WAS GERMANY READY?

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2231, 18 August 1914, Page 7

WAS GERMANY READY?

GERMAN PROFESSOR'S RECENT • VIEWS, ECONOMIC COST OF WAR Professor FriedrioH Lena. contributes to tho J uiy number of "Westeriiiann's Monatshelto," which arrived by. the last mail, an article on Germany's preparations for war. Though it was probably written in' the middle of June, he did not then anticipate any immediate war, but he urged readiness. He refrains from criticising her military and naval preparedness beyond advocating a further strengthening of both forcos on account of the continuous growth of the Russian and French armies. Apparently) he is not impressed with Germany's diplomatic astuteiiesa, and prays for a breath of Bismarck's spirit -in her foreign policy, acknowledging, that the Empire was built upon the hypothesis that its neighbours on the east and west ;ould be kept from an oft'onsive alliance. On the eoonomio aide'the writer adopts a pessimistic view of Germany's preparedness in the shape of lack of systematic organisation, which is made difficult by her geographical position. He declares .that in* any future .war Germany's ecoii omic. life, will be hit much more grievously than that of her enemies, and that this inferiority is greatly increased by her . alliance with Austria-Hungary. Prance knows her Atlantio ports to be protected by Great Britain, while her own fleet covers Marseilles, which accommodates four-tenths, of her entiro eea-borrie trade, aid for which England holds the gales open at Suez and Gibraltar. Britain would, temporarily lose one-tenth of her 'outward trade which used to come to Ger. many and Austria, but would gain in return a part of Germany's ocean exflorts. Russia, which exports for the most part (Agrarian products via the Baltic and the Black Sea, is interested in keeping bothseas open, but it ia only her western provinces that Imve a surplus for export. The interior and the east would remain' untouched. Her trade with Germany, which amounts for imports to almost onehalf of the total value, would also be modified. Austria-Hungary would have: three-fourths of Jier boundaries exposed to attack, and her ports, liko Germany s Hamburg, could with ease be hermetically soaled by means of a few warehips. She. moreover, lonktf Russia's advantage of national unity. . , Germany, after Britain the most strongly industrialised Power, is, in complete contrast to the latter, separated from the ooean by the English Channel and the. Hebrides, so that Britain,as the ruler of the open sea, holds three-fourths of Germany's own trade under t her control'. Holland and Belgium, through, whose ports an invisible third of Germany's exports and imports passes, are in the same position.' ' From a war-economic point of view, Germany and Austria, owin» to their geographical positions, would always remain under a common disadvantage on account of their extensive land frontiers and-the possibility of having their few harbours corked up by the enemyV fleet. Germany's important ore and coal deposits are close to her eastern and western frontiers, and her principal industrial centre is in the Rhine province, in close proximity to France. Austria'oould supply her only with brown coal. A blockade would stop all industrial imports, Biich as cotton. France and Russia, even when strongly invaded could never get. into «uch difficulties. The history of- the last forty years has increased Germany's economic difficulties in the event of war. A market for her 300,000 industrial concerns, and the maintenance of .thirty millions of townspeople • have daily to be provided anew. Germany's importation of foodstuffs and raw materials is twenty-six times as greatas it was half a century ago, her exflortation of manufactures 7} times, whilst her population has doubled during that period. Her rural population, with the exception of the Poles, has. decreased. More than half of her migratory labourers and of her imported cereals come from : ■Russia, so that even in time of peace an interruption in the Black Sea trade is severely felt. Austria cannot supply her , with labour or corn, but during, the late Balkan crisis fiho swamped the German market with her textile products. The financial' strength of middle-European Powers has certainly increased since 1871, as is shown by their permanent independence of the Paris and London moneymarkets since the Morocco crisis, but compared with the capital wealth and concentration of gold reserves of their neighbours, a. much stronger exertion of the home credit is required. In the State banks of Germany and Austria-Hungary aro lodged about - ■£150.000.000. as against some in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London. : Austria had . to pay 7 per cent, interest on New York Treasury bills; because tht,.

was boycotted by tho Powers jrf the Entente, whilst French. and Brit) sli consols at tho same time found buyons at 3 per cent. Germany's unchangeably geographical position and her growing; industrial development yearly intensify fiho disproportion of her irarld-economic -complexity and her wrir-econoraic iEolation. She could only counteract such disparity by exerting nor own strength, iJor where, with the exception of Austria, could sho find allies on whose assistance] she could rely with confidence, even if dnly in the military asiwct? The political economy; of Italy, with her extensive seaboard in the centre of tho sealed Mediterranean, would at once bo exposed, to pressure by day hostile sea Power; her fidelity to the Triple Alliance' would thus be subject tn a heavy ecomonic strain. During timqs of peace England, Prance, Gormany, ojad Austria' receive each a quarter of external trade. Itumania'H friendship in>uld bring tho passnge of the lower Danube under the control of Central Europe. If Rumania should mo longer be (attached to the Central European Alliance (the Czar paid King Earol a friendly vilit in Juno), this would be the most serioWa loss of t\e last few years. Germany's! northern neighbour, Swedon, would war time be able to provide her, as she has done in the past, with a third of hfcr requirements in metal as soon as' Ithe combined fleet of - Germany and' Swedisn; ha 4 command of the Baltic from IKronstodt In the Sound. But oven if these oountnes were closely allied with Geimany, as the time of writing they wlare not, they would in the aggregate only'provide little more than one-tenth of her external trade. The military improvement of her position through their assistance would certainly be of greater importance. Even if tho length of any fvitur? wax misfit not exceed six months, Germany would m duty be bonnd to make pconrtmio preparation. Stores and magazines would not suffice for that length of time, in. view of t2» ; /aet that England ioouM be starved out in a few days, and .oonsddering that Germany would not be'able to fix the most favourable time with regard to the harvest for the commencement of hostilities. A .systematic 6tudy'of theecono. mics of war should bo an urgent necessity. , _ There ia 'a distinctly prophetic tone: in Professor Lenz's reference to three cycles of 43 years in Prussia's history. He compares the present'epoch (since 1871) of absolute faith in the "blessings of peaM with the 43 years intervening betwen the close of the Seven Years' War and'the downfall at Jena in 1806, and with a similar period between the Vienna Congress (1515) and tho beginning of tie Italian and German struggles for nnidn in. 1859. 'Pben he asks: Who can sap to-day whether and when the fateful closing horn of such a oycle of- peace will 'strike again?