THE USE OF TANKS

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 117, 14 November 1939, Page 10

THE USE OF TANKS

, The German idea of the use of tanks is that they should be employed to ! protect infantry while artillery is on | the move, or in flank attacks, or massed "at the point where the decision is I sought." They are the modern shock troops, and they are not tied too closeily to the infantry, so that their possibilities may not be limited. Little attention is paid to the use of cover; apparently the intention is to use a curtain of fire to provide this cover. The importance of this is constantly stressed. The German regiment which provides this fire-power had, at the outbreak of war, 85 light machineguns, 42 heavy machine-guns, 27 light and 18 medium trench mortars, 6 light and 2 heavy "infantry guns," and 12 37mm anti-tank guns. There is repeated insistence that speed is more important than caution. However, the value of reconnaissance is fully appreciated, and the air force is tied to the army to a much greater extent than is held necessary by British military thought. And'there ismuch emphasis on "verschleierung" and "tarnung," two words difficult to translate so as to render the difference between them. The first means the hiding of intentions by the use of offensive advanced guards (fixing attacks), night marches, feints, protection against enemy reconnaissance, and secrecy. The second means camouflage, the screening of; roads, the dousing of lights at night-time; the tactics of the 1918 offensive again. These general tactical principles were tested in Poland. They demonstrated that they were completely realistic and capable of. application in the circumstances. They were, of- course, used against an enemy who was unable to penetrate the veil before the German plans. The fastest set the pace in the Polish invasion, the tanks far outdistanced the infantry, and were saved from annihilation, by close co-operation with German aircraft which attacked centres of resistance. But the Germans had such an advantage in material that they would probably have succeeded in Poland even without the tactical skill they revealed, there. So it is yet uncertain that the Nazi military ideas can be employed on the Western Front. Only a large-scale attack, launched with great violence, can show the Germans whether their ideas hold against properly-prepared positions* and the odds against the success of such an attack are believed to be very heavy-