RESIDENT MAGISTRATE COURT.

Westport Times, Volume VI, Issue 974, 28 May 1872, Page 2

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE COURT.

Monday, Mat 27. (Before J. Giles, Esq., 8.M.) ASSAULT.

Sarah Featherstone was charged with an aggravated assault on Dr P. J. Bi'uen on the 30th April last. Complainant deposed that on the day in question he was at the house of defendant and gave her some money. They partook of beer together, and she commenced talking about his careless treatment of her when unwell. Complainant replied that she had no business to follow him from house to house, and that he gave medical attendance to just those he chose. Some other words on the subject, and she, after going into an inner room for a few seconds, returned and suddenly struck him with some object she seized from the table, the blow taking effect on his right eye. Complainant staggered from the blow, and exclaimed " you have ruined ray eye," the prisoner replying " the devil mend it," and afterwards following him from the house wth foul expressions. Complainant became stupid from the effects of the blow, and his memory for some time afterwards was blank as to passing events. Had been under medical attendance ever since, and had sustained the loss of sight in the eye in consequence of the injury inflicted.

Dr Thorpe detailed the nature of the injuries inflicted on the plaintiff. The wound extended from immediately below the eyebrow, completely severed the upper eyelid, penetrated the spectrum of the eye, severed the edgo of "the lower lid and terminated on the prominence of the cheek. It was both incised and lacerated, and considerable hcemorrhage had ensued. "Witness extracted from the wound some fragments of earthenware, one about half an inch long, corresponding iu color and composition with broken pieces of pottery produced in Court. Severe constitutional derangement followed, and for some time Dr Bruen's life was in danger. The prosecutor was not perfectly sober when witness flrst visited him, and seemed unaware or indifferent as to the nature of the injuries inflicted. The evidence of the arresting constables was read as to the floor being strewn with broken crockery and soda water bottles, and also as to a statement prisoner made when under arrest that she had struck complainant with a soda water bottle. The prisoner, who made no defence and called no witnesses, was committed for trial.

CIVIL CASES. Levett v. Hay.—No appearance. Order for issue of warrant if applied for. "Whyte and Pirie v. Bent-ley and Corr v. Byrne. No proof of service. Adjourned. Calahar v. Suisted. —Tho Court delivered judgment as follows therein:— This is an action for damages on account of injuries sustained by the plaintiff" from a bullock the property of defendants. The defence isthat the bullock is not proved to be defendant's property, and that it is not proved that defendants knew the bullock to be dangerous. The first ground of defence I dispose of at once by saying that in my opinion the identity of the bullock with one owned by the defendants is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the evidence. The second ground of the defence proceeds upon the doctrine that the owner of an animal not force natures is not responsible for casual damage done by the animal unless he were previously aware of its mischievous disposition. In the present case the beast in question had only passed into the possession of the defendants immediately before the the accident happened, and it was therefore impossible that they could have bad any knowledge of its disposition and habits. Therefore, if the maxim before mentioned were to be interpreted strictly and literally, it would appear that the plaintiff could have no case. But the cases recorded show thr.t the strictness of this doctrine has been very, much relaxod, at all events ,in" the case of animals driven along public thoroughfares. In Hudson v. Koberts, which was quoted by defendant's counsel, a bull being driven along the street gored a man with a red handkerchief round his neck, and the defendant having stated that it was kuowu that a bull would run at any-

thing red, it was held that this was evidence tliat the defendant knew his bull to bo a dangerous animal. It is obvious that this entirely does away with the necessity of any particular knowledge on the part of the owner of the disposition of the particular animal concerned, but admits a general knowledge of the dispositions of such animals to satisfy the doctrine of the scienter. It also shows that in cases whero animals are driven in public thoroughfares the Courts have leaned towards that view which makes the owners responsible, and have allowed the smallest evidence of the scienter to be given. In the present case the bullock which caused the accident was alone, and the person who had driven it, Mr Seaton, who was a witness in the case, said that a single bullock was more apt to be dangerous than one in company. Now, this is just the same kind of evidence as that referred to in Hudson v. Koberts, where it was said that a bull would run at anything red, and as Mr Seaton must be • regarded as defendant's agent in the matter, I presume his knowledge of this general fact is equivalent to the defendant's knowledge. Therefore I think the objection as to the scienter is sufficiently obviated by the evidence. The only question remaining is as to the real merits of the case.' Now, this bullock was being driven along by Mr Seaton, on foot, and when the beast had passed Messrs Stitt's, Mr Seaton no longer thought it necessary to follow it. The accident arose from the plaintiff trying to snatch away a child which was in or near the path of the bullock, which turned its head and gored her in passing. I think therefore that there was not sufficient care exercised in driving this bullock, by itself, through the streets, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, which, after taking into consideration the sum she has already received, I assess at £ls with costs. Mr Fisher intimated that an appeal would be probably raised upon the question of scienter. Butler v. Jacobsen.—Debt admitted. Judgment for amount claimed. Rafferty v. Walton Pell.—Claim for £2O. Mr Fisher applied for adjournment for 14 days. Defendant being in attendance at Eeefton Court. Granted, plaintiff being allowed 7s 6d expenses.

WESTPORT WARDEN'S COURT. Mo:sdat May 27 ■ (Before J. Giles, Esq., Warden.) ACTION FOII TRESPASS. Ambrose v. Muuson.—Mr Fisher for defendant. Plaintiff claimed to be owner, under business license, of section No. 92, Kennedy street, adjoining section 91, held by defendant, and deposed as to defendant having en the 17th instant knocked down portion of a fence, recently moved by him to the boundary 1 ne of section 92. Plaintiff had held his section for two years, and defendant held a building on the adjoining section, known as the Morning Star Hotel, and now sought to claim, under his business license, the intervening . ground between his house and plaintiff's. Evidence, was given for the defence, as to the ground in dispute having originally belonged to one constable Rouke, by whom it was sold to South, the former proprietor of the Morning Star, who required it as a right of way, to the back of his dwelling. The defendant having subsequently purchased the premises from Christenson, buying from him the house and 24 feet frontage, the house covering some 13 feet of frontage only on section 91, Christenson at the time of the sale pointing out the boundary fence standing against plaintiff's house, Plaintiff pleaded that the grouud formed a portion of section 92, which ho held under a business license, and that the d fendant could not, under one business license, hold portions of two sections, notwithstanding any presumed right obtained by prior purchase. Mr Fisher expressed his opinion that he could find precedent therein, and the Warden adjourned the case to refer to the Goldfields Acts and Amendments. On resuming, defendant's counsel was not prepared with proof upon the point at issue. Judgment was given for defendant with costs, on the grounds that although in the case of sections taken up on a rush or new ground, the law as to the issue of separate business licences for each particular section might be enforced, yet in a case where proof was given that laud had been bartered or exchanged, a rigid interpretation of the law was scarcely equitable.