisure along the wholo distance, no other war-ship would be able to refill her bunkers anywhere, even if she had managed to slip through the Suez Canal before war was declared. To hold our own nnd something more in the narrow seas is, of course, a necessity of empire and independence ; and here we are, or soon will be, well provided. In the Atlantic we are not, of course, so strong as on the Eastern line; but even here wo are far better off than any European Power, while even an American alliance would fail to turn the balance against us in the present enfeebled state of the American navy. Halifax and Bermuda alone would be of enormous value, and they certainly ought, as Mr Donald Currie urged the other day, to be connected by cable at once. Submarine cables and the absolute need for coal and coaling stations have largely increased our naval power, if only we use them properly and organise the whole offensive and defensive system beforehand. We can perhaps the better appreciate the power which they give us by assuming that one of them even—Bay Bermuda—were in the hands of an enemy. Reason the more that we should provide carefully against the danger of any sudden coup de main. St. Helena and the Falkland Islands are both important points in the South Atlantic; and while the former is not connected even yet by telegraph with the Cape of Good Hope, the Falkland Islands, which might command the route round the Horn, are altogether unprotected, and at the mercy of a sudden wellplanned attack. An enemy could do us permanent injury by seizing such a point and fortifying it; it might then bo used as a rendezvous for swift war vessels that would do damage until they were captured or sunk. In the Pacific, to whicli probably the attention of the new committee when appointed will bo specially directed, we have the means ready to our hand of making our commerce as secure as elsewhere if we only avail ourselves of them. As we have frequently said, the Australian and New Zealand ports, and the Australian and New Zealand coal, cannot fail to give us the control of the South Pacific Ocean if they are put to proper use; butforyears past the question has dallied on, and now at this critical time, Melbourne and Sydney, Adelaide and Brisbane, the Bay of Islands—a perfect coaling station —Auckland, Dunedin, and Fiji, are either inadequately defended or are not defended at all, and telegraphic communication is dangerously incomplete. Victoria, Vancouver's Isliud, is in a similar defenceless condition ; while from that point to Fiji, and in the other direction to Hong Kong, we have no naval rendezvous of any sort. In this we are, of course, no worse off than any other nation, with the exception of the United States, which has an arrangement with the Sandwich Islands that, in our judgment, we ought to imitate. This comparative unpreparedness in the Pacific should certainly be remedied as far as possible by increasing the strength of our squadrons in that ocean, now by no means so powerful as they should be. Still, every allowance being made for shortcomings here and there —and wo, at least, have never shrunk from pointing them out — it is easy to understand from this rapid survey of our Imperial and colonial vantageposts the envy with which we are regarded by the rest of the world. It is in the European Council Chamber, not on the ocean, that we. shall surrender our maritime superiority if we are foolish enough to listen to the suggestions of those who begin to consider themselves the heirs to our commercial greatness. One sentence in Prince Bismarck's late speech has escaped notice amid the Hood of criticism that lias been poured on other portions of it, Germany, he averred, would be able to act as mediator with Great Britain, and with her she had only "a commercial rivalry." The commercial rivalry between Germany and England at present is about on a par with the military rivalry between Boumania and Russia; but if we can only be induced to neutralise the advantages we possess in our enormous fleet and our unrivalled positions all over the globe by tying our own hands for offensive purpose, then indeed those who envy them may hope to become the heirs to our wealth and our power. The German Chancellor (we do not blame him) is striving to attain at sea a strength in some degree commensurate with that which he has secured for his country on land. As England has rejected his overture.M for joint arrangements and persists in isolating herself, his influence may be used in forming a league—not ncoessarily for immediate use—against the "British interests," which we have so paraded to the exclusion of honor and dignity. Thero is not a nation on the Continent that decs not rejoice in our loss of prestige in the East; there is not one that would not welcome the crippling of our maritime supremacy. The very hesitation and incapacity which the Government hare -hown in dealing with foreigners renders i■*. the •nor'! necessary that we should confirm the confidence of our own people by prompt preparation for defence ; and as a step to this great end we welcome the appointment of this new committee.