Why the Geneva Naval Conference Failed

Radio Record, Volume I, Issue 5, 19 August 1927, Page 2

Why the Geneva Naval Conference Failed

Had agreement been reached between Britain, United States, and Japan at the recent Naval Conference, millions of pounds would have been saved in unproductive expenditure. Why did the Conference fail? This lecturette, delivered from 1YA on Friday evening last, by the editor-announcer, based upon official data and information supplied by the Imperial Affairs branch of the Prime Minister’s Department, explains the fundamental facts of the situation, and shows the efforts made by Britain to ease the world’s financial burden while protecting her own 80,000 miles of sea trade arteries. A second-and even more interesting part of the lecbe delivered next Friday evening.

The cause of international: disarma--meut has been exercising the minds of @ comparatively small number of people for very mauvy years, but it was not nutil the world war that the subject became one of every-day discussion and of personal interest fo large numbers of people. Since the war the movement in favour of international peace, and of international disarmament as a first step towards international peace, has made remarkable progress, -It is now a matter of very wide interest, and a real factor in world politics. At the conclusion of the war the Covenant of the League of Nations was: accepted by a vast majority of the na-_ tions of the world as one means of achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes. This Covenant, and the hody that it created-the League of Nations -will be discussed in a separate lecturette, but it should be noted . here that Article 8 of the Covenant accepts the importance of disarmament in the following words :-- "The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest peint consistent with national safety, and the enforcement, by common action, of international obligations." The article provided that the Teague should formnlate plans for disarmament, which should be binding on all members, and should be subect to reconsideration and revision at least. every ten years, and also that the members of the League should undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programmes, and the condition of such ef their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. It has, unfortunately, been possible, go far, to make very little real progress en the lines indicated by this article. Thre disturbed state of the world, and especially of Turope, the fact that pome very powerful nations remained, and still remain, outside the League ef Nations, and the still existing fears and apprehensions of many of the nations within the League, have all militated very strongly against the taking of effective steps in the direction of dise@rmainent.

WORKING FOR LIMITATION. For some time past, however, a Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, ’ set up by the League, has been investigating the subject, and at its last meeting, which commenced on March 21 of this year, two @raft conventions on disarmamenutone submitted by the British and the ether by the I'rench-were examined in detail. No less than thirty-nine pub-: lic meetings were held for this purpose by the Preparatory Commission, and, althongh it was not possible to arrive at an agrecment upon one draft, considerable progress was made in examining details and in clarifying the wiain issues involyed. The chairman of the Preparatory Commission-Mon-_ sieur Ioudon, of the Netherlands-ob-served that, for the first time in the history of the world, the problem of the limitation of armaments had been approached as a whole, and by practical methods. ‘What is cssential,’’? he said, "is that, having cleared the ground, and accom-, plished our first stage, we should meet aga! as soon as ‘he ideas expressed here have ripened, Governments have had time for reflection, and the more’ intelligent section of public opinion has pronounced its verdict." You will note that the Preparatory Commission aud the League of Nations are dealing with the subject of disarmament in all its phases-land, sea and air-aid you should also note that one very powerful nation that 1s not a member of the League of Na-tions--the United States of Americahas for this purpose associated itself with the League’s work and has taken part in the discussions of the Preparatory Commission. The United States Giovernment, however, while anxious to assist in any movement that might help towards the cause of disarmament, have nevertheless expressed the epinion that the problem can best be attacked from another angle. They think that if each individual difficulty is isolated and considered not as part. ef a whole, but individually, one at a time, there are better prospects of success, and in accordance with this principle the United States Government were responsible for the meeting of the Washington Conference some years ago. LIMITATION OF SEA POWER. This conference, which met on November 12, 1921, and continued until February 6, 1922, dealt with a numher of subjects, but the principal item for discussion was that of naval disarmament. The problem, instead of being dealt with as a whole, was con-

fined to disarmament at sea, and on this subject the conference met with a very considerable measure of success. New Zealand was represented at the conference by one of its most notable’ citizens, the late Sir John Salmond; whose reputation as a jurist, it is perhaps unnecessary to say, was and is world wide. Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India "(of the British countries), the ‘United | States, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China weré all separately represented by men of the highest ability and reputation, though not all these nations, of couse, were concerned in the discussious on nayal disarmament, One result of that conference was the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Nayal Arinaments, and it is necessary to explain the provisions -of this treaty before it is possible to understand clearly the aims and objects of the conference on naval disarmament that has recently been held at Geneva. This treaty was signed by the five oreat naval Powers, namely,

Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, L’rance, and _ Italy, atid the main provisions are as follow ! (1) The Powers agreed, in accordance with a set programme covering a term of years, to reduce the number of their capital ships (i.e., battleships and hattleerttisers) as follow:Tons. British Empire, to 15 ships, total 525,000 United States, to 15 ships, total 525,000 Japan, °‘ to 9 ships, total 315,000 France, to 175.000 Italy, to 175,000 So far as the three leading Powers are concerned this is known as the 5:5:3 ratio, Great Britain and the United States being placed on a parity, with ‘Japan’s power as 3 to their 5. This 5:5:3 ratio was not adopted as a result of any theoretical considerations; it was the result merely of the existing naval strength of the Powers represented at the conference, | (2) It was further agreed that no capital ship should he built larger ‘than 35,000 tons, or carrying guns over ‘16in, calibre, and that building in future | should be confined t: the replacement of

existing ships after a life of twenty years. (3) The size of cruisers was limited ta 10,000 tons, and their guns to 8in. calibre, but it should be noted carefully that no limitation was imposed on the number of criisers or the aggregate tonnage of cruisers. (4) No restriction of any kind was imposed on the building of submarines, destroyers, or aircraft. (5) Provision was made for the treaty to remain in force until after two years’ notice, and that no such notice could be. given before December 31, 1934. Inany case, eight years after the coming into force of the treaty a conference of the signatories is to be held to consider possible modifications, and this conference is due to be held in the year 1931. 7 (6) A final provision laid it down that in case of war any signatory might suspend the provisions of the treaty for the period of hostilities.

BRITISH SHIPS DESTROYED, Tor our purpose it is not necessary to consider this Treaty in any further detail, but it is of interest to note that, as a result of the limitations of capital ships so imposed, it was necessary to destroy. a considerable proportion of ‘the existing British fleet, including two ships of particular interest to the Do‘minions in the Pacific, namely, the battle cruisers Australia and New Zealand, both of which had served a most useful purpose in the Great War. _ Beforé proceeding to consider the ‘Conference that hag recently been sitting at Geneva it would be well to note that there are two causes underlying the efforts of the principal Naval Powers to obtain an all-round reduc‘tion in naval strength. The first is, of course, the desirability of attempt‘ing to further the cause of international peace. It is plain that where nations are straining every effort in com‘petition with each other to increase their warlike power there is perhaps a natural tendency to attempt ta use that power when circumstances are propitions, not only because the time may ‘seem opportune but also for the purpose of obtaining relief from a crushing financial burden by destroying the

opposing navy and so reducing the national menace. THE COST OF PREPARATION, The second point of view arises to some extent out of the first. It is the desire in all quarters to avoid the annual expenditure of huge sums of money upon ‘naval armaments, which are of course entirely unreproductive. This desire has been greatly intensified by the financial difficulties * through which so many nations have passed since the time of the war, which have rendered it almost impossible to continue the race for armaments in the future im the same manner as in the past. On this aspect of the matter New Zealand’s representative at Washington; ‘ir John Salmond, says: ‘(No sooner are such ships built than they begin to grow obsolete by the advance of scientifie invention, and by the building of more powerful vessels by rival states, and this process of ruinous competitive expenditure goes on indefinitely. ... Lhe primary importance and significance of the Washington Treaty is to

be found in its financial aspects. It relates to times of peace, and to expenditure in preparation for a time of war. It is not an agreement to preserve the peace, nor is it designed for that end ..» It in no way limits the weapons with which States may fight and defend themselves-it merely limits the weapons which they may prepare for that purpose in time of peace.’? SATISFACTORY REDUCTIONS. The result of this treaty up to the’ present has been generally satisfactory. Important reductions have been effected in the cost of maintaining the navies of the world, and as the naval strength of the powers concerned is definitely limited, so far as the most expensive vessels are cotieerned, there has been no competitive building in those ships. The limitations with regard to cruisers, however, which ships you will remember are confined to 10,000 tons and to. 8in. guns, have had an effect certainly contrary to what was intended. The tendency has been to build cruisers up to the maximum allowed by the treaty, and as there is no limitation on the number of these ships \ (which are by no means inexpensive) there seemed every prospect that an-

other naval race would commence, not in battleships er battle-cruisers, but in 10;000-ton cruisers, as soon as, or probably before, the nations were in a financial position, to bear the cost. It was im these circumstances that President Coolidge of the United States of, America issued to the four Powers who signed the Washington Treaty with America his invitation to a further conference on naval dsarmament, to he held at Geneva in June of this year, Though his invitation was addressed to four Powers, namely, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, only two of these Powers (Great Britain and Japan} accepted the invitation. . Krance declined to take part in the conference, owing to her belicf that the question of disarmament could be considered only as a whole, and that a conference on the naval aspect alone might result in jeopardising the success of the Leariwe of Nations disarmament inquiry, which covered all phases of the problem. . Italy’s refusal was based on different grounds. The Italian Government expressed the opinion that Italy’s naval power was already limited as far as poscible in view of her geographical situ-ation-dependent for her cutlet to the- world on the nariow waters of Gibraltar, Suez, and the Bosphorus, and in comparison with the maritime forces of other countries, including many who had not signed the Washington ‘Treaty, or been invited to take part in the forthcoming conference. Notwithstanding the absence of these two countries, the United States, Great Rritain, ond Tapan decided to proceed with the conference independently, and steps were taken to provide for the representation of the British Empire by n strong and expert delepation. ‘The Rritish delegation was headed by the Rieht Hon. W. C. Bridgeman (First Uerd of the Admiraltv); the American delegation was headed by Mr. Huech fihson, and Admiral Saito was the leader of the Japanese delegation. ‘She representatives of New Zealand were the High Commissioner (Sir James Parr) and Admiral of the Fleet, Hart Tellicoe, assisted by Rear-Admiral Beal. New Zealand was fortunate in being ahle to secure the servives of Arfmriral of the Fleet, Earl Jellicoe, as one of its representatives. His exnert knowledge and international prestige enabled him to plav a prominent and helpful natt in the deliberations. As time reauires a conclusion aft this point, those interested in the subtect are reminded that the final portian of this lecturette, including an ex« nlanation of the proceedings and the failure of the conference, will he des livered next Priday evening at appronimately 9 o’clock. .