A REVIEW OF MR HERBERT SPENCER'S " THEORY OF THE WILL"

Waikato Times, Volume XVIII, Issue 1504, 23 February 1882, Page 3

A REVIEW OF MR HERBERT SPENCER'S " THEORY OF THE WILL"

At the December meeting of the Victoria Philosophical Institute of England, which took place at its house, 7, Adelphi Terrace, London, the Secretary, Captain F. Petrie, announced that this Society, founded to investigate philosophical and scientific questions, especially those said to militate against the truth of Revelation — had enrolled 122 members during the year, of which 53 were resident in America and the Colonies, the total number of its members Avas now 940 ; it was farther stated that this year many of its American members had combined ana founded the " American Institute of Christian Philosophy," a society to cairy out t?he same objects and organization in America, and for that purpose it had adopted the same objects and whole scheme, but that while taking this step its founders had decided to keep up their individual connection with the Institute in England. After this a paper was read on Mr Herbert Spencer's " Theory of the Will. The author showed that Mr. Spencer's philosophy denied all freedom of will, and made deliberation to be only the mental aspect of the commingling of nervemolecules. In the tune of indecision these were colliding one against another, but when a decision had been reached the strongest nerve-stream had made head against all the rest, and was flowing unobstructed on its way. Such, according to Mr. Spencer, was the passage of deliberation into decision, of hesitancy into volition. Manifestly this set aside all freedom of will, made the whole process merely mechanical, and as Mr. Spencer allowed, was the negation of moral obligation. The paper criticised Mr. Spencer's Argument, and maintained that Mr. Spencer, from first to last, had only made one bold assertion, and had repeated it many times, but had given not one iota of proof. Thiitcen of his arguments — all he had presented — were carefully examined, and shown to be nothing more than confident assertion. They were classified and replied to as follows : — First, Mr. Spencer said that "the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will" is "that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." Against this Kant and Hamilton were quoted, as admitting that we must desire, but holding that free - will can restrain desire. The martyrs could not but desire to avoid the flames, but their sublime will held in control their lower ngtuie and compelled it to obey the IaAV of righteousness. Secondly, Mr. Spencer simply assumed that the will had no control or power of free choice, which was the very thing he was bound to prove. He next called it "an illu&iou" to think " that at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ide.is actual and nascent Avhich then exists." Evidently this was confounding substance with phenomena, between which elsewhere he carefully discriminated, and it was making the ego only a succession of states, and denying all substance of mind which was going contrary to one of the structural doctrines of his philosophy. Mr Herbert Spencer has frequently stated that the vyo was nothing else than the state of consciousness passing at the moment, but this statement was never sought to be proved, indeed he contradicted himself, inasmuch as he spoUc of " the subject of such psychical changes." Now '• subject" is that which underlies j phenomena, but he had said the ego was only phenomena, so that his subject was only an hypostatized zero. He next suggested that the will seems to be fiee because its action is incalculable. This was shown to be only an ad enplandum argument, for the flight of a bird through the air seems to the untrained intelligence to be free, but the student of science saw that e\ cry movement of its wings was accoidmg to fixed law. Mr Spencer lately urged that if psychical changes conformed to law there could not be such a thing as free-will. In reply to this, it was shown that the will might make its own U\v, to winch psychial changes would confoim and yet bo free, and that the will would, in this way, adumbiate its own i oial nature. Taking for a moment the Theistic position : surely Goil was fieo, and yet He perfectly confoimcd to His own law, so also man might be free, puiposely made so by God, in order that, being free, he might acquire the true valour of righteousness. Thus all Mr Spencei's arguments had seemed to fail when examined thoioughly, ami the matter stood where it was. Finally, it was contended that the freedom of the will was the unassailable citadel from which alone the doctrine of moral responsibility could be defended, and as such it was a question appealing powerfully to all, and Inning in it the gravest moral issues. With the will free, conscience was seated on the throne, and life was a great moral test of fitness for an eternity of righteousness.