VITAL SEA FIGHT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20919, 20 October 1942, Page 3

VITAL SEA FIGHT

SOLOMONS ISSUE JAPAN’S MAXIMUM BID AIR POWER’S INFLUENCE (By Telegraph—Presß Assn. —Copyright.) (Special Australian Correspondent.) (11 a.m.) SYDNEY, Oct. 20. In the obscurity of official reticence and the confusion of conflicting opinion among the world’s war news analysis, one prime fact stands out in the battle for the Solomons. It is that the Japanese are intent upon pouring into this “war crucible’’ the maximum strength of ships, planes and men they are able to muster. Anything less man complete victory for Japan will carry the tacit implication of eventual defeat in the Pacific war. It will be an admission that Japan’s power by sea and air is no longer capable of sustaining, still less expanding, her Pacific empire. In her efforts to win back the Solomons, Japan has withdrawn strength from her main bases in the central Pacific, probably from the Netherlands East Indies and apparently from New Guinea. That sne is unable to maintain her New Guinea offensive while preparing for the Solomons blow is, in itself, an admission of comparative weakness. There nave seen few war Observers who'believed that the American grip on the south-eastern Solomons was complete and secure. It has been widely held that. Japan ’could retake the islands—if she was prepared to pay a price sufficiently high. Gravest Danger The gravest danger to the Allies’ broad Pacific strategy is, perhaps, less that the islands may be retaken than that the urice of their recapture be not sufficiently high in irreplaceable ships and aircraft. A decisive victory for the Allies in the naval battle which, if not already joined, is almost certainly looming, would mark a real start of the much-talked-of islandhopping offensive against Japan. By taking the southern Solomons the Americans merely positioned themselves for such an offensive. While Japan may have won local air supremacy in the Solomons, although this is still in dispute, it has been gained only at the expense of other theatres. On the broader Pacific front, air superiority now lies with the United Nations. Japan’s sea losses in this attrition war have been heavy and may well be an eventual decisive factor. Among the 368 Japanese vessels'claimed to have been sunk during the war, Mr William Fleisher, former editor of the Japanese Advertiser, lists six aircraft-carriers, 24 cruisers, 45 destroyers, 29 submarines, 93 transports, 12 supply ships and 99 merchant ships. Double Strategy

Further heavy losses in the Solo-' mons naval battle, unless these were compensated for by the crippling defeat of the American fleet, would put Japan definitely on the defensive. The first aim in the double strategy motivating the American occupation of the south-eastern Solomons was to break the keystone of Japanese encirclement in the south-west Pacific and protect the Allied supply line. The second was to draw the Japanese navy into a position where its valuable units would become vulnerable to attack by Allied ships and aircraft. “At the moment the second objective seems to have been too successful,” according to the war commentator in the Christian Science Monitor, •’but not until word comes from the silent United States Fleet will it be possible to tell whether the Japanese nave run into the trap or whether their naval striking force has again been under-estimated.” Where Are U.S. Battleships? The correspondent , adds that the appearance of Japanese battleships off the Solomons has given rise to the question: Where are the big United states battle waggons? Two- factors affect ansv/er. United States naval men still believe that a full-dress engagement between capital ships is a distinct possibility. Thus the American ships must remain where they may best serve for such ar. event. Alternatively, knowing the Japanese penchant for economy of force the United States may decide that the Solomons could be defended and reinforced by heavy cruisers alone. But there is no reason to suppose that the United States reinforcement by capital ship strength is impossible. #

Air supremacy, perhaps, depending on the American ability to hold Guadalcanal- airfield and maintain it in commission, is likely to influence the outcome of any major naval battle. But it is this battle which will decide the whole future course of the Pacific war. Until the question of Pacific naval supremacy has been decided, ihe course of the war in this theatre must remain incalculable and liable to sudden upsets.