AXIS PROBLEMS

Evening Star, Issue 24281, 24 August 1942, Page 3

AXIS PROBLEMS

GERMANY'S HOPES IN RUSSIA RAGE AGAINST WINTER {British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, August 22. Questioned with reference to ' the opening of a second front in Europe, a Wilhelmstrasso military spokesman admitted that it was possible, “provided it was attempted with sufficient men and equipment.” The spokesman, who is quoted by the correspondent of ‘ The Times ’ on the German frontier, added that failure to open a second front would substantially improve the Axis prospects for next spring if. as was hoped, the Russian campaign was concluded decisively by the end of September at the latest. Then asked to define what he meant by “decisively,” the spokesman said the Gorman leader's now realised the impossibility of occupying the whole of Russia, hence the High Command must sooner or later choose a line to mark the extremity of the advance that could easily be held against Russian counter-attacks, and behind which economic exploitation of occupied Russia could proceed undisturbed. Little, however, would he gained if the Russians succeeded in withdrawing with their armies intact behind the Volga. Nor would the German purpose he achieved unless the Russian military equipment was destroyed and resuscitation prevented by the occupation or paralysis of the supply routes through Persia, Murmansk, and Archangel.

The correspondent says that if the Russians are not smashed and isolated they will, as last year, organise a winter offensive, thus keeping in the field several million Germans whose release during the winter for munitions making is vital if another offensive is to be undertaken next spring. In view of the approach of winter, Marshal Timoshenko’s continual retreats and delaying action are causing the German High Command great uneasiness.

The German High Command/prefers great pitched battles, making possible destruction of the Russian Army. If the Russians were reduced to impotence before the end of September the winter interval would bo employed in preparation for the invasion of England in the spring of 1943. Wide differences of opinion exist between German military experts about the feasibility of this plan, many being sceptical about its success rinless Japan is induced to invade Siberia. Japan thus far Jias not undertaken to comply with tlie German wishes, and is less disposed to do so after the attack in the Solomons.