MUST WE EVER INVADE?

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1090, 31 March 1911, Page 5

MUST WE EVER INVADE?

IN SELF-PRESERVATION. ■ } (Br Gvno.) This oxecedingly important message marks tho first time, since tho present military development of the nations of .. Europe, that an English General has ever expressly advocated an army for purposes, if need be, of invasion. It is a question which belongs to that part of tho "science" of war which id known as grand strategy. And as it is especially important when it comes from Lord Jiobcrts, for ho is tho only known living master of grand strategy which tho British nation possesses. Our other Gen-,' ernls aro either tacticians or orgaiiisci'sV~but none of them, except Lord Roberts, has ever been placed in a position where they' had opportunity of showing what they could do in tho matter of major strategy, and consequently in this respect Lord Roberts stands alone. Ho is. better qualified than anyone else to say how much of the national resources should be', devoted to the fleet, and how much to the ' Army, for tho creation or increase of.an army, or the creation or increase of a ' ■ navy are acts of what is termed "pcaeoi strategy," and their consequences in time of actual war aro certain to bo very farreaching either for good or for evil. A mistake in devoting national finauco to' channels that will prove ineffective when hostilities aro actually in being is a blun-1 . der from which the stress of a soriuus war) would leave oven a wealthy nation, such as Britain, no opportunity to recover. I Lord Roberts's dictum as lo devoting ■move of the" national resources lo ' the Army will probably strike a great blow') at tho very generally held theory that the*' screen formed by the Navy is all that the nation needs. It will probably lead people, to realise—though tho awakening will beslow—that Invention is working sitciT"*S changes with respect to narrow, water ' areas (e.g., North Sea) 1 that the time is approaching when Britain must seriously choose ,betwecn being invaded or invading herself.

This matter will bo more clearly seen by considering what would certainly en- ' sue in the event of a war between England and Germany, if that war were pre- — ceded by a declaration. Tlio British licet ,-cmrld not harm the German'ports because each and every one of them is a fortified re-entrant, and a fortified re-entrant is an insuperable tactical problem. For tho samo reason most of tho British ports'' would bo immune, however strong tho : German fleet might happen to be. Also i the North Sea would swiftly bo mndo ; such a hornet's nest of mines, torpedoers, and submarines that the main battle fleets j would have lo lie drawn back far froiil jj each oilier to await certain developments';' which would probably never come. This;' would produce a deadlock, which would 1 defeat the whole theory and purpose or j warfare, and this is,this very considora[" Hon which has no doubt largely lelided • to keep the .peace between the liadouj.) mentioned.

This being so, it is most unlikely that'; wnrr between, say, Britain ami Germany, , would bo preceded by a declaration, !, What is likely in such a ease would b* i. that the German General Shift" would seek to arrange for one swift blow, which would end the war in a week or two. A. certain force, say, 150,000, would bo dispatched and landed on the English coast, and, disregarding tho Aldcrshot and Colchester divisions, would march straight on tho English naval ports, and, taking cliargo of the garrison guns, drive all warships in port out to sea. The English fleet would bo then almost without a base, and without coal, and the rest would bo easy. . M It is to make such a coup more difficult that Lord Roberts has, no doubt, put forward his scheme. It is the countermove in gr.uul strategy, and the only olio.' For purposes of invasion, however, the force which ho proposes to create, would bo much too small, unless acting in concert with a powerful ally, No doubt hiß Lordship has this in view.