PRIVATEERING IN A CASE OF WAR.

Waikato Times, Volume X, Issue 775, 5 June 1877, Page 3

PRIVATEERING IN A CASE OF WAR.

('United Service Gazette.') It is no secret that a very strange feeling pervades the Russian- people In favor of attacking British com- * tnerce by privateering in the event of war. We are informed through the Russian' Press, as also by our town correspondents,' that large sums would-..-be forthcoming: » from private sources alone for the purchase and «qnipment of privateers in different parts of the world. There is no reason whatever to; ■doubt the truth of sueh information. The Treaty of Paris is certainly not likely to be Tespested by Bassia in the face of what has already been j repudiated by her. Treaties and solem assurances are treated as matters . -ef no moment by Rusek, whoa they are fojrad te utaad ia tibe way ef mod aoadltfticmi. JHete'f, petit Si*, has any power .exemplified -to the full the doctrine of th« end justifying the means as has Russia. As a naval power,: she las, as far as her fleet is concerned, ' acknowledged her intpekeaaoe to; contend even that of Turkey. The squadron she bad in fee Mediterranean has. beta ordered to .America. .Safety from) capture• may 1)9 one motive, but there is ale© another that is as well; taking the -question not only ef posvobilitieabnt. /=, probabilities into aceomnt,,. whieh should not be overlooked. The Russian ships of war, whilst in the. of the United States, need' -not have on board their fall, complement of hands to intare their safety in those neutral waters. Other or more effective woik would be ready to hands in the event of war. 'The electric eable would no eeoner :bave conveyed the news of hesti Cities between the twe eoftnfcriea having Veen proclaimed,them the sehf eie "which has been fully organised would be put in feree, which i« nothing' more nor Jtsa than the manning of * fleet ef privateer* with * officers and men from ihe Russian •sqntfdion, The Russian adwienl, -with the powt-r conferred .upon, him of issuing letters of marque',won d, thus be able to act almost inotanlanro: sly, and before even a *uflicent number of English nien-of--\var conld be collected upon the testation a leiible commercial blow avou d biive been strtiek at English oon.nierce. Jt is useless to taik of the neutrality' of the United States »nd of neutral ports. A fleet of Russian Alabmnas wrnld : be abroad *i»d at work. .'J be first intimation of the fact would be the English merchant vessels sent in 'as priees. Jt was not Kt.elly for the safety of the Hursinn Mediterranean squadron that the Emperor ordered ib.to;pro-. -cetd to the Uniied States. prescience saw that its naval officers «nd men could be moi'e effeetaally employed than in defending iheir «hi}>s. To run the rink of attaek by 4111 iron-clad squadron would have l«en to insure the Russian ships finding secure moorings in an English . harbor. • To send them to .America was not only to insure i heir. safety from any saeh a ttack, 3but to make their valuable }eraonznel available in the direction we itave foreshown; There are other ports in which the safety ef the *hips could have' been equally well •eßftured, but there aro none other than the porta of the United States 'whence : the force on board them so rapidly dispersed in tes43els already selected for- eerviee as privateers.