GERMAN STRATEGY

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2231, 18 August 1914, Page 7

GERMAN STRATEGY

A' valuable EXPOSITION WHAT IS BEING DONE R BELGIUM ' ■ i . ' (By Colonel Foster, Pirector 1 of Military Studies, University of' Sydney, in-the "Sydney Morning Hernia),") Although the plans of fejie German General Stan for the war with France are ■highly ' secret, there. ara many factors which, combine to throw, much light on the shapti the first, Getjman . operationa will assume. The subject has naturally bnon. the constant study of tins French General Staff, and also (of the Belgians, so vitally interested in the matter. The problem has been, to determine the localities /where each portioa of the German armies will.be directed to by railway, after their • mobilisation has been completed in th«ir home qijarfcetrs, aud then ti; forisraftt •:tbe. ; .road» they will ■take in advancing agaaiisit the French Army... ■ The factors which have; enabled this problem to ' bo solyed with every proliability of accuracy may be shortly described. Under "Ui<! ;foliowin|' heads t- •" .I.—'The disposition' of- the; German •Army iu .peace, and its ;strength and organisation.. : • . : 2. -What is. known abottf; its mobilisation and method of conqaitration, ■ 3.—The railway network , leading from the Army Corps districts to the fronUei, and the stations whif:h have been prepared for detraining' troops, i , i.—The, roads leading fr(mi these sta-' : lions which may be used tjs lines of opi erations directed at the Frenoh Arm). . s.—The existing fortresses and fortifi.- ! cations near the frontier, and, most ixu-' Lportant of all, an anticipation of the methods of German strategy deduoed 'Itom its action in late warjj. ' , Organisation of the! Army.' The first head, shows that the German Ai my will be mobilised in,' 25 army oorps, with probably 11 cavaliry diiisiotio, or possibly 14. Theae will bq divided into armies .of three, four, or five army corps and two or.. three cavalry divisions each, eaoh under an army; commander who is iw a rulo the Inspector-General' in peace of the group ot larmy corps forming his command in >ar. There may b» formed a oavalxy dorps 1 of two [ or three divisions,, under the eupreni# command, and not attaohoi ■ to : any ormy. . ' ' Bach army corps,-except tjie Guard in Berlin recruited generally, is looted in peace either in one of the provinces I of Prussia, or in the larger of the 'other States forming the German Enipire. Tlxu small forces of. the smaller St|ites, such a.i the three free cities (like Hamburg), or the small principalities anil duchies (like Eouss or Auhalt, or Sasje Weimar or Brunswick) form portions,' of tho neighbouring Prussian corps.! Bavai'ia has three corps, Saxony and Wurtemburg two, and Baden one. Theire are three corps in Alsace and' Lorraine specially prepared as frontier corps for war. • The other 14 oorps are provided by Prussia .and the smaller States. The cavalry divisions arei not formed | till mobilisation, except th<>se of .the Guard and Saxons kept up; in peace. Eaoh army oorps district has some cavalry regiments out of which: the cavalry divisions are formed, the rij-st being allotted to the divisions of 1 the several army corps. The normal strength of an army corps .is two divisions each of /two brigades of two regiments of three battalions of infantry. Eaoh division had some cavalry and 72 field guns, and some .engineers, besides its train. A oavalry division normally comprises three brigades ■ of two regiments of four squadrons each, with fava horse' artillery batteries. It is thus half the dtrength of the British cavalry division of four brigades of thies> regiments, with two horse artillery brigades each of two batteries. Besides the above troops, forming the army of first line there irill be raised in eaoh army corps district two reserve divisions; but it is hardly likely that their mobilisation can ba effected till that of the first line army is completed, and they will be weaker ii) guns. Those divisions will ba used to reinforce the army in the front, to. undertake sieves, and to guard the. lines, of communications, and to occupy conquered territory. They form the array of tjhe second line. The reserve men not needed in these divisions will be assembled at the regimental depots at home, fuid can be sent to the front in drafts to replace casualties in their regiments as required. The 'first line army will comprise over a million men, the second line army some 800,000. There will also be a number of troops guarding the ooasts and garrisoning the home fortresses. It is likely that at first there will be mobilised 2,500,000 • out of tho 3,500,000 trained men in Germany. \ Mobilisation, Each army corps is practically a small army of all arms, self-contained, with its 6taff and administrative services for supply and transport, and care of wounded, and providing its own reservo men who live in its area, and are readily called up on mobilisation. These fill up the ranks to war strength, for .only rather more than half tho infantry battalions are preseut in peace. Theso reservo men have to be armed, cquippd, clothed, and fitted with boots, and distributed to their units. On mobilisation, too, a number of now staffs have to be formed, and ammunition colnmns and train? which only exist in skeleton in peace havo to be •provided. A groat number pf additional horses are also collected. Tile amount of business to be transacted, on mobilisa- . tioii can only be faintly hifiited at, and it is only by elaborate organisation to the minutest detail that thp process can be effected In tho few d|vye (under ft

week) to which it has now been brought In i Germany and Franco. lit 1870 the Germans took 11 days to mobilise, other countries, especially Russia, far longer. Concentration. When all tho units of tho first lino army are complete in men, horses, transport, etc, and fully armed nnd equipped with accoutrements, harness, and eaddlory, their railway movement to tho front can bogin, but not till then. Tho war of 1870 showed the folly of tho French in hurrying partly-mobilised corps to the front without their trains and. food supplies, or oven all their reservo mon, and tho Germans did not move off from their homo stations till ready in every detail. This. railway movement is a gigantio operation, and is only possible in the four or five days allotted, owing to the elaborate detailed arrangements made in years of peace. The trains required, their lime-tables, and arrangements for feeden route, have all been long hud down. Each army corps has its own railway lino leading from its district to its destination on the frontier. These railways have been selected so as to avoid crossing or interference with thoso of other corps, and tho rollingstock is mil told off to provide the necessary trains of varying compositions, which are double the length of ordinary trains, and move at a slow rate, drawn by two engines. Each corps keeps its, railway to itself during the war, tor use in passing back its sick and wounded and bringing up its reinforcements in men and horses, and its supplies and stores. . The Railway System. The French General Staff has made a thorough study of the German railways, and gathered from it, with reference to the position of the army corps in peace, a fair idea of tho deployment of the whole Army or its disposition by army corps on the frontier against France. In recent years a number of railways for strategic use have been made up to the borders of France and Belgium, where no cml'traffic called for them. In some cases-existing single lines have been form, ed olose to the frontier, with many long sidings, and pHovided with platforms for unloading mon and horses. The sid< ings allow of several trains discharging at once, and of their being marshalled for their return journey to bring up mora troops. All necessary accessories are pro-vided—water-cranes, engine-sheds, 'turntables, coaling bays, and repair shops. Tt will be thus dear j;hat no change in the locality of a detraining station could be made in a bnrry, so that the exaot distribution of the troops along the frontier is definitely fixed ' Roads and Fortresses. Thorough investigation of the roads leading from these' detraining stations into France and Beligum has indicated the *ines of advance of the-concentrated German armies. Each army corps must have a separate road, and these should be within eight miles of each other,, or half a day's march, so that .corps can co-operate with their, neighbouring troops if called on to fight. Tho French fortifications, of course, have a great influence on the lines of, operations, oat these, being secret, cannot be well discussed here. German Strategy, The kind of stragety which we may attribute to the Germans is-the most useful factor in forecasting the plan of campaign which. they will now adopt. Aho strategy of past wars is always a pood guide to future once planned by the same General Staff. This can be" seen in a study of the wars waged by Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, and other great generals. The strategy of a nation on which its officers are brought up is seldom or only gradially, ohanged. It tends to keep.on the same general lines in war after war, . e its features' are due to national qualities or deficiencies, and become stereotyped, especially when the strategy, has been successful. When .we look at the strategy which the Prussians followed in 1860 against Austria, and ;.gainst France in 1870, we are struck by the identity of the preliminary disposition of the army and of the plan of operations. Nor is this all we have to go on. The Japanese, pupite of the Germans, used identical strategy against the Russians., All these wars snow first a decided.'spirit of initiative and a determination to seek out the enemy and attack him. This spirit is borne out'by all German military literature and teaching. Wo may, therefore, count on the German Army invading France to attack tho enemy, and this will enable : them to direct the opening phases of the war. Subsequent events are on the knees of the gods, and cannot be forecast by the . most skilled strategist. They depend.on the tactical successes in batuo, and on the movements, wise or otherwise, of tne enemy. During the' war the strategist lives from hand to mouth; making short plans for the next few days only. .Napoleon himself said, "I have never' had a plan of campaign," In all the three; wasrs named above we note a. disposition of tho whole force in three, separate armies placed along the frontier with intervals between them, but each- concentrated for t'ho combined action of 3ts parts. From the first localities of this strategical.deployment, as it. ij. termed, we note a converging advance directed on the front and flanks of the enemy by the centre and flank wings of the attacking army. In ISfifi and 1870 tho centre army was the strongest, and the right army weaker than the left one, and clinging to the centre army, while the stronger left army made a wide eweep In its flank attack. In Monohuria the oentral army was the weaker one, and clung to the strongest, the left army, while the right one made' a wide sweep. This division into three armies was suntablo to the moderate 6ize of tie whole in these wars, but the great numbers now. to to 'engaged will demand a division . into fire armies, lest each should be unwieldy. Modern views are positive that no man can well command more than five army corps, and two or three cavalry divisions, and the five German armies will probably' consist of three, tour, or five oorps. ' Form of Operations Summed Up. The form of operations dictated by German strategy may be summed up as a powerful front ,ttack, in combination with.a strong attack on one flank, and a weaker attack on the other flank to fix tho enemy's forces there. From the above considerations, after carefuil study, the conclusion-has been come to that the Germans will form a strong central mass operating westwird from Lorraine, a strong flank attack on the FTenoh left; operating in a south-easterly direction (trough Luxemburg and the Ardennes in Belgium, and a weak army directed on tho French right, from Southern Alsact.. The right attack will be delivered by eight army corps, forming two armies, of which one will bo deployed along the 30 miles of Belgian frontier, south of Aix to St. Vith, and ,he other along the 35 miles of tho Luxemburg frontier m front of Treves, from Bittburg to Sierek. ' In front of these two armies will be pushed the' main mass of German cavalry, as this is the most open field for its action, the centre being blocked by the line of French fortifications. There'will be besides one or two cavalry divisions- with eaoh army, probably a oavalry corps of two divisions or more, which will move rapidly due west Into Belgium ahead of Hie armies, to toTer their advance and sweep -round .he French flank. This great flank attack wilt aim at tho Meuso, Givot, and Stonay, while the cavalry corps tries to reach the valley of the Aisne further '.vest. There are sufiioiont roads through the Ardennes and Luxemburg for each corps to have a separate one, some seven miles apart, so that tho .whole will be floncontrated for co-opera-tion in battle The corps composing these two armies will bo drawn from the northwestern and north-central Germany, and will be mainly Prussian. They .will •probably be supported by an army composed of reserved divisions following in second line. Their, maroh to tho Meuso may be expected to take fivo days. Tho weok left wing wUI bo formed of an army of perhaps only three corps, and a cavalry division, which will be concentrated, in South Alsace, at Colmor and Mulhausen, and will operate between the Vosges and the Swiss frontier, avoiding the strong fortress of Bolfort, which reserve tToops coming up behind will besiege. This army will divert attention and hold down the French right, w'hilo posted so as to resist an offensive movement of the French against the German left, which might bo diverted from Belfort into Alsacß. The Central Gorman mass will probably be deployed on the frontier between Metz end the Vosges Mouatnins. and advance towards Nancy throftgh the gap in the .fortifications between the great fortresses of Epinal and Touh Part of it may emerge, from the German fortified line on the Moselle.from,Sleta to Thionvillo, and attack tho forfrfleaticna in front.,.

Tho Gorman9 have provided very heavyfield mortars to attack forte, and light pirdor bridges to cross t'heir ditches wilh. This centml mass will coinprisa two armies of four or five corps each, drawn from the three in Alsace-Lorraine and tho southern Gennaii States. These will lx> supported by an amy of reserve divisions in second line. The centre mass will make a great otfort to penetrate tho liVench front, iv'hilo tho right wing- is concentrating in tho Meuse for an attack on the Ft en cli left, so as to hold down tho French centre anu provent its -einforcing tho left by shifting troops northward. The Germans hope thus to envelop the French left- simultaneous converging advance of all their forces, exactly in the style of the operations in 1866, or those df the Japanese against the-Russians at Lio-Yang. 100 total number engaged will depend on tho corps which it may hoM_ essential to retain on the eastern frontier against Russia, which will certainly comprise tnoso quartered in the provinces likely to Lo attacked, liamoly, Bast Prussia,, Posen, and Silesia.. , ... The great combined ac&vanco cannot begin till the twelfth day after mobilisation was ordered, wlien the conceutrAtioii of the whole first line winy will be completed. The general battle can haxdlv begin till a. week later, when the, llnnK march through Belgium will have been made. This indioate3 August i U for we first invasion, and the JBth to tlio 2oth for the great battle, but the data ana looality of the latter will depend on the French movements. y