MODERN WARFARE

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2231, 18 August 1914, Page 7

MODERN WARFARE

A BATTLE THAT fl/ASTS FOR A FORTNIfJIHT - An article on tho -ijatu're of a great European battle under present-day cpn- ' ditions was published, jin the "Anny An--nual" for 1913, and ,'i p of especial interest at the present moment. . The; article . was a reviow by Leili tenant-Colonel Bois■Uonet, of-the Frenoh-.Army. of a. study of \oiodern war by Genai ;al Schlieffen, of. the ; German Army, whiclc | had previously, appeared in the "Deufcfoh© Itevue." Itwas • stated that the idcafi. propounded by Gen- ; eral Schlieffen had i received a . kind of ; approval from theV'perman Emperor. ' According : to - (oral /Schlieffen, the '■ calling out of all fft; men, stopping there:by tho commercial; mjd industrial4ife of • the nation anl entyii(ling, expenses by mil- , liards, will render impossible - tactics of ; exhaustion or a jriir to the, bitter.end; ; a single battle wi/i,end, it '.' - This battle, the)* fore,' must' be destruc- ' tive; such result; cian bo. brought- about, only by the hem(n fne in of a flank, or, 'better still,, of bfitp hostile flanks. The general- fqrt(sees:.that:,fronts- will have an extent i)o j.-which nothing in the past can be oomr/ar W, that the battle will,' last soveral days-ra fortnight,- perhaps, as at Mukden— tad] that the field of battle vrxll be ah Jmi jiense desert. He wants no 1-pnger cavalry oh the battlefield, he sen ids it to attack with guns and rifles' the) rear of the enemy. Ideas favoured irj France, writes Colonel Boisonet, are Jot verydissimilar; we talk no more of war to the knife, -we do not -. equip ouhelvfcs fo t a protracted, struggle, / we dream-of not ping but surrounding; 7 wo declare .--'front nl attacks impossible; finally, we io no f wish <» 6ee any cav- - airy on the,'battlpfield.',. ~ i ' !'■'•/ Vfar of = Exhaustion. -'.".'■-.'. The calling out '.by mobilisation order of all fit meq renders impossible a war to the bitter fcnd, as .General Schlieffen very correotly lieinarks. 1 . ..The industrial, commercial, and agric plturaf life of the country Trill intensipted, thereby causing a loss of ■, milliard b; this state could not last. for,it- : would|. spell famine - in both countries! within-.<i' fairjy short time-, .-..■-' If-the first battle bo decided against us, it remains foit us only to!lay down our arms, pass i|he : enemy's:; Caudlne Porks, hm comply/ with all his demands; What t.-puld remain of France? '■'■■'. :, Is ifcf admissibli)? ;Is. the calling, out ,of all ,'dt men from the:onset of war in- . dispensable? v" ; ... , ■ .will oil these mobilised men '.be of any use in the I battle that is going, to - seal the fate of okir countryP What be- ■ comeii of these inen? A : portion . only serve/s to bringviur; standing; regiments to a. war footing;? the others form units of riiserve,' constiti'tte the garrisons of our innmmeraolo-fortified-places - and man depots.- The greatfer number of men called out by mobili featioh order will take nopart in the baltle that will! settle the wa.v.'.'.-; )■>.-.-•- -.- :/■■■■■,'/■ '. The next warwi;ll be one of exhaustion;' battles those.of exhaustion;:the army organisation must bei such as to show that fxhansiioi as latej as possible. ■' Enveloping of the Hostile - Army, . What-will be ill the: future the bat- . tie as understood by General Sohlieffen -, and some French strategists?. ' '.-.• In the centre, the; two adversaries want.to do nothing a pruiri; the Gern«ins,;veTy greedy, because the'( resnlt would: not be.of,' a sufficiently-.-destructive nature; the . French, .very cauti bus, for fear/of too great losses.: • .["'■ .' ' •'-. ' | ... ■ The General eays,, indeed— -;". : ', ''The simple froi[tal'. attack-' on : tho enemy may very' T,fell succeed, but results would be feebliV; the repulsed enemy would be on anottier ground, and- the ',- campaign would dj.-tyr:on. •'To get a destructive effect, it! is neoe3sary to carry . out a simultaneoilis; movement against ' '.:'s?: { r < )n F«fcJ:M!^ferA,,-';pr J^b>tter, .; against.both 'flanHS •: of-;tl>o-.'oaemy. "All the troopsjtlfat were kept form--erly in!the rear florj the decisive attack •'must henceforth : ai priori; be led to'the .'., .flank : attaok.", : "'. - j :■:' .."•••.!.:. - ■ '■ ■ '■ ':■ >!•' ••;'■■ •'■;" Dealing with all \ ariny of- limited strength holding a fihe position, well pro- .', tected by intrencb-ments as .the. Frenoh corps rn 1870, the movement advocated by General Schliefleni was possible, eveneasv. Does the Gejieral believe, then, we' shall scatter again ( onr troops on absurd :positions? It is jio' longer SOO.OOO .or 300,000 men we shlvll hayo in-line, but about a million; sjirih a mass shows no. . .flank bo attack; it 4as not the appearance of one. line dnjy, neatly 'ending at both extremities, Ikihind what -may be •• termed its wings lie iechelons, -'.-• : If we are not tioci clumsy, the army corp3 wishing to daitround • us will have' to move so far awajy'irbm their railroads that the replenisMnij; of their numerous artillery will be' veify precarious, whatever means they' r|»brt to, : Futnrp- battles will be fonghj: .With.PTOjectiles; an. enormous amount i>t ammunitioh wiU- be spent. "We will hjavfe to use a tremen--dous amount.' W|V icannot compete in: aiimbers with the iGermans,'our decreasing population doa'ajnot allow-it: let us . ask our inferior |m;)mericar strength a greater result, ;lefl l|hem:fire much am- ■ .m-unition, give'th«iml the"means of-firing an enormous amo?in t, the most they pos'sibly can. AH th(»:ties having for object : ''to restrict the usei of cartridges are wrong, moreover, ' tl/iey are deplorable. '; Rather we may:aisk of our higher com-- • -mand who pretendsito obtain victory by movcriacints, which they call manoeuvnhg: "Mniero on oarth do'yon think of finding-oi flank -to manoeuvre -.against?"; You Mill find none, the .whole '•territory up to t)if> Ehinp. will be packed .:'" with' soldiers; ■ i i, - - Manoeuvring-f/iis,' -however, ■ with our : leaders a panaoe|ii "Slanoeuvring is allpowerful;- I' rt read - somewhere, be- - , cause it acts on, the enemy's 'moral, that is to say.'.hia wfll, which■ is.-after all, -.•■ the true and fijipl objective. ,: It would be perfect if our menoeuvring were to meet on/.y with the enemy's moral ' and will, unforl.Tinately it will'meet th<> rifles and gnns-cif troops led.a priori by .that enemy to lattack our flani. It is a certainty, Schlieffen tells, us.so., i If. perchance, pur, enemy offered an un- ' covered flank w» would ha-ve to be-very cautious and hike great care not to, put into practice ijhts rule that I have read also somewhene i "Units entrusted with • the flank attajolf: must move "to a place sufficiently fa}.' (from the frontal attack •: and take np a '-perpendicular position to that front\ bflfolro starting." It would be. c'/angerous to take up.sucS a position -Kjithout being quite certain that there in the locality only the moral and the determination of the adversary, and ittjat the latter has not posted • at a great / distance troops preparing ' for a similar operation; the Germans will . always have edmo, and the sight of these • troops in the -Tear or flank of our manoeuvrins w<>uld Immediately cause its failure. -; • Fronts Will rlave a Considerable Extent. , ' The" first |b(ittle will be joined by both . adversaries' 'fidth the proconceiyed idea ■ merely of 'fipding a solution in an «en- ■ veloping moTement, a manoeuvre. The, will give up; that idea only when the impossibility cif carryinfj'it out will havo become maiaifostly evident. ( ' The Gerrcians will begin the battlo as General Sclilieffon said. .The army corps ; entrusted 'With parading in our front will deploy to an extent with which nothing, in the pas{ can be compared—four times what was .seen, at Koeniggratz and St. Privat,' not by the force Of circumstances,, but because they want to spare many -~, corps to; envelop u». The G«neral _ pretends that ths,-' longrange quick-firing rifle was precisely invented to 1 replace many old weapons by one, provided there is the necessary ommuniticm, and ha says nothing of the gum to whioh snoh an assertion applies much • more dorrectly. Infant)? acts by its fire, alone: it nets also by movement; it gains the victory In driving the enemy from his position. It mast have numbers for tho advance and shock. A handful of men woul3 never overawe tho enemy, a scattered infantry could never give the assault, however may be th« rate of its fire. The artillery, on the contrary, acts only with-' shells. A quick-firer replaces advantageously several old guns because there Is a first-rate advantage to let the least possibto number of guns fire the ammunitjoa one may dispose of: fewer gunners are; exposed to fire, and there is less risk of'having batteries without ammunition oritha field' of 'battle.: ■. The reosoning-of General Schlieffen will £ nfevertpeleßS seem quite logical, if one Bears Sn mind tfet in his opjnioa the

frontal 'attacks will never . be pressed homo, that the role of infantry will be quite secondary, that the only object of this attack is to pin tho enemy to tho ground, to mesmerize him somehow and distract his attention from tho ] troops who are going to fall on his flanks _ and by enveloping gain a victory without d dicing a blow. To that end.one does not neeamuoh infantry, but many guns to make 01 great noiso and take up a w;ao i'ront with few army corps. The, question of - replenishing this artillery- could not engross the German attention; they saw us neglect entirely tho ammunition and entangle ourselves in absurd theories; tho answer of the Secretary for War to a senator, during the debate on tho pill of the artillery organisation, must have reassured those who were still uneasy. When both sides have about a million men in line, it would be very strange to find flanks'to, attack. Unless we. begin now, as in 1870, to scatter our forces on absurd positions, our opponent will have to go so far to turn U9 that the question of his supplies wiU to very, difficult, l lik* to believe that it will be finally understood that quick-firing weapons must be so on the field of battle. During, this battle they will come' to rowniee some time the impossibility to end it with manoeuvring, and then they will make up their minds to fight in earnest. . ■ ■ ' . ' . A few skirmishes will bo longer be sufficient, a great number will be required as formerly; the few meagre ranks of soldiers, with, which General Schlieffen is ■contented, will no more-suffice to til up the gaps and cope with the unforeseen circumstance, important reserves will bo wanted behind the front as fornicrly. *■':.- The soldiers in the firing-line will have to live under fire 1 several days, a tortmight, perhaps; their physipal and morn faitigue will be excessive; ,and 'they will recmire a more effective support thai' a 'few .meagre lines; to support those lines; make good their losses, and restore a part of their energy, it will be ■ necessary'to have in the rear reserves ; protected as much as possible from the | unnerving influence of the battlefield. - The enemy's fire will not be the only thing to cause losses. After eight days, a fortnight, perhaps, of that existence, cases of exhaustion will be numerous; in :summor. what a number of men will drop on the march during ..the great heat! The, expenditure - of energy will be enormous; tho only means to obviate this is to thicken the fighting .line in proportion as tho energy wears down; . .\ '■■■'~■..' , Our soldiers OTe brave, but picture to yourself the situation in which they will be during so many days, almost isolated, stationary, day and night under a continual storm of projectiles. After several'davs of this existence w?H they be in a- state to aim, to place l the siplits at the required,elevation? Will the soldiers who are laying down rise and movß-forwnrd at the command of unse»n officers behind them? Will they be able to listen to the=e commands when their attention , will be riveted on what is in their front? 'Will it be possible without compulsion to get them again into motion, and drive- them forward with supports • vigorously led by officers who will prevent them from stopping in the firing lino? .-'..-' - The fighting-line will, thicken. automatically as it apnroaohfts the enemy, in snitri.of lossm, and -will only advance in thickening,,then the thickening is inevitable.,' ; • Therefore; an airmy corps which took np a front-too wide-for the number of its infantry would condemn it« fi?hHn? line **> a stop.- an irreparable stop which wonM ocour the sooner the'more extended its front, • The Battle Will Last Perhaps-a • '.-'.',■' " -Fortnight. , We must bo prepared for a battle that will last, a. fortnight perhaps. . , : . The two armies, whose-tendencies w« study, want to avoid a direct attack for fear of too heavy losses., The Germans do not say ao;as plainly, as we, 'they, nut it more indirectly, they pretend that a' victory on the front is insufficient, they are not content'' with beating us, they want to make -us prisoners as at Sedan. Wo are hot greedy, we will be satisfied with a. victory, but we want no loss. skilful strokes that be,,resorted to in o'rde'r*"t6'"'6btafn'' these:-beautiful results cannot possibly be carried' out, because armies are now too great and troops 'entrusted with the enveloping movement conld not move very. far. The question of supplies, chiefly the replenishing of ammunition, will weigh heavily on all operations. The weapons are quick-firers,; they will have to be so, it is.a fact that, must be taken into account in strategy as well as in tactics. ■ 'However, clever strokes will only be pensed with when their execution will be manifestly, impossible. The beginning of the fight will be dragging on, and, as General Schlieffen very correctly says, the field of battle will be a great desert; the presence \of artillery will only be given away by tho booming of the guns, and the direction of musketry - fire indicated, by the appearance here and there'of a. line of infantry, making a forward rush, then disappear almost immediately.. The fight will continue like this for several, days; there will be much noise and bluff to waste time, and await- the manoeuvre, whioh »>n reaching the enemy's flank will rout him. Meanwhile; the'field of battle will remain a great desert. ■-"''.'"'.'' What will they fire at, if it is only a desert, and'nothing can be seen? At the flashes, at points where the i enemy is believed to be seen, at nothing often, but.they will fire because you must fire at something.. At the -beginning the -Irenoh artillerymen will make sketches, solve problems, inscribe numerous "millienW on their sketches; when they are fired on, they will open fire, ana, as the enemy's fire will not stop, they will put the sketches into their pockets and will become again gunners. A moment will come when they will make up their mind to fight in real earnest, .and then they will attack. The Germans will be the first to resign themselves,, they want to avoid the direot attack, but they have not made its impossibility an article of creed. It is justly feared that all that our army, .oven our cavalry, has been taught will ■mult in. absolute inactivity because the command counts, failing manoeuvres, on the "rafales" of his artillery to annihilate' the assailants; the battles of 1870 would be seen again. Let us hapo that it will be nothimj of the kind, and. that in face of the failing of the manoeuvre, our- generals. will again come to their senses... On both 6ides the attack will bo led timidly, without using all the violence and all the necessary means, and the battles will last many days; it is. possible- that, under the fire which will be seen-in the next war, tho forward movement of reserves, reinforcements that will feed the fighting line and carry it forward, will only do possible at night. One can predict, without fear of error, that future bottles will be battles of exhaustion; those who. have the responsibility of- preparing for them, must organise with a view to delay as much as possible- that material exhaustion. They would have a terrible account to give wure it otherwise. In the preparation for war mistakes are not allowed. How manv rounds can a quick-firer, like our 75 mm. gun, fire even at a slow rate? A fire, ranging end firing for efI feet, is made at an average of thre« rounds per minute for each gun j -often the rate will be higher, firing for effect will not always be preceded by ranging, a previously found range will be used. Let us suppose, however, an average of thrte rounds a minute; a gun, which has fired 500 rounds (the total ammunition per gun in an army corps when _ there were only 92 guns), will have been in aci tion only two hours and a half, and-in !■ summer daylight lasts more than' twelve hours. Therefore it is not exaggerating to fix the number of rounds per gun at 500, and unless our gunners do nothing, they will fire that number without overthrowing the enemy. General Picquart mav be reassured on that point. Three thousand, rounds per gun, as was demanded by a senator, would only allow a supply for six days' battle, and our gunners (the Secretary for War has only echoed their theories and taken up the responsibility) do not even want 3000 rounds per gnn; they are satisfied with much less, ammunition does not interest them, the number of guns alone matters with them. ' Three thousand rounds per gun would probably not suffice for more' than six days' battle, and even if we had them and were in a situation to continue the struggle for a fortnight, it would be prudent not to bring into line even half the number of our guns, because in the field of battle guns without ammunition spell disaster. . During that long and terrible battle, ■the fighting line will have to be' sup. ;ni;~a —"■ -«jjy with ammunition, but also

• with food, for tlio emergency rations Trill no longer bo sufficient. Food and refreshments will have to bo carried ttl men in the fighting line, and thp wpun<lod must be removed. Usually it ivill only be by night that fresh supplies of food and ammunition will roach the fighting line and that the wounded will be able to bo borne away, The Cavalry In Battle, Wo will no longer see on. tlio field! of battlo a single trooper; cavalry can no longer have any scope on ground held by the other arms. In the future dirigibles will carry out the reconnaissance of the enemy's positions and the situation of his flanks. Squadrons of dirigibles will .wag© war on cach other. Freed from its duty of reconnoitring, the cavalry, after having disabled the hostile cavalry, ivill ■ bring to bear on .the enemy's rear the power of its aTtillery, machino-guns and carbines. General Sohlieffen outlines here for dirigibles duties which are perhaps a little prematura and certainly exaggerated'. Successes of German dirigibles have roused his enthusiasm, he forgets that we have not said our last word. Dirigibles and aeroplanes will undoubtedly tako a very largo part in the neit war, but we may believe that they will not totally supersede' the cavalry in reconnoitring the battlefield, they will supple--ment it. This is a- question to be followed olosely, the corollary of which is the search for e> ncny artillery weapon against this new arm. Formerly our cavalry charged and swept awuy all the cavalry of Europe; it was led by Murat, Lasalie, Rapp, etc., who wanted to break ■ through. Leaders could be found in our cavalry who are willing to burst through and who have • enough courage to load homo their squadrons straight for the lances. Oh 1 that is not easy, it is very difficult, far' moro difficult than manoeuvring!The secret of victory for the cavalry I It is in front of sguadrons a leader determined to go straight for the enemy, and behind, squadrons oonvincod that their leader will succeed. In peace exercises, we ought to show that our squadrons are led Dy men who will go straight, n-o must show it to all our troopers, all tlio foreign cavalry. They used to. know that Murat would charge, and when they caught sight of his plume, they were already vanquished. Your manoeuvring is not an attack a k Franoaise, but a la Bouohotte. .• .Not only, do I. believe in oor cavalry fitted against the Gorman cavalry, but perceive, contrary to General fichlieffea's opinion, opportunities for it, on the ground of other arms after the latter will: have spent several days under fire. Think of the condition of infantry after several days spent under fire, aftor nav» ing bivouacked ' several nights on the field of battle, without any shelter, in the midst of dead and wounded. Will it still be capable of delivering a well-di-rected, fire or of using tKe rifle, whatever kind it may be,, with judgment? Will it offer any fesistiWe? Frankly! will not a vigorously lei} cavalry charge 'have the greatest chanoes of putting to -flight air those poor devils? Artillery, it may bo said, will shell the cavalry. ' The artillery! its gunners will be as worn out as the infantry.. Will it-have;still ammunition?. .. Our .troopers failed, in spite of their courage, at Woerth and Sedan against an enemy with weapons inferior to those of to-day; a cavalry charge against quickfiring guns_ aid rifles seems an ibsiiri idea. No, it is not against the guns and nfles that the charge' is directed, but against the men who use .them, and the weapon is just worth what the soldier is worth. A ' oavalry charge launched against victorious troops by a general ap. pealing to his squadrons because he does, not know where to turn, nevpr has and npver will succeed. Cavalry charges will always bo possible egainst worn-oui troops,' specially asainst thoso which we will see In future: bait 1 es. ■ .