GLOOMY OUTLOOK

Waikato Times, Volume 124, Issue 20742, 28 February 1939, Page 3

GLOOMY OUTLOOK

WORLD AFFAIRS IN 1939 W.E.A. LECTURER’S VIEWS MUNICH THE TURNING-POINT Possible international developments in 1939, viewing the present world situation in the light of the Munich agreement, were discussed in an informal lecture given after the annual meeting - of the Hamilton branch of the W.E.A. by Mr E. M. Higgins, tutor-organiser to the association in the Auckland district. Mr F. A. de 1a Mare presided over a fair attendance. In opening his address, Mr Higgins said he was afraid the lecture-subject was to him a gloomy one. Reference to the subjects of last year’s lectures would show how quickly events had moved. Japan had materially increased her military domination in China, the Spanish war seemed almost over and Czechoslovakia now appeared past history. Starting with the Munich Conference, he said it now appeared safe to say that Hitler was determined to remove eastern and south-eastern barriers to expansion and had virtually threatened world war to gain that end. Britain and France had forced Czechoslovakia to give way, giving up much o.f her actual and potential wealth and .leaving the “rump” of Czechoslovakia politically impotent. Not War and Not Peace On the situation after Munich, it I had been said that war moved back a pace, but peace did not take its place. That, said the speaker, seemed a fair summary of the situation. Discussing the considerations which had led British foreign policy to the Munich agreement, Mr Higgins referred to various suggested explanations, such as the view that peace should he maintained at all costs, that by sacrificing Czechoslovakia's strength Germany’s expansionist drive could be diverted from threatening the western democracies, or that concessions could purchase peace in the belief that Germany was not insatiable. There was also some ground for the belief that concessions had been made to the dictatorships to support such regimes against their substitution by administrations likely to disturb the social equilibrium in Britain and France. All of these contentions could well be true in some degree. Germany’s Growing Strength Those worried over the prestige of British imperialism had seen much to deplore in the post-Munich period. Hitler’s Germany was now the strongest political and military entity in Europe and the way had now been opened to balance her lop-sided economy from the relatively undeveloped Balkan territories. Germany’s power had now so greatly increased that to meet her in the field demanded most elaborate counter-moves. Hitler was now in the position to take the initiative and many wondered how the British Government, which had “ditched” its own allies, hoped to stand alone against Germany. As an American commentator put it, Mr •Chamberlain had succeeded in effecting the seeming miracle of losing the last war and at the same time losing the next.

Before 1931 people were justified in assuming that the prospect of a repetition of 1914 would be removed and even up to the beginning of last year there was still hope, since the right of aggression was not openly admitted and the principle of collective security was then still generally accepted. To-day, however, the world was again back in the jungle. Italy was agitating for Nice, Savoy, Tunisia and Djibouti from France, and militant fascism was growing daily stronger in Spain, while there had been renewed persecution of the Jews throughout ’ Europe. And the only defence against the further spread of such barbarism seemed to be more and better and bigger arms. Such developments did not seem to fit in with the “peace in our time,” statements of Mr Chamberlain or with Hitler’s declarations of no more war. Under cover of the arms campaign, too, there seemed to be a general advance towards reaction politically. Facing such a situation, some people felt that any postponement of war was to be applauded. There was another and more truculent school which contended that everything must be done to strangle fascism. Such thinkers wished to see the greatest amount of arms made available to non-fascist Governments. There was again a third line of thought which led to the question of whether one had reason to think Hint those in charge of affairs in, say, Britain, might use such arms against powers other than tlie fascist powers. Many felt that since Munich talk of collective security was dangerous since collective security might easily be used as a slogan in a war not waged for that purpose. Again, would not war mean the establishment, in all participating countries, of the most ruthless authoritarianism? Economic Conference Needed The speaker fell that there was a strong case for people of goodwill pressing for the calling of a world economic conference. It might not achieve much at the outset, but the | speaker believed that it would be rich in tactical value. The ordinary people of the world, too, were entitled to question the propriety of private profit from armaments and the adequacy of air-raid precautions, the latter problem, one which seemed to have been muddled badly in Great Britain. Despite a substantial outlay, protection for the bulk of the people was to-day non-existent. In New Zealand, the time was one for continuing the fight for free speech j and organisation and to fight any tendency to put guns before butter in the Dominion. “For the defence of New Zealand,” said Mr Higgins, “we need first a contented people with a high morale." Another avenue of activity which might well he exploited more was in the reviving of systematic boycott of the goods of nations relying upon resultant credits for aggressive purposes. At the conclusion of the lecture, the speaker answered several questions and was then accorded a vote of thanks.