WORK AND WAGES
USE OF STRIKE WEAPON
ARBITRATION IN NEW ZEALAND
CRITICISM OF THE COURT SYSTEM,
On Saturday evening, at tlie Red Cross Room, Dison Btreet, Professor B. E. Murphy, o£ Victoria, University College, continued his series of short-course lectures on "Economic Problems" for the Workers' Educational Association, and delivered an interesting address on "The Legal Regulation of Labour." "The strike or lock-out is usually but wrongly regarded as almost an offence," said the lecturer, "tut this is an unsound view. Industry is a voluntary bargain among free individuals, and it is the essence of the matter that tho -parties should disagree at "times as to the meaning or advantage of their contracts. As the industrial surplus is decided by a trial of strength, and not by any necessary or natural principle of justice, it is distributed by diplomatic pressure, which involves in the background the existence of force, though it is so drastic a thing that it should be used as sparingly as possible. The possibility and occasional actuality or strikes must be frankly faced. The loss occasioned by the strike is great, involve ing reduced earnings, lack of food, dimin' ished production, public inconvenience, and a legacy of hatred and victimisation, but the fear of such consequences is one of the reasons why strikes are relatively, infrequent, and why the fear of them may bring about an agreement. Strikes, even when apparently a failure, as they, mostly are, may be advantageous by their effect on the future actions of the parties. They should, however, be avoided where possible, and elaborate systems of industrial peace have been built up to avoid them aa far as can be done. FORMS OF MEDIATION. Mediation by a third party is often, useful in view of the fact that much industrial dislocation is the result of personal animus, anger, and wounded vanity. When the parties are standing on their dignity, and afraid to move lest this should be regarded as a sign of weakness, a mediator can often do much, especially if the mediation is confidential, so that neither party is committed. Publicity anil investigation are useful to focus public opinion, but usually lead the parties to posture for public support, make them litigious, and may draw them further anart. than ever. Industrial negotiations are , most successful when private. Conciliation ia the most effective method, for it may avoid a definite rupture, while ullowing little'room for advocacy or the litigious spirit, and it commits neither party. It is better to have a small group of negotiators, to avoid the imposition of money penalties for breach, and to rely on good faith. Referendum back to the rank and file is a mistake, as it reopens the whole controversy and causes the negotiators to avoid responsibility by shifting it on to the ill-informed and mentally inflamed general body. Arbitration is useful in interpretation disputes, and, in any case, is usually preferable to a total stoppage. The trouble is that if the arbitrator is an unbiassed outsider he is usually not sufficiently conversant with conditions in the dispute, while if attached to the industry he is bound to lean to one side or the other. There is no necessary principle of justice, and the tendency is to split the difference. This affects the tactics of the parties, who allow for it in their demands and offers. . ARBITRATION AND PRICE LEVELS. Compulsory arbitration is confined to Australia and New Zealand, and has not epinmended itself to the rest of the world. | Introduced in 1894 primarily to settle hours and wages, it has become a regulative assembly for the adjustment of all industrial conditions in New Zealand, and has been alternately denounced and applauded by employers and workers, being popular for the time being with that side, which, in the absence of the Court, would be in the strategically inferior position. The worker always appears the aggressor in the industrial struggle, even when he is really acting defensively, because the employer, being in control of industry, can make such arrangements or changes as he likes, and leave the men to take action if they do not like it. It is usually said that the Act abolished strikes and raised wages, but there would have been a rise in wages and few strikes, even if it had not existed, since conditions on its inauguration were favourable. In the 'nineties the world price level began'to rise, there was much wealth as the result of refrigeration and the public works policy, labour was greatly m demand, and purchasing power at any reasonable price was great. Employers, finding the industrial situation favourable, paid the arbitration wage and passed it on, with a profit. The tariff protected the employer and gave him a command of the internal market, and under its shelter he was able to pass Borne of the benefit to his workers! The system was really a bonus to employers and workers, protected by the tariff and the Court, at. the expense of the rest of the community. After a while this artificial system showed itself in a rise in the cost of living, so that the rise in wages was partly nominal, and where not was obtained at the expense of the consuming public. In later years strikes began again, though many of the stoppages were admittedly trivial. From 1894 to 1915 there were 148 strikes and lock-outs, 53 in defiance of the Act, and from 1906 to 1924 there were 612, an average of over 30 a year. Our industries are after all unimportant, and the most essential activities lie outside the Act. "AN ECONOMIC SHOCK ABSORBER." A court is too clumsy for tho regulation of industry, introducing a dead level of uniformity, and encouraging the idea that wages depend on the Judge's fiat and not on the economic situation, If the Court does not develop precedents it lands in chaos; if it does, its discretion is fettered, while if Parliament does not interfere with it, it creates a legislative authority. outside itself, and if it does interfere it impairs the prestige and authority of the tribunal. As a matter of fact, it is an economic shock absorber, and tries to give an award such as the parties, if reasonable, would come to by mutual agreement. It would have collapsed long ago but for the extraordinary ability of its successive Judges. It breeds a litigious spirit and turns union secretaries into industrial barristers with about as.much concern for justice as a legal ■ advocate. It assumes as a basic principle that master and man are fundamentally at variance and get no jurisdiction until a dispute arises. It prevents tho parties from exploring other avenues of industrial harmony, and keeps their noses to the grindstone of controversy. It is inconsistent with joint control or continuous consultation, along which line future peace seems to lie. It is an imposition from without, whereas industrial peace and justice can only be a growth from within. In addition, it is peripatetic, vexatiously slow, and cumbersome. There is too much scaffolding and too little building. It begs the question of social justice and assumes the validity of the existing system of distribution, which is exactly the point which the "advanced" worker now disputes. It must in the long run lead to State fixation of rent, interest, and profits, since all the distributive_ shares are connected, and this means Socialism, which was not contemplated by the inaugurators of the Act. This is realised by (some in Australia, but hardly as yet in New Zealand. It can never be final because the utmost the employer can concede falls short of. what the worker will demand, and appeals are now heard for an industrial truce—that is, to shut it down and give the parties a chance to oome to terms by unassisted negotiation. The existence of a weapon of industrial coercion in ths background will always be a temptation to men, on whatever Field, who think the circumstances of tho moment are in their favour. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. The State should lay down minimum standards of wages and conditions generally, and above that leave the parties to light it out, sensibly recognising the possibility of stoppages, since they occur anyhow. In essential services, where cessation of work is dangerous as a menace to public health and safety, the right to strike might reasonably be surrendered in exchange for official arbitral protection, but hevc a principle of justice is available, the rate paid for similar work in private employment. The Arbitration Court has no principle to apply to cases in general. There is no inimeiKufco prosppct of the elimination of this system, or even aiiy general recognition of its futility. IE the demand for protection for secondary industries grows it will probably be supported by such unions as use the Act, which will be ennployed by them
as a weapon to secure their share o£ the plunder obtained through the tariff. "Once remove the tariff and the Act would wither up like a hot-house plant exposed to the air."
A spirited discussion followed. The final lecture of the series will be given next Saturday evening, when Professor Murphy will deal with the question of the "Worker in the Past, the Present, and the Future." The public are cordially invited to attend.
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXII, Issue 60, 8 September 1926, Page 10
Word Count
1,552WORK AND WAGES Evening Post, Volume CXII, Issue 60, 8 September 1926, Page 10
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