THE GERMAN DEMAND FOR PONDICHERRY.

Westport Times, Volume V, Issue 815, 20 May 1871, Page 2

THE GERMAN DEMAND FOR PONDICHERRY.

(From the "Spectator.") There is reason, we fear, for the kind of instinctive wince with which Englishmen hear that Germany has included the cession of Pondicherry among the conditions of peace. Wha't in the world can Bismarck want with that little Indian enclave? Clearly, he, with his wide information, is not deceived by any dream of ships, colonies, and commerce to follow from an annexation like that—the acquisition of a port with an open roadstead, surrounded by British territory, and completely cut oif from India by an internal customs' line. No owner of Pondicherry could make it an entrepot except by defeating or conciliating the British Government, while, from its size, it can never be made a self-sup-porting colony, For all trading purposes Saigon would be much more valuable, and from thence German dominion might be extended eastward and northward, until, if she pleased, she might have an India of her own. Count Bismarck does not make mistakes from want of information, and if he takes Pondicherry he takes it with political rather than commercial objects—to obtain a foothold in India, rather than to acquire amere possession. There can be no doubt that if he can get rid of the Treaty of 1815 limiting the force of soldiers to be kept in Pondicherry, the place would give him exactly the foothold he requires would enable him ia the event of any European complications arising to menace England most seriously, and this in two different ways. The direct annoyance would be very great, for in the event of war ten thousand Germans cantoned in Pondicherry, would require the whole Southern Army to watch them, lest by a sudden raid into the interior and a partial British defeat they should encourage all Southern India to rise in insurrection. Any defeat would have that result, indeed has had it throughout our Indian history, and on any such occasion there would be half the Peninsula to reconquer. Moreover, in the event of any quarrel in Europe in which we did not win, there would be Indian territory for us to cede and Germany to acquire at discretion. Pondicherry, too, will be the Eastern depot for the German fleet, and for the first time in onr history we shall be compelled to keep a great Indian squadron within the Bay of Bengal. Considering how closely our own finances and those of India are bound up, this is not a pleasant prospect; but it is cheerful campared with another, the possible establishment of a claim to interfere in Indian politics. This is a claim a proud state like the Empire will very apt to urge, and this is one which every Indian prince will at once try to foster. We are not much afraid of any action on the part of the people. They are not heartily loyal to our rule, nor do we believe they will speedily become so; but they have never betrayed a disposition to exchange our sovereignty tor that of any other European power. The Hindoo believes, as the " Times "has remarked, that conquerors will come and go, but that his society, being divine, must endure for ever, and as a temporary discomfort prefers the rulers to whose presence he has become accustomed, who leave his daily life untouched, and who abstain in contempt or sympathy from interference with his social order. No other governing race save the Roman has ever dared to do this, and we do not believe that the German, with his instinct for order and organisation, would attempt to do it. He would remodel everything, and would excite a hatred to which the feeling now existing towards ourselves is affection, perhaps rouse ultimately that calm, patient, inflexible Hindoo resolve that this Rhall end or he will —the passion which leads him to " sit in dhnrna," and which the British Government, with all its faults, has never yet aroused. But the Princes of ludia

are essentially diplomatists. They have always used any instrument which came into their hands, foreign or native; and they will use this one subtly, cautiously, but with most dangerous effect. We shall not like to threaten war with the strongest and least accessible power in the world because Count Bernstorff has made representations on behalf of Ibrahim Khan, Nawab in the South, who thinks himself hardly treated in that matter of the frontier railway. Nor shall we like to interrupt good relations with Q-ermany, because the" said Ibrahim poses himself in Berlin in the attitude of a petitioner asking justice against London from another " Indian power," Every little incident of that kind will be a hint to the Viceroy that such and such a Prince must be watch, ed, that such and such an army of observation must be strengthened, till half our expenditure in Southern India will be regulated by orders from Berlin, It may be said that we were liable to this kind of annoyance from France but the assertion is only formally correct. France had in India done her worst, and played out her hand. She had fought us there, defeated us there had been defeated by us there, and had finally retired, confessing by formal treaty that she was out of the game. No treaty was ever better kept, It is a re. markable fact, that when men are talk, ing so much of the demerits of Frauce that for fifty years she has in India en. dured a very trying position without the faintest effort to improve it either by force, or by intrigue. "We have not, we believe, ever been obliged to make so much as a serious remonstrance, and haver never had the smallest difficulty in controlling French adventurers. The natives, who do not forget history as our people do, remember the great duel well and would be slow to respond to French advances ; but here is a new power in India, a power of which the English speak with bated breath, and that power will become at once the pivot of intrigue. Of course, if the Hohenzollerns so will it, there will be nothing of all this trouble; but it will rest with them to avoid it, and Pondicherry will be at the least a weapon which may be turned against us. There is, however, no remedy. If Germany asks for Pondicherry, France has no special motive for retaining it, and we could not enforce our restrictive treaties without a war, upon which it seems evident neither our rulers nor our Parliament are willing to enter. If the Germaua choose to break them, they must, until we have again a Chatham ; but it is sickening to hear the " Times" say that even in German hands we can always take Pondicherry when, ever we choose. With ten thousand men there and a man like Von Werder in command, the work would require 20,000 Europeans, half the disposable white army, and the South might all the while be covered with insurrections. Does the Times think the Mussulmans of Hydrabad and Mysore would sit while our hands were full, or that they would aid us to maintain the power which for a century has been their despair ? Or does it believe that the policy of 1760 could be repeated, and that London and Berlin would agree that while there was war in Asia there should be peace in Europe? We might as well threaten Hamburg as Pondicherry when once in German hands; the enterprise would be just as costly, just as dangerous, and even more disagreeable to Parliament and people. If we have determined to sit still, let us, at least, recognise that we are sitting still, aDd must accept the disagreeable as well as the pleasant consequences of that inertness.