Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943. RISKS IN THE AEGEAN.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 26 November 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943. RISKS IN THE AEGEAN.

JN the statement in the House of Commons in which lie defended the attempt’ made to occupy and hold some of the principal islands of the Dodecanese group, in the Aegean Sea, the British Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Attlee, perhaps was more convincing in contending that justifiable risks were taken than in what he had to say about the diversionary value of this rather ill-starred operation as it was carried out. It is true that in the contest for the islands the British losses of men and of aircraft appear to have been appreciably lower than those of the Germans. Mr Attlee laid less emphasis on that fact, however, than on the extent to which the attack on the Dodecanese islands helped the Allied attack on Italy by causing the Germans to disperse their forces.

The help thus given no doubt was valuable, but it may be a question whether a similar result might not have been obtained without sacrificing a large proportion of the British troops who were assigned the forlorn hope task of attempting to hold Kos and Leros without effective fighter cover. Considerable German air and land forces probably might have been detained in or attracted to the Aegean area by feinting attacks and demonstrations,' without leaving British troops to garrison islands they could not hope to defend for afiy length of time. A clear indication that the immediate opportunities opened in the Aegean were limited must have been given when it was learned that the 40,000 Italian troops on Rhodes, the largest and most important of the Dodecanese islands, were not prepared to deal with the 9,000 Germans associated with them in garrisoning that island. The necessity of turning away from Rhodes meant that effective air cover could not be given to troops landed on other islands in the group. On the other hand, Britain and the Allied command in the Mediterranean no doubt would have been blamed for lack of enterprise, as Mr Attlee, observed, had they made no attempt to exploit the possibilities that were supposed to have arisen in the Aegean area at the time of the Italian surrender. The occupation of Kos, Loros .and Samos in September was hailed by some American and other commentators as showing that the Middle East Command was ready and eager to take advantage of all openings to harass the enemy in the Southern Balkans.

It was then hoped that the occupation of the islands might have an important bearing on an invasion of the Balkans in which the Allies would aim at‘linking up with the Russian southern flank.. . These hopes have collapsed for the time being, but it does not by any means follow of necessity that the last word has been said on the subject. Before very long, for ex-, ample, the Germans may find themselves in danger of being outflanked in the Aegean islands and in the Southern Balkans by an Allied invasion thrust across the Adriatic. The enemy for the time being has gained the upper hand in the Aegean, but another bombing of Sofia is only one of a number of indications that his total position in South-Eastern Europe is very far from being as secure as lie would desire.