ENEMY’S GUESSES

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 197, 18 May 1944, Page 5

ENEMY’S GUESSES

Allies’ Strategy Of Invasion TASK FOR GERMANS There has been much talk about Allied invasion plans. \ ery little has been written about the German point ol view. In fact, one may well ask: y hat can the Germans do about the invasion. 1 ' Lneir task is by no means simple. It is somewhat similar to a game of chess with tne disadvantage that the other side alone knows what chessboard will be used; it would be of little use for the Germans to start the game on a board not being used by the opposing players. The first problem the Germans ha\e to face is whether they intend to renounce the initiative or to stage an attack on Britain if possible before the Allied « • tack. Though their lack of aircraft, ships, and sufficient forces rules out an invasion, this does not mean that 11 Ul* mice landings may not take 1 or at any subsequent time. It theu the Germans decide that their forces are.not iu a position to take large-scale initiative t’i'y must set their pieces m suclv a wav mat when 'the chessboard is revealed those pieces may be readily assembled upon it to their athantai.e. 11A *The Military minds of Germany know that they cannot hope to station oiei whelming strength at all Possible parts of this European chess board. The in vaders must be pernutted to reveal the ir plans before steps are taken to await those plans. Careful pre-invasion reconnaissance can give the German experts A clue to probable action, but it cannot re veal a definite clue. Eor example, there may be large ship concentrations at B - tol, as the Germans state. This offers no clue to how, where, or when tqose concentrations will strike. It IS possible that camouflage in all its varieties will play its part to mislead the Germans. Main Enemy Defence. The Atlantic Wall has come to be regarded as the main enemy defence, inis Fs probably incorrect. It cannot do more than delay Allied landings, and during that delay the Germans must decide, by guess, intuition, or deduction, where the main thrusts will come. Reserves held far inland must then be sent to those areas to parry the Allied thrusts. A wrong guess means disaster, because U is impossible to move large armies about the face of the Continent after the manner of pieces on a chessboard. There fore, probably everything will be done to delay the initial Allied landings. Undoubtedly surface craft and the Luftwaffe will be used to that end. .Mmes, booby traps abd every other delaying factor will be There is another factor which must keep the German generals guessing. Aarborne troops can now establish in a slioit time a Continental invasion army as great as those involved at Waterloo. The German experts may be confronted wltil this problem, which may in its turn delav their moves and may force the experts to recast their plans, at short notice. It is quite impossible for the German experts to guess what localities have been chosen for formidable concentrations of airborne invasion. There are vast areas suitable for the purpose. We might, in fact, see these inland opeiations succeeding while the coastal invasion was delayed or held up temporarily. A further complication which win keep the German High Command guessing is their inability to know far ahead what communication lines are open to them for the movement of large bodies Oi troops. Their lack of air superiority virtually makes it impossible for them to see the whole of the chessboard, or to know if the pieces can or cannot be moved in time. In one night the Allied air fore, could make it impossible for a German army to move from “A” to 1 B in a specified time. The people of I ranee, Belgium, Holland, and even Germany itser have an underground movement which will make our espionage system ot tarreaching significance in the coming operations.—43.A.A. .