ROLCHAK'S FAILURES
THE CAUSES EXAMINED
WHAT RUSSIA HAS DONE
A BRITISH OFFICER'S IMPRESSIONS A British officer who has taken an activo part in the operations in Siberia sends the London "Morning Post" the following impressions of the situation in Russia, and particularly of tho condition of Admiral Kolchnk's armies and of tho part played by Great Britain in tho struggle. Tho attitude of Japan in Siberia lends special interest to the subject at present:— Since Kolchnk's successful offensive, early this year, the anti-Bolshevist troops on the Siberian front have suffered an unbroken series of reverses. The most serious nspeot of this retirement, in ninny ways, is that it involves the indefinite postponement of n. real junction with the armies of General Dekinin. By. a real junction is meant a junction enabling communication to be made by means of the railway system in a south-easterly direction from Moscow. Let us examine 6oriie of the causes of this series of misfortunes' to the armies of Admiral Kolchak. The standard of moral and discipline in the Siberian armies has never been very good, compared with our own stnndards, and i>t the present time it is extremely bad. There are several reasons for this state of affairs.
Lack of Discipline. First, it 'is impossible to establish proper discipline in an army unless discipline exists in the nation itself. Tho installation of discipline into our hastily raised new armies, after the outbreak of war, was rendered comparatively simple by the fact that we had a very fair standard of national discipline. Those who have not seen for themselves would find it difficult to believe the astounding things that occur in Siberia, due to this lack of national discipline. This stato of affairs is undoubtedly due to a general feeling of insecurity, a feeling that the masters of to-dav may bo the servants of to-morrow, a feeling that is tho natural outcome of what Russia hnsyundergone in tho last few years.' This'feeling expresses itself in a tendency for all,, except the very best 'men. to relax their normal standards of effort for a common cause and of everyday wobitv and single-mindcdnesa. .We frequently find cases of the custodians of law and order, the police nnd the troops, indulging in plundering of peasants and others whom they have been sent out to protect against the numerous small bands of robbers who still infest .Siberia. Tho most glaring cases of bribery and corruption continue unchecked as a result of tho general -slack feelins of "laisscz fairo" which prevails. The reader will be tempted to ask whether this is not a sign of weakness on the aart of the Government. To this I would wply that Kolchak's Government is probably as strong as it is possible for tnv Government in Siberia to be under tho present conditions. Kolchak himself is a great-minded patriot who hns YOluntnrily, and with no motives of .•elf-advancement, taken on himself one of the most difficult tasks that over confronted a man. Taking into consideration the difficulties ho has had to contend with, it is wonderful tho extent to which he has-restored order out of chaos. It is generally thought that ho is unfortunnto in som.o of his subordinates, and, at the present moment, many chsinses sro boing made in his Ministers to rectify this. Latterly, also, there has been noticeable a marked stiffening of national discipline, and a number of highlv-Dlaced officials, guilty of irregularities, have been brought to book and Ditnished i>s.they deserved
, Officers and Men. Tho second causo of the poor moral and discipline of the Siberian Army, which every soldier would look for first, is tho standard of its officers. The majority of the old Russian officers, comparablo to our "old contcmptibles," who escaped being massacred during the days of tho revolution went away down south. These are now all fighting in Deniki'n'6 army, which accounts for the success lie has achieved, and for tho comparative failure on the Siberian front. Kolchak has been much handicapped in raising his armies by the great dearth of trained officers of tho old standard, with whom to train and lead his troops. Tho old regular Russian officer, different as he is from our officers, and with all his faults, was a very, highly trained officer. Their knowledge of .the theory of war is quite as good as ours, though wo aro perhaps more up-to-date in some of tho very latest refinements of modern war. The principal difference between them and ours lies in their relations towards their men... They do not seem to have the same idea of looting after their men as the British officer does. The result :'s that under extreme strain their discipline will not stand. The reason for tho very different attitude of tho Russian officor is tho great gap there is between officers and men. Their men, generally speaking,.are of a class entiroly Tacking in, culture; many of them, the majority, in fact, are illiterate and incapable of thinking and reasoning after - the manner of tho British soldier. Thero is no doubt, however, ; that, properly trained and led, they possess qualities of potential soldiers of the Highest order. A third cause, is. to be found in the material available for making tho r-rmies in Siberia, a point on which Russian officers 'themselves 'dwell. Up to the outbreak of war thero had been a constant influx into, Siberia of emigrants from Russia. " These were partially".peasants, , coming to cultivate the fertile steppes of .Siberia, and partly those coming to develop the great mineral wealth of Siberia consequent on tho opening up of the Trans-Sibcr'ian Railway. The Russians themselves say. that their best men did not emigrate, and seem to have n comparatively poor opinion of the Siberians. Without a profound knowledge of both it is not possiblo for the outsider to form an opin'on of any value.
Safe From the Reds, Fourthly, the people of Siberia have never gone through the appalling horrors wnich the people of Russia havo suffered under the Bed regime of the liolsheviki. They view matters from a very narrow and selfish point of view. They object, after the manner of certain persons in .England, to the' payment of taxes to tho State,, and to being called upon to, fight for their liberty. They fail to realise that by comparison with the lot of those under the rule of the Beds their present situation is almost Paradise. Their state of mind has been i'nlluonced still, more by tho efficient propaganda with which the Bolshoviki have flooded tho country. There havo been a number of risings due to this- Bolshei A propaganda, but t'hey havo all been suppressed, thanks to the vigorous measures taken to deal with them. Lastly, tho troops on this front have had to go through a long campaign under terrible conditions of defeat, lack of proper military supplies, clothes, etc., conditions calculated to undermine the courago of the best troops. Those who havo had tho good fortune to seo our own armies in tho field know tho extent lo which we try' to givo the British soldier everything possible 'to, make him happy and healthy. Ho is well clothed, well equipped, well-quartered when possible; when sick ho is properly cared for; no-, thing is too good for him. Mattors aro very different for our Bussian comrades on tho Siberian front. Thanks to the niggardly assistance -given to Kolchnk by the Allies, his unfortunate troops, havo suffored throughout from lack of almost everything that an army requires. With the thermometer standing at 40 degrees below zero (Fahrenheit), i.0., with over 70 degrees of frost, wounded would lie brought in to a roughly made shelter of branches, if they were lucky, and would have their wounds "dressed" with scraps of nowspaper. I quote this one instance typical of many others, and not confined to medical needs nlone, as an example of the conditions which Kolehak's hoops havo to fight, through.no fault of their) own or of their Government, but thanks j to tho efforts of the "hands off Russia" party at home and in the countries of our Allies.
Half-hearted Assistant, It is outside my scope to dosorllw the activities or trie British Mißsion in Sibo™, beyond r-emarking that the pres-
once of the Mission, quite apnrt from its activities, does a great deal of good. There linvc been rumours current in sonio places in this country to (lie effect (hat the Mission was to bo withdrawn, with the. result that Russians, officers and civilians, aro constantly asking members of tho Mission if this is true. Tho denial of tlio report affords them great satisfaction. Tho presence of a small number of British officers and non-com-missioned officers serves as the "outward nnd visible sign" of the support of the British Empire, and has an excellent effect on the moral of the people. In addition to this, it seems to have n good effect on discipline generally, possibly owing to the natural desire of most people to try to show off their own institutions to the best advantage in the presenco of foreigners.
| There is a general feeling of dissatisfaction among Brilishois m Siberia at tho half-hearted nssistnnoe which the British Government is giving Russia, especially on this front. The question of sending troops, strongly advocated by the great majority of Riis?inns, is one on which one is unable to form an opinion without knowing the political situation at Home more fully than one. does. It is, however, beyond doubt that the presence of a small proportion of Allied troops, preferably British, .at the front would have made and jionM mnko a vastdifference to tho situation. The moral of the Siberian armies would improvo out iof recognition, and the moral of the Rods would correspondingly tlelcriorate. It is probable that it would scarcely be necessary for the British troons to fight to any serious xtent. Bv the standard of modern first-class troons the Bod troops iut but a sorry fi?uro. At the same time one must bear in mind that they are trained and led. to n. considerable extent, by German, Austrian, and Hungarian officers, and that thev are opposed on this front by troons inferior to them in'equipment and training and of greatly reduced moral
Wait and See, ; Apart from the question of sending troons. there is one way in which the Allied Governments couid deal n deathblow to Bolshevism, and that is- by recognising, lornially, the Government of Admiral Kolchak. Such a step would have an instantaneous effect in all directions. National discipline and moral would receive a much-neodeu stimulus, all would set to work with renewed enerev with no uncertainty as to the future._ If wo are to believo the various official announcements on tho subiect. Admiral Kolchak satisfied the conditions laid down by the Great Powers as a basis for recognition. We were told that formal recognition was only a matter of a few days, and what lias hnpDcned? Nothing. It would seem that tno Great Bowers have decided on the weak policy of waiting to see who is most likely to win before risking anything. Thev fail to realise that with very little assistance Kolchak and his supporters would be in a position to overthrow Bolshevism in no time.
It is obvious to anyone who has any knowledec of Bolshevism, that, in no circumstances can we allow Bolshevism to gain tho upper hand. All the anti-Bol-shevik Governments in Russia have realised the necesiaty of unity, and have rccoirnised Kolchak as their supreme Governor. Why, then, do wo hesitate to recognise Kolchak and thereby hasten the end of the present conflict? Tho British Government takes great credit to itself for the ass'istanco in material which it has provided for Russia. It is understood that General Denikin has received considerable help in this waj;, but tho assistance given in Siberia is minute, compared to requirements and to the resources of the Allies. -Wo should bear in mind, moreover, that Russia has to pay us for all sho receives, and that it is a God-send for us to find a market for our vast stock of surplus war stores.
Russia's Casualties. People at home are rather apt to tako 'a biassed point of view of what we owe Russia. It is common to regard her as the defaulting partner who nearly brought us to. grief by her premature withdrawal from tlio Alliance. It should bb evident to us that no nation in tlio position of Russia would have willingly accepted the terras which Russia was given, exeept under absolute compulsion, nor would any nation, of its own choice, havo laced the appalling horrors which Russia has had to endure, thanks to tlio devilish machinations of the Germans. Tlio British public would do well to remember that, if Russia had not fought tho Huns for' over two years, in spite of the fact' that liov wholo fabric was honeycombed with German agents, wo should never havo had tho respite- to train our Now Annies, of which the said British public is 60 justly proud. Russia has had the heaviest casualties of any bolligerent in tho war, and, it is commonly cons.dered, saved Our front from being broken by fighting the battle of Tannenburg. Tho Russian point of, view is: "We gave you tremendous help as long as wo could, and contributed to tho final victory which you gained. Now that we are on our beam ends, tho least you can do is to help us."
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Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 87, 7 January 1920, Page 7
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2,249ROLCHAK'S FAILURES Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 87, 7 January 1920, Page 7
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