FOOD PROBLEM IN GERMANY

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2430, 8 April 1915, Page 7

FOOD PROBLEM IN GERMANY

ERRORS IN OFFICIAL ESTIMATES

A FEARFUL SELF-DECEPTION

The economic position of Germany was discussed in a paper read on Wednesday by Professor W. J. Ashley, or Birmingham University, before tho Royal Society of Arts.

Professor Ashley pointed out that towards the close of last century Germany had passed from being preponderatingly agricultural and had recently become at least as largely industrial; it had left a position of internal self-sufficiency to take a place in tho mutually dependent circle of international trade. In 1900 it was reckoued that between a sixth and a soventh of the nation's food came from abroad. Such was the position when the Gorman Government brought forward its proposals for a big Navy. It recoived the energotic support of many university professors, and among them of almost every economist of repute ih the country. The political opposition resented their appearance in the party arena, and dubbed them "Professors of the Fleet," _ but their arguments carried great weight with the educated classes, and especially in_ official circles. They argued that until Germany could protect by its own fleet its oversea trade—then, as now, eome 70 per cent, of the whole —its economic position was insecure and at the mercy •of any Power which could control the seas; and their writings showed that the danger which Germany had incurred was contemplated, as only too probable; and that they did not exoect that any such doctrine as that food carried by neutrals is only conditional contraband would be of any assistance. Doubtful Calculations. Germany to-day, in spite of its fleet, was precisely in the position the economists pictured befo."» the fleet existed. In current discussion in Germany it seemed to be taken for granted that, so far, no supplies worth mentioning had actually oome through from outside. At the moment of writing (February 18) it seemed hardly likely that food would remain onlv conditional contraband. Even if no change took place in English policy in this respect, and the difficulties Germany had to meet were only those of the scarcity of neutral shipping, the dangers and delays of transport and the expenses of payment with the exchanges against it, so far as they continued to be operative, the assumption would still hold good Chat Germany wouljl have to depend on itself. He calculated from the official figures of crop and import that m 1012-13 the foreign imports were under 11 per cent, of the consumption of "bread corn" (ryo and wheat); and a deficiency in the total bread corn supply of even 10 per cent. —to take the most hopeful estimate —meant a lack of more than five weeks' consumption. It had been sirgued that any deficiencies in bread corn could be made no from potatoes; that potatoes was "the national food reserve," and the Emperor declared, in February, 1913, doubtless in all confidence: "There is no longer any doubt that Germany not only can now, but also will be able for tho future, to supply bread an A meat for all her people." There were, howevor, weak places in. the situation. which were well Known to cool observers. By far the weightiest reason for anxioty was the very doubtful value of tho official statistics of production. During all these months of war that has been the skeleton in the cupboard of the German people. In all lands harvest figures were the weakest department of Government statistics. They commonly depended on estimates, not on enumeration; so that somo severe critics would not call them "statistics" at all. That the.German figures contained a considerable element of probable error had been pointed out in statistical publications for some . years past. Two years ago Professor Ballod, of Berlin, a leading authority, wrote: "No one can say whether the harvest estimates are not 10 per cent.J 15 per cent., or even 20 per cent, too high. . . . In the province of Posen they are certainly too high." These facts helped one to reaßse the probable state of mind of the German Government during the last 6ix months. In spite of the much-praised efficiency of its offiit really had not known, with certainty, what amount of corn it could oount 'upon within the country. The self-satisfaction natural to all Government offices, tho tendency of agrarians to magnify their agricultural services, the wish to reassure tho public, the public committal of the Emporor a year before to the big harvest figuros—all theso influences would naturally lead the Government to speak confidently of an adequate supply. Meanwhile there had. probably been, those in high places who nave known that, if their armies did not "hack their way through" in a very few months, the food outlook was far from bright. A Fearful Self-Deception, The German Government had taken various measures in order to bring about the necessary' adaptation of consumption to needs and one has to ask, Will the shifting around of foods andthe substitution of one for another be dietetically adequate, and can it be brought about? Professor Ballod's conclusion was that, on the whole, Germany was worse oft in respect of food, rather than better, than 15 years before. He pointed out that the bread corn question could not be considered by itself; it must be considered in conjunction with the supply of fodder and other feeding stuffs. The total import of foodstuffs has risen very markedly. "It is a fearful eelf-deception to suppose Germany can live 11 months on its own bread corn. It can manage, -yes; but only if it can continue to import 60 per cent, of its fodder."

The Government's first practical steps were to decree minimum prices of wheat and rye and bread, to give instructions as to the proportions of wheat, rye, and potatoes to be mixed in flour, and to prohibit tho use of bread corn for fodder. These measures seemed te have met with little or 110 success. The Government thou compromised with a plan of permissible increases of corn prices at specified periods; but this also proved unsatisfactory. Tho next step was te create a groat corn company, under Govornmont auspices, with powers of compulsory purchase, which should buy up large quantities and hold them until May. But even this measure was soon found to be inadequate, and eventually corn and hour stocks were expropriated by tho State, so that the people of Germany were now all beingput on rations. Other foods, and especially meat, might have to bo brought within tho scope of tho system ; and the present plan all rested 011 tho assumption that the people would continue to be able to pay for their bread. It would bo most risky to prophesy; but in tho best event for Germany, and assuming all imaginable docility, the nation, if foreign supplies contiiiue to bo cut off, was going to bo subjected to an irksome and discouraging: regime.

After a detailed review of the industrial situation, Professor Ashley said wo need not expect any dramatic breakdown of the whole German economic or-' ganisat.ion; for some months the country might struggle along on its present, supplies, and it would probably continue to gel. in some of'its materials from abroad and pay for them by exports or by gold. Moreover, thfl r ast Govern.fflcuVodeu ,uoul4 tggijJajWfl