SEA SUPREMACY

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2376, 4 February 1915, Page 6

SEA SUPREMACY

THE COST OF IT HEAVY TOLL IN MEN AND SHIPS LORD FISHER'S STRATEGY. London, December 18. The announcement of the defeat off the Falkland .Islands of Admiral von Spee's German squadron was received throughout England with profound satisfaction. There were no patriotic demonstrations, but the smiling, contented faces encountered everywhere in London streets, tubes, and buses that day was in itself, by reason of tho rarity of a smiling Londoner, convincing index of the depth of popular feeling, and the paen of praise and acclamation from the British Press of all shades and degrees of opinion testified emphatically to the nation's joy at a victory which restored British sea prestige, damaged through bad paval judgment five weeks before, to its former proud , ' place in the eyes of the world. The victory had all the elements of spectacular and dramatic surprise which appeal to the popular patriotic imagination. It was just five weeks before that Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, with three weak ships—the Good Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow—met the German squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee off tho coast of Chile, and engaged the enemy with undoubted courage, but lamentable results. Opposed to an overwhelming preponderance of gunfire, Iwth the Good Hope and tha Monmouth Vere quickly in a" blaze, and, fighting to the last, the two vessels sank with all on board. The Glasgow alone of all the British shios engaged escaped. The German sauadron, on the other hand, sailed off uninjured. The victory was hailed with hysterical joy -by the German.Press as proof of the decadence of British sea power, neutral nations were pemlexed, and the British people swallowed, the bitter - pill in gloomy silence. But British vengeance was suddeji, swift and shattering. The dramatic nature of the retaliatory blow was heightened by two picturesque elements. The coup origin ntod in the brain of the man who gave Britain her Dreadnoughts and was responsible for the modern British Navy, and was his first administrative act after ho had been recalled, at, the age of 74. to resume his post as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. And the_ man Lord Fisher chose to carry out his plan—Sir Frederick Sturdee—left his desk at the Admiralty offices in London, where he had been acting as Chief of Staff since the commencement of the war, to become the t victorious- adisiral of a squadron which sent four German cruisers to the bottom of the.. South Atlantic, with nearly 2200-men with them There was nothing very surprising in .this result, provided the German squadron was once found. The naval engagements of this war- have infallibly demonstrated the wisdom of Lord Fisher's theory of the annihilative power of big ships, big guns and superior speed in modern sea fighting. All modern' naval warfare goes to show that if a. weaker force be brought to action by a stronger—weaker whether in numbersj power or efficiency—the weaker force is annir Mated, while the stronger escapes punishment entirely. But the instinct which penetrated tho plans of the German admiral without a moment's loss of time was'sea strategy of the highest order, and revealed the sea genius and "«ure touch" of Lord Fisher. The American Press, in their commente on the victory, incline to the opinion that tho German;" admiral underestimated Lord Fisher. The British 1 Admiralty, in planning'the expedition, was faced with several problems. The German admiral, after coaling and taking in provisions at Valparaiso, _ after his victorious encounter with Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock'e fleet, set off for - some unknown destination about the time.Sir Frederick Sturdee started in pursuit. Where was Von Spee bound for? It might have been his intention to recross the Pacific; he might have contemplated a raid on the coast of British Columbia; or he might have determined to double tho Horn and come into the Atlantic. The problem for the 'Admiralty to solve was, which of these things he would do. There was, of course, certain data to help them. With the fall of Tsing-tau the last German naval base disappeared. Even if Admiral von Spee lad plenty of coal—he had two colliers with him when ho was caught—he had, at any rate, no known means of replenishing his ammunition supply, and the bottoms of his ships must nave been foul. Moreover, he had collected to himself three small cruisers. The evidence pointed to an attempt to enter the Atlantic, and then, perhaps, to make a dash for home. Having decided that Admiral von Spee would probably attempt to get home, but having, as a, necessary precaution, placed the Australian fleet and the Japanese fleet oh tho look-out in case the German admiral should attempt to "double back" across the Pacific, the next thing was to ensure that Sir- Frederick Sturdee should not overrun or miss the enemy. The German squadron was not necessarily bound to pa6S near tho Falkland Islands. It might have steamed northeast, or north, or gone to Walfisch Bay, in German South-west Africa. The German admiral did none of these things; ho ran right into tho British sqnadron iff the Falklands. The fact that he did so indicates that the British admiral hair accurate information of tho enemy's course. How that information was obtained has not been rovealcd, but it has been suggested that I tho Glasgow, the British cruiser which escaped from tho previous engagement, followed the enemy, and supplied the approaching squadron with information. Finally, tho British Admiralty had to solve the problem of picking up the enemy without delay, and to waste no time cruising about in search of him. Tho latter course meant a limit to coal endurance, and if tho British squadron had been compelled to betray, its presence and numbers by going into a frequented port to coal, that would have been the end of any chance of catching the Germans. When the news of the victory reached Germany, the Germans were greatly confounded and surprised to learn that a British squadron, of whoso existence they did not know, commanded by an_ officer whom they believed to bo working at the Admiralty, had wiped out of existence the only war squadron which Germany had in tho outer seas. Thus, ton years after he had re-or-ganised the British Navy and given it renewed life, Lord Fisher has had the proud satisfaction of bringing off a brilliant naval coup, and of proving to tho world the truth of his theories of modern naval fighting. When ho was called to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in 1904 he immediately proceeded to carry -out his plan of reorganising the British Navy, and that plan involved tho "scrapping" of a whole fleet of old, slow, weak ships. There was a Rood deal of hostile criticism aroused by this sweeping reform, but events have proved that it was tho right thing lo do. These two cruiser actions in South American waters are a reminder of the terrible penalty of weakness and defeat in these days of high-powered naval guns. When the Good Hope and Monmouth were destroyed Britain lost 94 officers and 1560 men. The Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Nurnberg took to the bottom with them about 2200 officers and men. These two cruiser actions have consequently resulted in the loss of about 3SOO officers and men, and have involved tho destruction jj£- material which cost £4,500,000.

Yet they rank but as minor naval actions ! These naval actions prove that the secret of successful naval strategy today is to have superior power at the right place at the right moment. They also prove that defeat means annihilation. Tbo modern ironclad, if strnck in. a vital part, sinks to the bottom of the sea like a stone with all on board. That is the terriblo difference between sea fighting now and in the days of old "wooden walls." In the battle of Trafalgar, which up to the present ranks as the greatest naval battle in history, and which won Great Britain the command of the sea, not a single vessel of either side was sunk by gunfire. ' Sovcnteon of .the enemy's ships were captured, and one caught fire and was blown up Tho , British ships suffered only slightly. Tho British losses in men were only 449 killed and 1200 wounded, and the enemy's losses were not much heavier. In the cruiser sotions of this war tho British and Germans have both suffered a far heavier death roll that the British Fleet sustained in the greatest naval battle in the world's history. The lesson is plain. Economy in naval preparations in peace times is downright folly. The victory in modern naval warfare rests with big ships, big guns, and high speed. The latter factor is as valuable as big guns. Speed permitted the light cruiser Glasgow to escape the fate of the Monmouth and tho Good Hope in the battle off Chili; speed enabled Sir Frederick Sturdeo's avenging squadron to select ite own fighting range—ono doubtless beyond the effective range of the German ships—and send them to the bottom without injury to themselves and at a trifling cost of "life. The British naval victory oft the Falkland Islands means more to Germany than is represented by tho number and. tonnage of the ships sunk. It means practically the extinction of Germanv on the high seas. There were fourteen German cruisers and commerce destroyers afloat at the beginning of the war. There remain, after this victory, only five German war ships afloat outside the North Sea. German raiders etill at'largo are. the cruisers Bremen. Dresden, and Karlsruhe, and the auxiliary armed merchant ships Kronprinz and Eitel Friedrich. Of tho lour German shipa sunk off the Falklands the Scharnhorst and Gneiseuau wore cruisers of 11,400 tons displacement, and before the war began had formed part of the German squadron on the China station. They are sister ships with a powerful armament. Tins comprised eight 8.2 in., six 5.9 in., and fourteen 14-pounder guns, with four submerged torpedo tubes. The heaviest guns threw a projectile weighing 2(51b., while the 5.9 in. guns fired projectiles weighing nearly 1001b. Designed originally for 22.5 knots, both ships had exceeded this speed, but probably from the long time they have been out of dock they were not so fast in their later days.—Melbourne "Age.