THEORY OF WARFARE

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 117, 14 November 1939, Page 10

THEORY OF WARFARE

NAZI MILITARY IDEAS

POLAND & WESTERN FRONT

The continued speculation whether the Germans will not even now launch an offensive gives interest to the theories of warfare held in the Reich, and the effect of Polish experience. At the end of last month, even though the rivers were flooded from autumn rains, the state of the ground apparently did not rule out a, possible offensive move; and British military leaders were studying the Polish campaign to gain a complete understanding of German methods in case a push should be attempted soon. It must be remembered that the principles of warfare are not new, that they are recognised in the manuals of every General Staff and that the difficulty is to determine how to apply them in varying circumstances. The value of mobility, of the doctrine of infiltration, the principle that there must be no count of fatigue in pursuit of a beaten foe; these are known to everyone. But study reveals different emphasis laid upon different elements, and it is thus that the mind of the enemy is read and his intentions construed. Military doctrine is, in essence, as much a social phenomenon as political doctrine. That is to say, it is influenced by the state of the national mind. Nazi Germany, like Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, is arrogant, confident. She is also neurotic, impatient, and inclined to risk-taking. Therefore there is a strong element of the adventurous in modern German military theory- Yet the operations in Poland, in type, were of the kind that might have been carried out in the great offensive of 1918, had modern armament been available at that time.

Today the general principles of the German offensive are these: the attack is to be carried out i» great depth, in irregular dispositions without narrowly defined objectives. Every unit moves under the, protection of its own fire. Where breaches are made in the opposing forces the troops near these breaches press forward and strive to disintegrate a whole section of the front by their onward movement (infiltration) . The German theory here calls for rapid advancing; the French believe in lateral expansion of the attack. Reconnaissance must never be placed second to protection. In short, the German aim today is to overcome that paralysis' which set in when armies grew to their present size. Decentralisation is the aim, orders' are made as little detailed as possible, troops are not allowed to think of their objective as a line, and much freedom of judgment is allowed to subordinate commanders. So far, it will be seen, all this aims at the old goals of mobility and a flexible plan. This decentralisation does not apply to the infantry alone; it is applied also to artillery, which is now available for supporting the division,, the lowest fighting formation, instead of the'army corps. Even accuracy of shooting is subordinated to rapidity in opening fire. ...■,.■.".