CONVICTION QUASHED

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24910, 25 June 1946, Page 3

CONVICTION QUASHED

AUCKLAND FORGERY CHARGE

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL

(P.A.) • WELLINGTON, June 24. The Court of Appeal to-day announced its decision in the case stated by the Supreme Court, Auckland, arising from the trial in Auckland in February of Charles Clark, retired Chief Postmaster, of Auckland, on six counts of forgery of special oil fuel licences when a jury found Clark guilty on all counts. The Court quashed the conviction and acquitted Clark. The Chief Justice (the Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Myers), in delivering his own judgment and those of Mr Justice Blair and Mr Justice Finlay, said in the present case it had not been suggested that the appellant had had any intention to defraud anybody, or that, in fact, anyone had been defrauded. The appellant’s conduct, however, had been incredibly stupid, and if the acts committed by him amounted to forgery, their Honours thought it would be fair to describe the offence, for practical purposes, as technical forgery. The appellant had signed false names to documents which were otherwise regular, and which he had full authority and discretion to issue, and the prosecution had relied upon this as 'constituting forgery.

In the Supreme Court, no evidence had been called for the defence, continued the Chief Justice, and almost immediately after counsel for the Crown had begun his address to the jufy, the Judge had intervened with a question as to how counsel would define “material part” for the purposes of a definition of forgery given in the Crimes Act. Thereupon had ensued a somewhat lengthy colloquy, which—the Court thought unfortunately —had taken place in the presence of a jury, and as the result of which the learned Judge had ruled as a matter of law that a signature was a material part of a licence and that the licences were "false documents.”

Duties of Judge and Jury The Court thought this ruling had not been right. It was the fundamental duty of a Judge‘in every criminal case to explain the law to the jury and an equally fundamental duty of a jury to apply the law, as explained or laid down by the Judge, to the evidence, but it was for the jury, and the jury alone, to determine the facts.

In the present case, he continued, tne Judge should have explained to the jufy the definition of a “false document,” and what was meant by “material part,” and it was then for the jury to determine on the evidence whether the signature was a material part, and whether the licences were false documents. Instead of doing that, the Judge had purported to find the facts and had directed the law Y tO accept the fin dings as findings of

t T B e iearned Judge, continued the Chief Justice, had proceeded, after giving the ruling, to say that the only questions of ..act arising for determination were: (1) whether the accused knew that the documents were false, that is, whether the purported signatures were fictitious; and (2) whether the accused made false documents jyith the intention that they should 2? upon as genuine.. He had added tnat there was no room for controversy on either question as a statement made by the accused to the police admitted both matters, and he said that counsel for the accused must confine his address to the jury to those two questions of fact. Direction to Jury Counsel had said that he proposed to address the jury on the whole case, but the learned Judge had refused to allow him to do that and had said: "I am prepared to direct to jury now to bring in a verdict of guilty,” whereupon counsel no °P^ on bdt to resume his

The Judge had then addressed the jurv shortly and the effect of what he had said, coupled with what he had said previously, amounted, in the opinion of r the Court, to a direction to the jury to convict ’ a £ d tlle Jury had returned a verdict of guilty accordingly. In (the summing up oi the trial’ the learned Judge, continued the Chief Justice, had not informed the jury that the .charge must be established beyond all reasonable doubt, and had said nothing at the onus of proof being on *the Crown. Omission to give such a direction, * as grave an error as an active misdirection m the elements of the u«T n^ e J m a c nd ? vas ?• disre g ai 'd of the essential forms of justice. general , ly ’ where a conviction was set aside under Section 4 of the thoSSSt 1 Act ' IS45 ' the Court that the proper course was to direct a new trial, and that the power given to the Court to direct judgment d i, c g H ant i a verdic t of acquittal. shSSld hnf U^ d y A n exceptional circumstances, .Court’s view this was such ?ntentMn Hi i vln J . re S ard to the absence of '"‘ej?ti?n to defraud, and the other exceptional circumstances of the case the entered would be Washed and acquittal and l 'Mi! U r,lS? ntS r. o f, Mr Jus tice Kennedy effect ‘ti'Stice Callan were to a similar