HOW STORY OF NAZI SURRENDER WAS TOLD TOO SOON

Chronicle (Levin), 30 September 1946, Page 4

HOW STORY OF NAZI SURRENDER WAS TOLD TOO SOON

The biggest leakage of the wai* happened like this: Brigadier-General Frank A. Allen, Director of Public Eelations at Shaef, realised that the Germans 'would prObably soon offer to surrendel-. So he eaw General Eisenhower and asked him to allow war correspondents to cover any meeting between the Allies and representatives of the German High Oommand. General Eisenhower was extremely dubious about this suggestion. He pointed out that the negotiations with the Germans were very secret indeed. This was especially necessary hecause any unconditional surrender must be made at the same time on both the Russian and Western fronts, and distances made it very difficult to co-ordinate with the Russians in such circumstances. Besides, the refusal of Himmler's offer had not caused the Germans to abandon hope of creating trouble between the Russians and the Western Allies. RUSSIANS' CONDITIQNS In the hope of ending the war quickly, General Eisenhower said he had asked the Russians to , allow him to accept an unconditional surrender on all fronts. They agreed to him doing so (a final surrender agreement would, of course, be signed later by the Russians as well as the other Allies) on three conditions: 1. Negotiations would be conducted with complete secrecy. 2. The terms would be simultaneous unconditional surrender on both the eastern and western fronts. 3. He would not make any public statement until the Russians had been satisfied through subsequent contact with the German High Command that the surrender was not a ruse by which the Germans could gain advantages against the Red Army, but was in fact genuine on both fronts. Hence General Eisenhower 's reluctance to allow correspondents to be present at the meetings. General Allen urged him f-urther, saying that the correspondents would , not release stories until they were told that they might do so. So General Eisenhower agreed that 17 correspondents might be invited. Next stage was for General Allen to collect the correspondents. He said: "This story is off the record until the respective heads of the Allied Governments announce the fact . to the world. I, therefore, pledge each and every one of you on your honour not to communicate the result of this conference, or the fact of its existence, until it is released by Shaef." SIGNING WITNESSED On Sunday, May 6, the 17 correspondents flew to Rheims and saw the surrender signed. General Allen said the correspondents' stories would be flown to London next day and released at three o'cloek on Tuesday afternoon,

Early on Mcnday afternoon the German radio at Plensburg, which was still in the hands of the Nazis, announced the surrender. Reutexs heard this and put it -out; so did the • B.B.C. Both Reuters and the B.B.C. made it clear that there was ino official confirnu.tion of the German radio announcei.ient. At three o'clock Edward Kennedy, one of the 17 correspondents who went to Rheimc, picked up a telephone in the H-tel Scribe, which. had been requisitioned by Shaef. headquarters in Paris, Kennedy, a i amous American correspondent, was then head of the Paris bureau of the Assoeiated Press. He' told the operator to give him London. The operator did so. The line was a direct military one. It led to the telephone exchange set up during the war in Goodge Street . Underground station. When he got London on the line Kennedy said, "Put me through to the Assoeiated Press. ' ' The operator put him through and he dictated his story. In the Assoeiated Press office was a cdnsor. Kennedy' s story was shown to him. H-e assumed very naturally) that it had been censored at Shaef in accordance with the usual routine and that his own "O.K." was merely a formality, He therefore passed it. The story at once went to America. From America it came back to Paris. So the correspondents in Paris to their fury saw French evening papers containing the news sold in the streets and heard loud-speakers shouting it to crowds while they themselves could send nothing about it because the release time was not until the following afternoon. Of course, there was a terrific todo about tbis. Shaef withdrew Kennedy 's accreditation as a war correspondent. The Assoeiated Press announced its ' 'profound regrets" for the distribution of the story "in advance of airthorisation." The rights and wrongs of the whole business were debated with extreme . heat. CORRESPONDENT ' S DEPENCE Kennedy declared that what he did was justified. He said his conscience was clear, that he had a moral duty to inform the world that the war had "finished. "No military security was inj volved, " he maintained. "Had there j been I shouid not have sent the mesi sage." He added that the story was | out over the German radio anyway. ] Personally, I felt strongly that j Kennedy was not justified in what he did, but he never moved from the i position that he was. Anyway, the next afternoon Mr. Churchill announced over the radio that the war in Europ-e was over and i the free world gave itself up to the J celebration of the victory. — (Rearj Admiral G. P. Thomson in "Secrets 1 of the Censorship.")