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THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS

ON THAT FATAL DAY DESCRIPTION OF LONDON'S REACTIONS All day long on the fatal day they telephoned between here and Prague. Reports came in that Prague had agreed, then that negotiations had broken down. Then at last it came in that Prague had agreed after extreme pressure from Britain and France and that Chamberlain would fly again to Hitler with the agreement that he had said at the first meeting would be satisfactory. Immense relief was felt in London at the decision, even though some grumbled at the fact that in forcing Prague to agree to give up a lot of territory, we had been forced to say we would join the other big powers in guaranteeing the new Czechs frontiers—but of course it was the only thing we could do after tearing away a huge piece of her country and leaving her defenceless. The Second Meeting. Chamberlain left on September 22 for his second meeting with Hitler, taking with him the agreements to the Sudetens’ demands and the night before, Eden macle a real fighting speech on the lines of “we must stand firm,” “greed of the nations” etc., etc. —just as Chamberlain was trying to spread conciliation. By morning the German newspapers were raving, huge red headlines ran across the Berlin dailies. And news began to come in that Hitler would demand more, that the German attitude had changed etc. We all began to be worried again—waiting, waiting for news. It began to come in slowly— Chamberlain had arrived—they had met —2-i hours —Chamberlain comes out smiling. Then an appeal came out over Europe—Chamberlain asking by radio that all nationalities in the disputed areas should observe special care so as not to provide “incidents” or disturbances. Prague—by radio—backing him up. Then morning—it is said that Hitler would not sign that “keep order” plan yesterday. “Oh well, Chamberlain is there, they are going to talk again this morning—they will be starting about now,” then a peculiar report—“Cham berlain sends Note to Hitler.” Then a long silence—then we realise that there haven’t been any morning talks —something has happened. Then suddenly “Premier returning. All British advisers leaving Godesberg.” Everyone thought it was all over, preparations with gas masks and A.R.P. were rushed ahead. Stocks dropped. Then out of the plane steps old “indefatigable”—actually smiling—“you .can’t say its a complete breakdown.” The explanation of what had happened was that in that 2i hours meeting the first night at Godesberg, Hitler told Chamberlain that after all he was not going to agree to the proposals he had said he would do—the ones Chamberlain had got Prague to agree to. Hitler then told him a lot of further things he wanted —but did not give a time limit. Chamberlain was astounded, but decided to go over that night and during that time he decided to send a note to Hitler before talking to him further —a letter giving in plain terms his comments on a number of the new proposals. So in the morning, instead of going over as arranged, he sent this Note. A reply from Hitler some hours later contained explanations—but no modification, so Chamberlain then sent another Note asking for the proposals in full in writing, and intimating that he intended returning to England. Then at 10.30 that night Chamberlain again saw Hitler—and was handed the proposals in writing and containing a time limit—October 1. That of course, put the finishing touch. Word came through that Czecho was mobilising, and that Britain and France could no longer advise her not to do so. You will read the account of the last talk at Godesberg in Chamberlain’s speech to the House. Anyway on Monday, September 26, we were faced with these facts—Chamberlain had reported Hitler’s demands to Prague but without any pressure from England or France—Prague had rejected them as hopeless—Hitler would march on Saturday—France would defend Czechs as soon as attacked—and Hitler would speak that night at 8 o’clock. What a beginning to unforgettable crisis week.

Preparations, Preparations. All day long preparations, preparations. People were white with strain as evening drew near—would Hitler confirm his determination to march on. or would he take the one outlet still open to him—say that out of his great patience and love of peace he would agree to postpone his action. It seemed just possible, because he could still have made a “historical” speech that way. By night it was known that Chamberlain had sent off Sir Horace Wilson by air with a personal letter to Hitler, to be delivered before the speech, and that Roosevelt had appealed to both Benes and Hitler, but that the appeal had been suppressed in the German Press. Eight o’clock at night—but the 8.8. C. have stated that no translation of the speech will be given till it is all oyer —in case of mistranslations in hurried scraps. The Germans upstairs in our house have tuned in direct to Berlin, however —and the passionately, dramatic voice has been going on for a

long time—Frau Hoffman, white and crying calls out that it is all over and that it is war. Weep Calm and Dig. Then the 8.8. C. announcer—they have the translation. Of course, it is hopeless. “Give us our complete demands or we will take Sudetenland — on Saturday, October 1.” All that night they dug trenches in London. In the morning Chamberlain announced that he would make still further efforts to get Hitler to agree to peaceful settlement. It was a day of gas-masks, trenches and guns. I cannot convey to you the atmosphere of those last few days. There was, of course, no trade—the streets were white with newspapers, some discarded as the later editions came out. some still clutched in the hands of white-faced men and women. Notices went up saying that eight tube stations would be closed that night “for urgent structural work.” The King’s message came out “Be ofgood cheer; keep cool heads and brave hearts.” The Premier would broadcast that night to the Empire. Parliament would meet to-morrow. Evening News lunch edition carried the memorable poster—“ Keep Calm—and Dig.” (To be Concluded.)

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WC19390206.2.116

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 83, Issue 30, 6 February 1939, Page 9

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,023

THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 83, Issue 30, 6 February 1939, Page 9

THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 83, Issue 30, 6 February 1939, Page 9

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