ILLUSORY TREATIES.

Waikato Times, Volume 107, Issue 17985, 2 April 1930, Page 11

ILLUSORY TREATIES.

GAS IN WAR.

“LESS BRUTAL” THAN EXPLOSIVES.

Dr Herbert Levinstein, president of the Society of Chemical Industry, read a paper on “Chemical Warfare” before the London section of the society at the Institution of Mechanical Engineers recently. lie criticised the “illusory” character of treaty provisions against gas warfare, contended that the limitation of naval armaments increased the importance of the chemical arm, quoted figures to establish that gases were less brutal and destructive of human life and property than shells, and pleaded for the prosecution of chemical warfare research. Dr. Levinstein said President, Wilson was the main author or inspirer of Clause 171 in the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade chemical warfare; yet, fresh from the drafting of this clause, he telegraphed to the Congress that although the United Stales would gladly join in a national disarmament programme, it would nevertheless be obvious prudence to make certain of the successful maintenance of many strong and well-equip-ped chemical plants. If President Wilson thought this obvious prudence for the United States we were not war-mongers or panic-mongers if we examined the problem for ourselves and pursued a similar course.

The restriction of naval armaments, the limitation of the number and size of ships, was almost purely an economy measure, but limiting the size or number of battleships or ordnance did not necessarily make war less likely; on the contrary, by making it cheaper, in a sense it made it easier. In any case, decreasing the relative importance of ships or guns or manpower was bound to increase the importance of any other arm, particularly the chemical arm. Prohibition Ineffective. Chemical warfare had in a kind of way been forbidden at Versailles, at Washington, and by the League of Nations at Geneva, and, indeed, ever since the Hague Convention of July, 1899. His object was not to show that the prohibition was illogical, but if it could be proved to be ineffective, that was another mater, for to rely on ineffective prohibition might be as dangerous in the future as it was in the last war.

The Germans claimed that they did not break the letter of The Hague Convention of 1 899 when in April, 1915, they let loose a flood of chlonne over the Hrilish lines at the second battle of Ypres and made a gap eight, miles wide in our line. In the terms of flic Convention the contracting Powers agreed to “abstain from the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases-" The gas in April, 1915, was discharged not from projectiles but from cylinders, an important technical difference. Most, if not all, of the gas-shells employed afterwards had a high-explosive charge, and 1 their object was not, therefore, “solely” the liberating of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The loosing of that stream of chlorine on the Canadian and French Colonial troops created a gap through which the Germans might have poured had their General Staff really believed at that time in the efficiency of ' the chemical weapon. This surprise attack showed the extreme danger of allowing ourselves to neglect defence against chemical warfare, because we did not expect it owing to 'some inaccurate or indefinite form of words used in a treaty. In Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, intended to prohibit, chemical warfare, there was a proviso at least as vague as that of 1899 forbidding in Germany the manufacture and importation of toxic gases and analagous liquids. Loopholes In Protocol. What exactly did the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which Great Britain had promised to ratify, prohibit? It prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials or devices, but it did not prohibit the use of screening smokes.. We of all people should be crazy to prohibit their use. Yet, in concentrated form, most of the smokes had deleterious effects on the human organism. Xo one could claim, for instance, that chlorosulphonic acid smoke, the Zeebrugge screen, was pleasant to breathe, in concentration. Those who used it in chemical works knew it to be a most unpleasant substance to handle. There was no screen smoke which was wholly non-deleterious, and if smoke screens were allowed and not .defined or limited the rest of the prohibition lost its virtue.

Again, were tear gases to be regarded as coming within the ban? Many people would argue that these were not, poisonous, for in very low concentration they only affected the eyes. If tear gas was prohibited, that would prohibit in war the use of a weapon permitted and used in peace. Tear gas was used in the United States for dealing with riots and similar disturbances, and as a protection to hanks and safe deposits against burglars and thieves. If it were permissible to use tear gas in peace time against one’s own citizens, how could it be wrong to use it in war against the enemy? High explosive shells, again, generally produced poisonous fumes which under certain conditions would poison men in the neighbourhood of the burst. The Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the use of high explosive shells that released poisonous fumes, nor did it define in any way what high explosives were permitted in war. The Protocol was certainly inaccurate in stating that the use of chemicals in war had been justly condemned by the general opinion of the world. The casualties of the last war showed that the military results desired could be obtained more easily and with less human suffering from gas than from high explosives. Gas maimed or killed a much smaller proportion of those it pu-t out of action than any other weapon used in the war. In proportion to the military results it, caused far less human suffering, temporary or permanent. From January 1 to September 30, 19 IS, the number German gas casualties was, in round figures, 58,000: of those only 3 per cent died. From August 1 to 10, 1918. the French had 14,578 gas casualties; of those 2.9 per cent. died. The total British casualties and deaths from gas from September 13, 19J8. 1o ihe end of the war, were 24.363 casualties. 540. deaths, percentage of deaths 2.2. Of Ihe American gas casualties less than 2 per cent, died, and very few were permanently injured. Gut of every 100 casualties from nil forms of warfare other than gas more than 25 died, and of those dial survived two to five were maimed. blinded, nr disfigured for life- It was estimated that mustard gas killed one man for every 40 put out of action, while shells killed one for every three.

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Economy of Force. While not suggesting that gas warfare was anything but dreadful, It was less wasteful of human life and property than older forms of warfare, and it was of such outstanding importance that, when the time came, it would be used even if such use were against the spirit of the Protocol. The persistent products such as mustard gas permitted a great economy of force. No place sprinkled with mustard gas could be usefully held. Against high explosive shelling men could go underground, and when the shelling ceased they could come up; but they could not come up and carry out any useful military movement if the surface had become contaminated by mustard gas. By means of mustard gas an army could protect its Hanks against attack, and an enemy could be denied territory which large numbers of troops would be required to defend. 'The use of mustard gas would also create a contaminated area just where an enemy was proposing to land troops or stores. It seemed to him an elementary act of prudence for a nation situated as we were to see that research for chemical warfare should continue. What, finally, would be the effect of the limitation of other armaments on tlie value of the chemical weapon? At the outbreak of war the first anxiety would he to increase these restricted weapons as rapidly as possible. There were ways of using gas that could he adopted very quickly without guns and without shells. There were large stocks of gas cylinders at once available in all countries where there was an alkali industry. Containers suitable for mustard gas, of simple delsign, fitted- with some bursting arrangement, could be quickly constructed. They could be thrown” by hand from aircraft, tanks, armoured cars, and other vehicles, or from projectors. Commercial aircraft could be turned into machines for carrying and dropping bombs or improvised containers within 24 hoursNo one could deny that to saturate arsenals, dockyards, ordnance dumps, and so on behind the lines with mustard gas in a war of movement would be effective. lie did- not assume that the enemy would use mustard gas. It might well be something new and surprising which might break down our gas defence unless we were alert. All these considerations proved that it was prudent in peace time for the War -Office to he in contact with the chemical industries. If an emergency occurred- it would occur quickly. Chemical warfare materials might prove the quickest to improvise as well as the most effective.