COST OF ESPIONAGE

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20906, 11 September 1939, Page 5

COST OF ESPIONAGE

IS IT WORTH WHILE? POWERB’ BECRET SERVICES ALL ILL-OMENED GAMES Is international espionage worth what it costs in risk, effort and public money, asks Walter Duranty in the New York Times. He presents a wellinformed survey of the methods employed by the secret services of the Great Powers in peace and wartime. The General Staffs of modern States have developed a system of •‘practice” war, which consists in planning military operations to meet any eventuality and resist even the most unlikely of opponents. As might be expected, this ill-omened game is played first against the most probable adversary, but in order to be adequately prepared for all contingencies the 'General Staffs play it also against friendly States. For both purposes it is desirable or even necessary to know as much as possible about the military strength, man power, equipment and resources of other nations. Such peace-time espionage is generally carried on through military and naval attaches in various countries, sometimes through their “secret agents,” but to no small degree by personal investigation and by a careful comparative study of recondite magazines, pamphlets and trade journals. It is most of it harmless enough, and as one might say, one side cancels the other out. Everybody recognises that it is more or less a routine job and, although occasionally some minor spy and his accomplices are severely punished, no one feels that that matters very much or is in any way unusual. A Different Btory It is a different story, however, when espionage occurs between two countries which are sufficiently unfriendly to believe that war is likely or even probable. In this case the routine espionage is reinforced by two important factors: first, the Intelligence Service, which has been content with reports from military attaches and their agents and other sources in friendly States, but now takes an active hand in the game and introduces agents of its own who sometimes are entirely unknown either to the military attache or to his diplomatic colleagues; second, professional spies, who having the nose of a bloodhound for coming international trouble and the opportunity it gives them, flock to the scene like flies around a honey-pot. What was before a more or less platonic game becomes deadly earnest. The risks, and incidentally the rewards, are considerably greater, and as tension increases between the two countries there enters a new element in the shape of what Russians call ‘‘diversionist activities.” In the past fourteen months of international crises people all over the world have heard much of this ungainly phrase, which refers to the attempts of foreign agents to get in touch with malcontent or venal groups and individuals in the country of their potential enemy in order not merely to gain information, but to forment strikes, riots and other forms of internal opposition and to inflict damage by sabotage, assassination and other 'terrorist acts against life and property. Professional spies are an interesting phenomenon of contemporary civilisation. Paradoxically enough, many of them profit from the patriotism of others because they have no patriotism of their own. Frequently they are men and women without a country—that is to say, of so mixed a parentage and upbringing that they hardly know themselves what is their native land or native tongue. Playing With Risks Primarily, of course, they work for money, but money is not all to them. They enjoy—I use the. word advisedly —-the excitement of playing 'fast and loose with deadly risk; they feel the hatred of the mongrel for the thoroughbred, and compensate the lack of a country of their own by trying to injure the country of others. Last, but not least, they find profit and a measure of security by “playing both ends against the middle,” for nearly all professional spies have more than one allegiance and more than a single paymaster. There is, too, a deadlier type of professional spy, almost necessarily polygot and of mixed nationality but intensely and genuinely devoted to one of the countries from whic-h his parents came. One is able to form a fairly clear picture of the espionage system as applied to a potential or probably enemy in a so-called “pre-war period.” Side by side with the more or less “legitimate” collection of information, whether military or economic, by military' attaches, diplomatic and consular officers and others, there are the less overt activities of the Intelligence Service, whose agents frequently pose as business men or other harmless individuals and sometimes are provided with an elaborate disguise in the shape

of false names, nationalities and passports. As the danger of war increases such local agents are supplemented by men of higher standing, detached for “special service.” Both sets of agents build up an information network and recruit professional spies and other subordinates among the native population. In extreme cases, which seem to be growing more common in the modern world, the intelligence agents undertake diversionist work. The U.S.S.R. has brought the ques- 1 tion of diversion prominently to the fore in recent months. The Russians say German and Japanese agents and their Russian employees or dupes have conducted a widespread campaign of sabotage against Soviet railways, factories and other industrial enterprises. There is little doubt that both Germans and Japanese have been animated by no friendly feelings toward Russia in recent years and it is not surprising on the face of it that they should carry on such activities here. Demands*on Nationals Both countries notoriously claim “body-and-soul” obedience from their nationals at home and abroad, and officials of the counter-espionage department of the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police, formerly known as GPU) have implied in published articles that they consider every German national working in Soviet Russia as a potential agent of the Gestapo. The German Embassy in Moscow has been credited with a statement that over three hundred German specialists have been arrested in the past year. Some are still in prison, others have been exchanged for persons of nationality unmentioned, arrested on similar charges in Germany. It has been said, too, that more than half the German communists who “escaped” from concentration camps in their home country and fled for refuge to Russia have proved to be Gestapo agents either acting by their own free will or under the pressure of threats against their relatives. Similar charges are brought by NKVD officials in Russia against many Korean “refugees” from alleged Japanese tyranny in the Far Eastern Provinces. Then, too, there is the case of the Metro-Vickers trial a few years ago, when the prosecution alleged that British engineers employed in Russia to install electrical equipment seized every occasion to obtain secret information about the new Russian military factories and armament plants. .The charges against them were not proved to the satisfaction of foreigners. On the other hand, many of the allegations now being made in the Russian press about German and Japanese activities seem to carry the stamp of truth. True or false, such allegations and charges are a characteristic feature of pre-war espionage. When hostilities have actually begun it is a very different story. A cardinal rule of wartime espionage is that one report counts for little, but that the combination of a great many reports may provide valuable information. During active hostilities espionage falls into three distinct categories; first, the discovery of strictly military movements—that is, what troops are being moved to what area, what new offensive measures or plans are contemplated and what hitherto unused means of warfare, like gas ® tanks, are about to be brought into action; second, the discove<ry of shipping movements, whether for military or other purpose, which may be of great value to a blockading fleet or to submarines; third, a carefully synthetised series of reports upon public sentiment and morale. In wartime espionage there is an additional and serious problem—that of transmitting information collected, which often proves no less dangerous and difficult than collecting it; and there is an additional mission, that of training and, if possible, counteracting the espionage of the enemy. From the viewpoint of a critical outsider, there are three somewhat striking features about espionage in general. First, although espionage services go to great and secretive pains and spend a great deal of public money, no small part of their activities is devoted to checkmating and counter-acting one another, as if both sides were engaged in a dangerous and exciting game from which little of positive value results. A second curious feature in the matter of espionage is that w'hen spies do discover and transmit a really important secret their home authorities rarely seem to pay it much attention. Thus, the British received information from Belgium that the Germans in the second year of the war were experimenting with poison gas behind their lines and were planning gas attacks. Nevertheless, no preparations were made lo meet the threatened danger. Vital Results Rare Finally, however, it is true that in, certain instances espionage or diversionist action can have and does have great value and that is the reason why it is maintained by every major Power, and small Powers too. A single spy dropped behind the enemy’s lines from an aeroplane, or a thoughtless word picked up by an enemy agent in a rest camp or leave area may give an Intelligence Department the last link needed to complete some deduction by which the enemy's intentions may be forecast or frustrated. Even so, truly vital results are rare enough, and it remains a question whether international espionage is worth what it costs in time, risk, energy and money.