RUSSIA'S MILITARY AND NAVAL STRENGTH.

Wairarapa Daily Times, Volume VII, Issue 1976, 28 April 1885, Page 2

RUSSIA'S MILITARY AND NAVAL STRENGTH.

The following facta and statistics, gathered from statements published some short time ago, have considerable interest at the present critical juncture of affairs: . THE RUSSIAN. ARMY,. Great difficulty is experienced in estimating the strength of the Russian Army. The vast numbers of the population, and the extensive area of the ;empire, render the military force of the country almost inexhaustible. In 1874 certain changes were promulgated by the Czar for tlio regulation and maintonanoe of tlio army, based upon the compulsion of every Russian subject to form part of the military system 'without power to furnish a substitute fpr his personal service. The nuii(ber'of soldiers it would be possible thus to raise would be no fewer than 4,000,000; but the expense of maintaining this number would, of gourse, be move than tlio country could bear. The following are, however, the principal conditions of t]ie Czar's schenie; —Personal military service Is compulsory on every Russian from the age of twenty'[this provision does not apply to the .Cossacks], and the number of men actually token as soldiers in each year—the "contingent," as it is called—may vary according to circumstances. The contingent for the particular year is divided into two unequal parte —25 per cent, of the recruits being taken for the field army, and 75 per cent, for the local troops, which are destined to form the reserves. The 25 per cent, taken for the field army have to give fifteen years of service, six of which are supposed to be passed with the colours, though in reality the men are on furlough during the fifth and sixth years. Up to; the end of the eighth year they belong to jtlje fjiit reserve, and for the next four years to the 'second reserve, which is intended to supoly battalions ready to gupply losses in the field, and thus feed tlie active army. The remaining three years of service qre to be passed in any portion of the seryicej ljabje tu be used lis gircijingfengeiT iiiny direct', "The First reseive' fills up tlio regiments when mobilisation is ordered; the Second Reserve supplies looses in the field or hospital; tlj'e remainder may either be used like the second reserve, or form new divisions if required. But the 75 per cent, do not escape scot free. They also sorye fpr fifteen years, but pnly in their districts, When the fifteen years of service are past all the men of the contingent fall for the next five years into the Rejchsiye!)]:, which al§g Includes all R)lf»!anB not forming part pf the annual contingents. These also owe service to the Czar from the twentieth to the fortieth year qf jige, oi]ly they will not be galled upon to take the field unless the crisis requires their service, The Reielißwehr qaiiijut be galled out at all in time of peace, If the new organisation were m full working order, which it cannot bo for some years to come, and if all expectations are verified by facts, the Russian army would stand about as follows, including Cossacks. Field Army, ... •... 755,000 men Field Reserve 110,000 „ Second and last reserve ...• 900,000 „ Cossacks 180,000 „ •

'l'ot-ii! „. • 1,045,000 „ The Reiehswehr is expected .to'.reach the figuro of about 1,500,000 men (250,000 being old soldiers), which would bring the llussiuu military forces to a; total of nearly 3,500,000 armed jion,oniearly 2,000,000 more than was available for war according to the old organisation/ 'At ; present the {ipjharn hardly reach fchis enormbuji ' strength of (|h papor, jn 1874,1,679,268 l)]en, p}}t pf ffjjppi t]jp gavajry fof'mod uo less than 1,317 sqiiailrons, and thp artillery possessed 2,728 guns. Of these, about 1,150,000 were in Europo, more than 200,000 in the Caucasus, nearly 125,000 in Asia, The general services of the army accounted for the rest. Omitting the sedentary troops from the calculation, the European army were supposed to ]iayp pf fie](} ti'fiip aji'l reiitpeg about 755,000 and 250,0110 respectively; in the Caucasus there were about 1.70,000 field troops and 23,000 reserves. These figures are, however, (is we have said, merely upon paper, and it is estimated by good authorities that, as tar as the present crisis ia concerned, we should probably exaggerate Russia's military power if we were, to take the estimate of the old organization as our guide, and give her 755,000 field troops, with reserve of 200,000, as the army in Europe was' supposed to stand in 1874. Of all tho European States, Russia is the best supplied with horses. No less than 16,000,000 of one sort or another exist within the dominions of the Czar, and exportation being iPgi]}!;. fheif pj-jce jB low, averaging about JJ2O/ Tl|ey ip.'fqr the most part, small and rough in appearance, but oxtremely hardy, and capable of picking up a Bubsistenco where most troopers would starve. Russia'; .ia also well provided with artillery of a modern type, breechloaders of a superior system to that of the Germans in the late .war, and cicely resembling, the German model. The I 'infantry aro 'aWijej}' ; breeoh loaders,' Uje' last an(j best the Berdaii rifle. The' samp ; fiiaiy of the engineer's, bridpe eqijipage'and train', and the new orgiinjzatiori provides for a supply' qf tljese. ' She Ija? 'also fer some, time been batpons, to wljiic]), (besides tjieir own officers): will be attached-both offioora and men from; tho engineers and the rest of the l army. Telegraph corps have been established, »pach of which will have 300 men in time of war.