ALLIED STRATEGY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 103, 24 January 1918, Page 9

ALLIED STRATEGY

MB. LLOYD GEORGE AND SIR DOUGLAS lIAIG STORY OF A RECENT CRISIS (Sydney "SunV Special Eepresentaiive!) London, November ]y. These have been the blackest days of the Alliance, for upon tho'terrible tragedy of Italy there has bc-nn superimposed a suddpu true recogntt-ion. of our difficulties on the West front. The iyearis sliding away with the Allies in distinctly a worse position than at last Christinas. No one now speaks of vk'- , torv within a year. To-day crisis 13 based upon Italy's debacle, but hag a deopcr spring—fcliat of dissatisfaction, \yit-h our soldier leaders and their strategy. Tho Prime Minister has come out into tlie open ivith views which.he has hna, beeiv known to hold. They are— (l'j That ?ome better way must be found than isolated and disconnected offensives on the West front, and (2) that a stem test of success, must be applied to military commanders in tho field. Many minor issues hang upon these two first essentials of tho Lloyd Georgo doctrine -seek out a nnified : scheme oC attack for all the Allies, and break down the rigid. eseksivo military caste so that the best brains may come to the ton in divisions, .corps, and army organisa*-. tions. ■ v ' ■

Tho tievi War Coutiqilr When the Germans dosmnA 4 ■ Italy they prepared' tlie > ed 1 l ,^ u that large sections of "J ™ were J^!"»! W even disb*v-*' Vf, *™J?nie potions fiome " -s*!**" theraselves .and went O •;_ *f heth.er a Supreme Allied War yiWticil frauia nave saved Italy is (lotibtfut. Mr. Lloyd George says that it would have mixed all these Western armies imparting to each the particular qualities of the others, and that the German offensive would have been withheld. Certainly he himself proposed three months ago that British nnd French troops should be sent to the Isonzo and Carso fronts. The suggestion, he says, was not even considered by those whose part to go deeply into it. tt was certainly grave]v considered, find bitterly assailed, by British generals. During Septemlifr and October nothing was more heatedly scorned by British generals than this proposal that British troops should go from the West front to Italy. Now thoy have gone; and they arc too latfi.

Tins experience was in Mr. Lloyd George's mind when ho declared for a Sunrerco Council. He *a\v that each commander was obsessed with his own front, and with bis own forces; .that each commander intently interested himself in "spcurins tho fullest possible forces for liis front, nnd in retaining those be had. Mr. Lloyd Georyi>. has never boon a belmvcr, in the West front. Lonar ago bis imagination was struct by the tremendous power of modern, machine-gun defence, and the defensive ' pow.er of groups of artillery. His imagination, has hover been able to see a way through such obstacles. He has agreed that with two claws of the pincers working—with Russia hammering at one section of the German Army, whilst Britain ahd Franco,hammer at the other—there would ho a crack and a break. But he lias not been capable of such stolid, thinking as that of the Western strategists—the cold and calculating theorising on which the 'hopes of German attrition depend. Ho lias never agreed that German fighting morale nnd German numbers are very near tho collapsing- point. Who can yet say which: is right? ■ •■ c

What Mr. Lloyd -George saw in Italy brought him sharply to tho conclusion that a great effort must ho made to have tho Allied armies treated strategically as one. :; The Paris Speech, At Rapallo, the pleasant Italian township at which the Prime Ministers. and their • principal military advisers met, Mr. Lloyd George had with him General Smuts. There were three other Britieh' Generals—-Robertson,

Maurice, and Wilson—buf, the significant military niait Was Smuts. For General Sinutr, lakes boldly the view *f tho Americans, of tho Australian military leaders, of the Canadians— tho view pf new world minds upon an old problem—that them should he no hesitation in sacrificing careers, prejudices, jealousies, and even national rights, -in a great war involving ail the world. The Echemo put forward for the now body was largely tho scheme or General damiie Smuts. It was fathered, advocated, and urged by Lloyd George. It was eagerly accepted by French and Italian generals, and it is now accepted by tho United States which had indeed commissioned its Minister PlonipotolUiafyj Colonei Mouso to .put fohvßra and secure a similar projlsoti. At tfris Mr, Lloyd George had an?&er nght-W] man. Here he was met by Mr. Winston Churchill; Aiid hero he went peJ-hftHs .farther , than was WIS--,, feortajnly further than Ills owl fcollcagiles desired. At an offieia. luncheon, given in his honour by the French Prime Minister, He , tabklet] the whole question of stfaisg.V, and with brutal frankness spoke slightingly b; JM**" in to* .West, and ktontc," thftt they had not been directed, against other and woak?V sections Of the great ""!?■ ,«<» fiven.used the word ■■impenetrable." "I his. description of the I'erm.an lines oh the British front. And he ! mi l that tno claims of .great victory a-ter tho advance of a- few yard's in f'lwite ifei-6 not justified. He told oi "; -$ s aK " e saw thorn, and at once the f*«]pje of Allied nations saw that if the I perspective of the Prime .Minister 0, |--ttngland was right, that of their military leaded fras very far wrong.

inline Minister and Field-Marshal. That British military leaders are sincerely perturbed about the Lloyd «eorge interference with strategy is undeniable.. There have been rumours end even threats of resignation. Mr. Lloyd George gave expression to his doubts before he went to Italy. He secured two frank reports from leading generals who are not in the Haig-Rob-ertson company, aud he based partly on theso a strong denunciation of tho existing policy of tho General Staff. His chief poiut was that General l{obertson was so bound up with thu l\esteru front, and so bound up with Sir Douglas Haig, thai every question was considered in its relation to liaig's armies. From the point of view of the Westerners, this was doubtless right. But a case could bo made out in theory, against thu subordination of a Chief of the Imperial General Staff to any single Com-mander-in-Chief. The Field Commanders should take their orders from the Chief of the Staff. For it is his duty to direct the armies of tho whole Empire, their duty to make the best use oi ! the forces the Chief of Staff can place at their disposal. The political attack on General Bobertson would have come, therefore, under any circumstances. It was to do the initial blow struck at the HaigRobertson company—the blow whereby a goneral who was not sworn to allegiance in this fellowship was to be placed in charge at the War Office, and tho road thus opened for minor changes in -France. Those changes would involve in the first and foremost place General Gough; and there would be a clearing out of perhaps one other .army commander, and .many minor senior officers. It is an unfortunate fact that soldiers generally think that the -Prime Minister aims higher, and wishes for Sir Douglas Haig's recall. Few people are so bold as to judge the Com-mander-in-Chief's work yot. No great soldiers' work can be judged in the midst of a campaign. The fact is that the plans in the West have not gone as desired and promised. To some.extent this is due to a delay after the Calais conference, when Mr. Lloyd George went far towards placing tho whole British Army in France under the command of Goneral Nivelle, then French Commander-in-Chief, os the only practicable way of securing unity o( command. He had to retreat from this proposal, and the readjustment involved ?ome delay, during which the British Cabinet refrained from authorising the scheme for offensives as prepared by General Headquarters. That delay is frequently referred to by the General Staff as though they regarded it as of great importance. But on the other sido there exists a batch of official documents, signed time and again by Oneral Robertson and Field-Marshal l.'aig,, in which results were promised which have never been anything like achieved. The atmosphere of optimism on the West front, charged high, artificially stimulated by censorship and by indiscriminate and -nnjudging nso of ill the small signs of German decay, deconecl everybody. So it is thai. Mr. Lloyd George has facts and evidence for his case. And being charged with .the awful responsibility of conducting the war, ho. will fight his rase through. He is cvon vow taking his decision.. Mo has to judge whether we can win on present methods or whether there, must he drastp change.' There is no doubt about his trend of opinion for the moment, and no doubt about his , courage'to-take the unpleasant course, however dangerous. Nor is there doubt that the disturbances have already given comfort to the enemy, and brought disquiet to many self-sacrificing war-workers in Franco and Britain. The.y reflect .1 condition of crisis. And tho Prime Minister's defonco for the creation or this crisis is that to wait longer would have been to court defeat.